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Affective Criticism: Theories of Emotion and Synaesthesis 
in the Experience of Literature. 
by Edward Jayne 
The "Affective Fallacy" labeled by Wimsatt and Beardsley 
and denigrated by an entire generation of critics must be 
restored'to legitimacy-as probably the most fundamental prin-
ciple of literature. The effect of a text takes prec~dence 
over the objectivity of its "intra-referential":content since 
this content is meaningful only to the exterit that it produces 
this effect. The concerted effort of formalists to deny or 
somehow bypass this self-evident axiom has been unique in the 
history of criticism and may be traced to a variety of causes, 
not the least of which has been a conservative isolation of 
literature from its social context. But the exclusion of 
politics from criticism has been itself a political act, pro-
~ecting literary "value" by refining it almost beyond human 
experience. 
The outlook of I. A. Richards has been of particular 
interest because he sought to justify this escapism within 
affectiv.e theory. First employing an "impulse" theory of 
psychology-and then a "projective" theory derived from ColeridgE 
he defined literary• .~·esponse as synaesthesis, the refined 
balance of emotions which is self-sufficient and exclusive 
of overt behavior. "Intra-referential" content was thus 
removed one degre·e :from the· text to·· our II incipient response," 
a bundle of mutually energized impulses i-nhibi ting both 
praxis and the stock response. However, Richards also 
i 
investigated the "sign situation," the total matrix of 
I 
experience signified by language, and he proposed that 
literary response involves the "choice of the whole per-
sonality." Both these concepts may be invoked to restore 
praxis, ethics, and even propaganda to the domain of literary 
response. Unfortunately, Richards has shifted to a more 
clearly formalist perspective in his later criticism. He 
has truncated the paradigm of information theory to exclude 
"speaker" and "hearer" except a.s the abstractions "source" 
and "destination," bringing him right back. again, really, 
to the "incipient response," though now mathematically 
formulated. 
It is my contention that 11 spea,ker 11 and "hearer" are 
both vitally important to the "act" of literature, and that 
their relationship must be established within a dynamic 
theory of affective criticism. Richards 1 "choice of the 
whole personality" is a useful first principle, but properly 
interpreted it involves unconscious displacement, archetypal 
embodiment, social responsibility, and other human dimensions 
requiring at least.ancillary concern with "reductionist" 
critical approac.hes (Psychoanalytic, Marxist, etc.) I ad-
ditionally propose t:hat the paradigm of information theory 
may be stratif ic.ationally rearrange'd to establish a hierarchy 
from (1) 11 9bjective immediacy" to (2) .our pre-verbal organ-
ization of experience·, ( 3) i•ts symbolization in language, 
and (4) its further iefinement in the literary act. All' 
.. 
~hese levels must be activated for literature to be meaningful, 
contrary to the formalist hypothesis bestowing "objective 
immediacy" upon the text, bypassing our fullest resources 
of experience, often even of language. 
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,Chapter One: 
A Polemic Introduction 
"Let us restrict our. inquiry to the text itself," the 
questioning student of literature has too often been ad-
monished. His professor has then d~screetly shifted the 
topic of discussi~n back to the business of close textual 
explication, and he himself has sunk ashamed with the 
recognition that his contribution once again transgressed 
the discipline of criticism. This has been our common mis-
fortune in English classes for the last twenty-five years; 
and though the search has begun for alternatives, rigid 
tenets of textual explication survive in many conservative 
departments, where they have even been regarded a sacred 
professional responsibility. The professor must expertly 
steer his class discussion from one end of a text to the 
other, .a sequen_ce usually coincidental with the fifty 
1 
minute hour, and all must end on the tonic' with a four or 
five minute coda of broad thematic appeal. The same sequence 
must occur, more or less, in the articles he publishes, and 
his professional strle must epitomize his method, an unsett:l.ed 
mixture of timidity and authoritarianism, irony and scientific 
detachment. He ~eems a twentieth century counterpart to 
Trollope's vicar seeking preferment, but his ambition is now 
tenure, with academia, not art (as Ma~raux claimed) having 
replaced religion. Ex~gesis has shifted from the Bible to 
approved secular texts of ·respected modern poets and critics •. 
When undisciplined:students have been diverted from this 
enlightenment, then fallacies and heresies have been 
invoked as if they were sacred·commandments .. 
These fallacies and heresies compose a formidable list 
of prohibitions. Poe 0 s "didactic heresy" (the flaw of the 
too-obvious message) and Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy" (the 
flaw of the excessive use of personificat.ion) nre relatively . 
. simple holdovers from the ninete~mth century. To these 
have been a.dded an impressive list of new flaws to be 
avoided. The "paraphrastic heresy" proposed by A.C. Bradley 
is the principle that good poetry may not be adequately 
paraphrased, and (its corollary) that which can be is not 
good poetry.l This fallacy was substantially adapted by 
Clea.nth Brooks as the "heresy of paraphrase" in ~!1~ yJe+J. 
W:r.·ought yrn, 2 while the "formalist heresy" also p:r:opC~ll!:-~d by 
Bradley, signifying the mistaken emphasis upon art for its 
own sake, has been conveniently neglected~ I.A. Richards 
proposed a number of fallacies in The Meaning o~ ~1e!l~n9, 
including the "Ultraquistic subterfuge," using the same 
word but with different meanings, the "Phonetic subterfuge," 
the confusion of pattern in meaning wit.h that in sound, the 
"Hypostatic subterfuge," the concret.ization of such abstract-
ions as virtue, peace, love, and democracy as if they actually 
exist, and "psittacism," the response to an idea invariably 
in a fixed sequence or context. He also labeled words 
commonly misusEc1d as "mendicants, 11 those not fully understood, 
and "nomads," those with a vague meaning that may fit any 
context. 3 Richards later proposed the "fallacy of vulgar 
packaging," the simplistic affective notion that the experience 
of the poet is delivered in toto via poetry into the experience 
·.of his readers.4 Allen Tate proposed the "fallacy of commun-
ication," t~e arousal of an affective state resulting from 
an "i.rresponsible 11 denotation of words, as well as the 
"fallacy of mere denotation," the neglect of connotations in 
poetry. 5 Finally, Yvor Winters proposed among many problems 
of modern poetry the "fallacy of imitative form," the mis-
taken belief that the form of poetry must (or even can) reflect 
the pattern of events it describes.6 With this many fallacies 
in the offing (and more), narrow has been the way for both 
poets and critics to good poetry. 
But by far the two most important prohibitions for 
New Criticism have been the Intentional and Affective 
· Fallacies proposed by Wimsatt and Beardsley.? If we heed 
the Intentional Fallacy, we must isolate the interpreted 
poem from its'original act of creation. The poet has failed 
if our attention is diverted from the text itself to extraneous 
biographical information about his life and experience. His 
potim should be self-sufficient with independent formal validity 
after it has been perfected and launched into the public 
realm. In this very limited sense it is a public act because 
it ·is an artefact of language, the universal currency of 
society. The biographical element may be acceptably brought 
under control in the role of the dramatic speaker, the poet's 
persona, or in his obtrusive (but controlled) identity as 
a narrator. It may be even further purified in the cultivation 
of his and his readers• sensitivity to tone; but the "gross 
body of life," which Wimsatt reluctantly admits lies behind 
every poem, can and should be ignored, so claim the convent-
ional proponents of textual explication~ 
Likewise, the Affective ~•al lacy is thE! emphasis upon 
one's response to poetry rather than the poem itself inde-
pendent of this response. This fallacy _may involve simply 
the shivers that Emily Dickinson claimed to feel upon reading 
good poetry or the complex integration of experience defined 
by I.A. Richards. The proper response must be our apprec-
iative recognition of formal self-sufficiency, not the spurious 
and usually excessive emotions we might mistakenly confuse 
with this recognition. Aesthetic pleasure is a matter of 
interpretation, or to invoke Ransom's position, of cognition, 
our. intellectual grasp of a poem's meaning with our pleasure 
in the grati~ication of having understood it. Avoiding 
both fallacies, the basic concern of the critic should be 
neither the poet nor his readers, but the technique of 
poetry in its relationship with content as experience wrought 
in language. Poetry is indeed a human act--this Wimsatt 
concedes--but it is an act which should be removed from, 
(l) those who perform it (poets), and (2) those upon whom it 
is performed (critics and readers). We are as~ed to shake 
off our personalities to attune our minds more perfectly to 
the New Critical job of explication. 
Needless to say, critics such as Tate, Wimsatt and 
Cleanth Brooks, usually identified as New Critical apologists, 
have avoided trapping themselves in this dogma. They have 
been f~r too flexible to have advocated such a formal 
reductionism. Instead they have acknowledged the human 
factor in literature, but with an emphasis as much as 
possible upon the objective text and its dispassionate 
explication. Allen Tate's theory of "tension" in which 
"extension" complements 11 intension" to give poetry its ex-
ternal ref~rence at least provides an aesthetic category 
for experience, however deemphasized. 8 Robert Stallman has 
claimed that Tate's theory "squares" with Middleton Murry's 
pronouncement: "Art is autonomous, and to be pursued for 
its own sake, precisely because it comprehends the wh9le 
of human life; be.cause it has reference to a more perfect 
human morality than any other activity of man. 119 Formalism 
is thus transcended (for Murry, if not Tate) with the 
5 
paradox that art is autonomous because of its perfection in 
not being autonomous, an argument with perhaps more aesthetic 
appeal than consistency. 
Cleanth Brooks would seem to have more clearly committed 
himself to a formalist position, especially in his 1951 
article, "The Formalist Critic," in which he proclaimed a 
~anifesto of three principles for criticism: (1) that in a 
successful work, form and content cannot be se~arated, (2) 
that form is meaning, and (3) that literature is ultimately 
metaphorical and symbolic.10 All of these principles combined 
would seem to reduce literary experience to form, with rhetoric, 
'.figuration exclusiveiy. representing the.dynamics of consciousnei 
6 
Bu·t he conceded in a later article that values {which do have 
his approval in literature) are "rooted in" or at least 
"-accompanied by, the expression of emotion," though of course 
he preferred "to stress the aspect of value." He also ad"· 
mitted thut there is a grain of trut.h in Winter's argument 
that every poem makes a moral judgment, though asserting 
that. there seems t.o be "no need of collapsing the ethical 
and aesthetic realms .. 11 11 Ethics and aesthetics!'!!~ be 
•"collapsed," Brooks reluctantly acknowledged, but he chose 
not to do so himself. Having ma.de ther1e concessions r he can 
hardly be pinned down to a rigid formalism despite his more 
doctrinaire pronouncements earlier. 
W.K. Wimsatt made the same accommodation with human 
experience using an ingenious rnetaphysical argument: 11 Poetry 
is a complex kind of verbal construction in which the dimen-
sion of coherence is by various techniques of implication 
greatly enhanced and thus generates an extra dimension of 
correspondence to reality, the symbolic or analogical. 1112 
In other words, formal coherence in literature refers to 
experience because it correctly duplicates the coherence we 
find in life, a fairly convincing explanation, though some-
what reminiscent of that quoted above by Middleton Murry. 
V.• In Literary Criticism: A ~t Historx_, by both Brooks and 
Wimsatt, the t.wo seem to have mellowed even further. They 
fpropose, "One of the main lessons of critical history would 
to be that the stress of literary theory must 
all on the exp~:E_iencc~ (subjective and emotive) rather than 
I 
on the what, the object of value so far as that is outside 
any experiencing subject. 11 Thi.s is a remarkable concession 
to the affective fallacy invented and labeled by Wimsatt 
himself. Their conversion is blandly explained with the 
argument: "Poetry. is a kind of reality refracted through 
subjective responses. This refraction itself is an area of 
reality. 11 13 In other words, the reality_ of poetry is its 
"refraction," an interpretation of the reality that constitutes 
our experience. This acknowledgement brings Brooks and 
Wbnsatt a considerable distance from their earlier formalist 
purity, if indeed their theories were ever "purely" formulated. 
The problem is with their zealous fol.lowers, the converts 
and epigones who have simplified their ambivalences and 
ingenious concessi.ons to rigid guidelines that entirely 
abolish~whatever transgresses the Intentional and Affective 
Fallacies. 'l~hese critics (and their following among class-
room practitioners) have distilled content to become "value" 
complementing form, and reduced doctrine, affirm~tion, and 
all shades of experience to manageable objectifications such 
as irony, ambiguity, tension, texture, and internal consist~· 
ency. They have atomized, reified, and rarified experience 
so it might lend itself more clearly to formal explication. 
~ave also involuted reference in literature {what the 
shares with his readers on an equalitarian basis) to 
become 11 intra-referential," the formal interaction of com-
onents exclusively referring to each other, a context the 
·et may autocratically dictate upon his .readers. Eliseo 
i". 
Vivas has approvingly described this authoritarian "intra-· 
referential" function in strictly mathematical language as 
"a discreet and closed system of mutually interrelated terms. 11 1· 
Murray Krieger has likewiHe demanded an 11 autonomy of poetic 
language, 11 to pre·vent a poem from functioning referentially: 
"To allow the poem to function referentially is to break the 
context. It is to allow the poem to po~nt outside itself 
and thus to lead me into the world of what meaning had been 
for me before I came to the poem; which is to say that I 
would be released from the control of the poetic context 
and, unhappy_parolee, I would be returned to the uninspiring 
familiarities of the workaday world~ •• 1115 The poem must 
/ 
be interpreted as a unique, non-referential context which 
"controls II us from above, an artistic i.mposi t.i.on saf c1 from 
ordinary "workaday" experience. Its unavoidable re:f.:erenti.,;il 
content, the.chaff of poetry, must be disregarded as much as 
possible. 
Joseph Frank has proposed another ingenious argument to 
justify this emphasis upon literary context. He claimed that 
the language of poetry is 11 reflexive 11 in its "meaning relation-
ships" so we must suspend the processes of individual refer-
;ences in their temporal sequence that they might be grasped 
in a simultaneous spatial context. •rhis spatiidization 
emphasizes the II intra-referential II function of language te.> 
he deemphasis (though not exclusion) of its ordinary 
ferences. 1116 Roman Jakobson uses virtually the same 
gwne'nt in his proposal of two axes, of contiguity (sequential 
9 
and similarity (referential), with poetry imposing one on the 
other, an argument we shall take up in more detail in Chapter 
Six. Though these arguments might be valid as a matter of 
degree, the dimension of space obviously cannot enti.rely 
replace that of time, especially in poetry, as Lessing con-
vincingly demonstrated two hundred years ago. In the terms 
proposed by Joseph Frank, though, this ~as been exactly 
the purpose of formalists such as Vivas and Krieger, who 
have wanted to replace process with "context," a substitute 
excluding the human experience commonly shax~ed by all. 
For dedicated New Critics, literature thus becomes . . 
objective in the sense that it itself is the proper object 
of our interpretation, rather than mediating an interpretation 
of human e:itperience for us. This bias not only tells us how 
to submit ourselves to the authority of a text, but also 
selects for us the texts to which we most profitably might 
pay this allegiance. Poetry has been preferred to fiction 
because of its tighter formal coherence, while poets and 
novelists with a formal bias have been preferred to those 
who emphasized a realistic (or surrealistic) depiction of 
life. Donne and Keats have been preferred to Spenser and 
Shelley, Austen and James to Dickens and Dreiser. Whatever 
texts depended upon exterior contexts for their interpretation, 
~hether biography, psychology, history, or politics, have 
ieen rejected for their "ulterior purpose," a "separable 
ntent" which might be an invitation to non-literary "reduct-
nism'," for example psychoanalysis and Marxism. Any critical 
epistemology has accordingly been rejected (or, more likely, 
has languished unexamined) which might demonstrate that all 
content of literature .is 11 separable," first displaced {with 
modifications) f::com .;;,he1;.;on'th«t of the poet's ideas, valuc~s, 
and experience to the poem itself, al'l.d then (again with mod-
ifications) to a relatively new context in the reader, who . 
must actively recreate the poem from the fund of his own 
.!.U 
experiencep Any Cfitical epistemology has also been ignored 
that m.ight show all experience of J.i terature to be necessarily 
reductionist, imposing the reader's re-creation upon the 
poet's creativity to arrive at a matrix of insight, an 
intersection of experience involving a necessarily unique 
response.1 8 Instead, the unexamined common assumption has 
been that a text constitutes an immutable objective truth 
accessible to textual explication and approaching absolute 
identity in its competent interpretation. Unique and idio-
syncratic interpretations have been considered deviations 
from this ideal, usually vulgar excursions into irrelevant 
By about 1950 this New Critical objective to reduce 
liteJ:·ature to questions of formal coherence ceased being 
.xclusively the preoccupation of independent critics and 
and then, inevitably, institutionalized.~ 
was accomplished, as Cleanth Brooks proposed 
his l<'orewo:r:d to Stallman's anthology, by books such as 
Stanley Edgar.Hyman (1948), The Im;eoftctr.!..££ 
by Eric Bentley (1948), and Stallman•s 
11 
anthology itself, Critiques and Essays in criticism {1949) .19 · 
The Well Wrough"t Urn, published by Brooks in 1947 must be 
added to this list as well as his immensely influential text 
written earlier in collaboration with Robert Penn Warren, 
I 
Uriderstanding Poetry (1938), and the college anthology, 
Criticism: The Foundations of Modern Literary Judgment, 
edited by Scharer, Miles, and McKenzie, published in 1948. 
These histories and anthologies brought a variety of crit-
ical perspectives, earlier considered random and occasional, 
into a coherent aesthetic outlook. Moreover, they made 
this outlook available ·to every college sophomore in the 
country. Formalism (justified as classicism) had been 
first proposed by T.E. Hulme, P,ound, and Eliot as an elitest 
aesthetics, but' now it became democratized., taught in every 
college English course. 
A new objective emerged beyond the wildest ambitions of 
Ransom, Tate, and Brooks (or even of Hyman and Stallman)~ to 
make criticism a science. If a foundation for criticism 
could be established in objective, verifiable principles of 
textual explication, the argument ran, then criticism could 
become a genuine discipline instead of an amateurish pastime.' 
The text wou_ld be trea_ted as an empirical body of facts, and 
criticism an assortment of hypotheses tested by_ these facts. 
of criticism would become scientific and, who knows, 
as infl~ential as other sciences have been upon 
Most cr.i tics and scholars of this persuasion 
Uld hav~ avoided so blatant a suggestion of positivism, 
whose scepticism and mathematical rigour generally offended 
them, but, more than they would have.admitted, they shared 
. its concern with precision 6 testable validity, objectification 
of data, close observation, and standardization of language. 
In effect they wanted to establish a "discipline" in the realm 
of human experience free from subjective bias. Richards 
. 
had proposed these objectives throughout his career, even 
as late as 1935, when he said in Coleridge on Imagination, ----·- - ------
" •• etha.t the theory of literary analysis is at an extremely 
interesting point in its development, on the point of making, 
through experime11t, those contacts with actuality that would 
transform it into a science, and a science from which very 
important practical utilities may be expected to result. 11 20 
He claimed in.the same context that good theories at least 
protect us from worse. 'I'hough rejecting the II scientism 11 of 
Richards, Murray Krieger shared his views upon the scientific 
purpose of criticism: 
••• the dedicated literary man is cursed with a rather 
curious and, he may like to think, old-fashioned empiricism. 
It is one which is dull and dogged~ It requires that 
theoretical statements about poetics, if he is to appreciate: 
them as relevant to his interests, must have immediate 
reference to the facts of his experience with poetry. It 
may be expressive of an unscientific bias in him that he 
feels constitutionally obliged to ignore more general 
investigations into such realms as those of psychology 
and semantic analysis unless, as they rarely are, they 
are centered about what he feels to be the peculiar 
powers of poetry in his constant experiencing of it. This 
fact of his poetic experience is for him the inescapable 
starting point of all theorizing; he clings to it as 
surely and as relentlessly as does the scientist to his 
laboratory-controlled facts~21 
Here Krieger himself seems to have fallen victim to the 
affective fallacy, but he paid little more than lip service 
to his axiom of ernperience. He was trying to establish the 
experience of poetry as·an empirical basis for the objective 
and systematic study of its form. 
Perhaps the most remarkable manifesto for scientific 
objectivity was the "Polemical Introductionu to ~.~~ 9f 
Criticism, by Northrop Frye, first published as an art:i.cle 
in 1949. 22 Frye proposed making criticism into what amounts 
to a hurnanistic positivism, if this does not seem a con.t:ra-
diction of terms. To reaffirm the necessity of eliminating 
the roles of the poet and his readers, Frye extended the 
theory of fallacies by attacking the conception of l:i.t:E~ratu:re 
as conununication rather than artefact. He also assigned a 
new fallacy, of "determinism," to all supposedly "rhetorical" 
'efforts to find a causal relationship between criticism and 
odes of inquiry proper to other fields and wi~hout direct 
earing upon textual interpretation~ He emphatically 
reductionist approaches which are internally con-
synthetic, and based upon a model of some kind, 
r example the Freudian and Marxist approaches, since they 
were to be regarded as "extra-lite:r:ary schematism." He 
similarly discouraged value judgments and questions of 
taste that could not be objectively verified. None of these 
could be fitt.ed in a systematic theory with the authority 
of science and structu:n:l and permanence of what might seem 
a modern counterpart to scholastic philosophy. 
What Frye advocated was establishing a discipline 
devoted to literary interpretation alone withil). a uniquely 
critical taxonomy. 'l'oward this end he proposed the search 
for a central hypothesis in criticism, one of "total co-
herence,11 presumably in both poetry and its criticism. He 
advocated bringing as much of the currently disorganized 
body of criticism as possible into the scope and symmetry 
of this cohe:r.·ence, but recommended el.i.rni.nc1ting that which 
would not fit except in external taxonomies such as those 
mentioned above. In other words, he proposed establishing 
a consistent frame of reference for literary criticism with 
the definable limits of science. To do so, he rejected 
the intentional and affective fallacies, eliminated the 
.. dynamic~s of communication from literature, and banished 
\intellectual inquiry of other fields from the proper domain 
A science he might have had, but unnecessarily 
few of its advantages and most of .its disad-
He fortunately did not practice what he preached 
his archetypal criticism. 
But what Richards and Frye iconoclastically proposed 
an unthinking orthodoxy by the early sixties. The 
thematic explication of poetry and fiction according to 
New critical guidelines became commonplace in English 
journals; special bibliog~aphies such as Kuntz's Poetry 
E:>tpl.ica:Lirm and i,cl.l :.i:1.nd Kfrigb:,;' s The English Novel were ... ,.,..,.,~------·~-- --- -...~ ---
compiled to catalogue much of this criticismo One part:i.c-
ular journal, Th§: !E.~plicator, was devoted exclusively to 
this approach, mostly with exegetical s~ippets supplementing 
previous explications. Some scholars extended the tenets of 
formal criticism to stylistics, while others gingerly applied 
themselves to a saniti2:ed historical approach to sources 
and an~.logues o Their assumptions were codi.f ied in T. S. 
Eli.ot 1 s early essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," 
and brought to the brink of parody by "f:?eR. Leavis in forcing 
the artist to strive toward the extinction of his perscm-
ality in order to gain admittance to literary tradition. Any 
significant contribution to literature was considered a 
product of its tra~ition rather than an expression of private 
experience or one's sense of identity and relationship with 
those around him. The anti-historical bias of this supposedly 
hist6rical approach has been correctly attacked by Edmund 
Wilson because it extracted literature from the real history 
of soci.ety--histox:y ma~..9-ue' was proposed to abolish real 
from literature.23 
It was fu:i:.·ther a common New Critical belief that authors 
primarily influenced by other authors and not their 
.. sonal experience t env.ironment., or intellectual milieu. 
enabled the literary historian to connect texts otherwise 
free from history on the basis of stylistic and thematic 
congruence, with some attention paid to chronology in order 
to distinguish sources f:cpm analogues. For example, he 
could trace Vaughan's 11 The Water-Fall" through Herbert to 
the prototype of metaphysical poetry in Donne without con-
cerning himself with the social turmoil in the Commonwealth 
or Vaughan's enormous sense of isolatio~ resulting from 
.Lb 
this turmoil. In the rare circumstance that history had to 
be assigned- a little more "body" beyond the sum of its texts, 
he could invoke the "Spirit of the Age," distilled from the 
"History of Ideas" approach earlier proposed by Lovejoy, 
Tillyard, and others, though he usually watered down this 
approach to explain a text tautologically as the consequence 
of its own themes.24 Historical importance was also accorded 
those authors and poets whose works easily lend themselves 
to thematic historical analysis, while those whose works 
eluded explication were deemphasized and often banished to 
-Obscurity. A "vital" poetic tradition often skipped from 
.. Shakespeare to Donne and Pope and then to Keats and Eliot, 
'. while the novel was shown to really begin with Jane Austen, 
'Sink to George Eliot,. and rise again to Henry James, James 
oyce, and D .. H. Lawrence. Meanwhile, Spenser, Milton, Shelley, 
:ennyson, Richardson, Scott, Dickens, and myri.ad others: 
discarded from seriou~ consideration as 
or typically formless British writers out-
e the "essential II tr:adi tion ~ Efforts to revive them 
thei:r.:· 11 irony" in formlessness or their hidden 
17 
form to be divulged with a more thorough explication. Textual 
criticism revived a few figures from history but downgraded 
most; what was left, a radically attenuated history of 
English literature, was universally taught in American 
colleges to illustrate this critical approach, and of course . 
the approach was employed to explore this history. The 
circle narrowed, and literary criticism found itself begging 
4 
the question. 
But the question needing most to be answered is how 
this particular orthodoxy ever got started, how it flour-
ished despite our national disapprqval of orthodoxies'. 
Religion was slain, it seems, and like dragon's teeth exegesis 
came up from the soil. Matthew Arnold had wanted poetry to 
I 
replace religion--instead we got its stepbrother, formalist 
criticism. How did it happen? There are several possible 
explanations, a coupl.e of· which may be proposed ·here. We 
I 
can first of all appreciate how p~ofessionalism in the field 
of English might have jealously guarded i~s autonomy as a 
"science" and thus sc:>ught to dissociate itself from lines 
,/ ' 
of inquiry more adequately treated by the advanced technical 
research in other fieicii:;, for example psychology, sociology, 
and even aesthetics. Every field understandably 
.own Lebensraum, and critical scholarsnip, with 
its share of insecurity, would seem no exception. 
> can als'o under·stand how explication might have seemed 
· roper escape from the te.chniques of German philology 
I 
h4:lps exhausted in the research of Kittredge, Tatlock, 
Lowes, and others. Their work was a pinnacle of scholar-
ship which left little room for further inquiry except to 
belabor the methods they had defined and thorou9hly applied. 
Newer modes of historical inquiry likewise must have seemed 
useless, whether the doctrinaire Marxist. formulas of Calverton 
and Hicks or the bland, popularized vagaries of the later 
van Wyck Brooks whi.ch were banalized in the teaching of 
literature through the thirties and early forties. These 
must have seemed as unproductive then as New Criticism does 
now. 
We can also recognize that critical explication has been 
a useful methodology while the profession of English letters has 
rapidly and cancerously grown over the last three or four 
decades to include practitioners with necessarily less 
encyclopedic ba.ckgr.ou.nds than Kittredge or Lowes. If the 
main task at hand could be agreed upon to be textual intci;;:-~ 
pretation, then most of the tools of philology might be 
properly set aside as redundant pedantry. The scholar-
critic could actually pride himself upon his ignorance of 
special knowledge in properly evaluating a text. An expert 
he could insist, is the educated "normal" reader, 
overeducated scholar distracted by irrelevant inform-
Ignorance thus conveniently found its v~ndication at 
the time when the profession of letters increased so 
as to suffer an unavoidable decline in competence • 
. l;'ican manhood returning from world war II and Korea had to 
.auaated, and their hastily recruited young educators, 
also from the wars, had to find a raison d'etre for their 
inadequacies. Whatever was lost in philological brer,dth was 
supposedly regained in technical competence and critical 
sensitivity. 
There is also a political explanation of New Critical 
f.>Cholarship.. Ji,,. studiously myopic concentration upon textual 
cri ti<::ism has conveniently protected the innocence of its 
practitioners f r:om t.he uncertainties of politics and history. 
If our ultimate authority is t:lH~ sacrosanct literary context, 
we might justifiably turn with gratitude from difficult 
social issues to an intensive investigation of this context 
and its profound ramif ica.tions. This was of course an rm: .. 
spoken response, omnipresent though never directly acknow-
ledged, except perhaps vaguely as a ttloss of spiritual order." 
Nevertheless, it seems more than a peculiar historical 
coincidence that the advancement of textual explication has 
been closely parallel to the development of the Cold War. 
The origin of New Criticism is usually fixed at the publication 
of The Sacred Wood by T .s. Eliot in 1920 and Princ:i.pl_es. o~ 
Litera~ Criticism by I.A. Richards in 1924, roughly three 
and seven years after the Russian Revolution and during the 
when conservatism was shaken to its roots by the imminent 
ossibility of Bolshevik revolution across Europe. This was 
when Russian formalism emerged, a parallel move-
candidly acknowledged its reaction against the 
trusion of politics in criticism. New Criticism was next 
ought to our country by the nsout.hern Regionalists 11 at 
Vanderbilt during the depression years of the thirties when 
America itself seemed threatened by 'the spectre of Bolshevi.sm. 
Finally, New Critical methods were institutionalized as 
the dominant orthodm;;y of our English departments in the late 
forties and early fifties, when our country was in the throes 
of McCarthyism 0 again panicked by the spectre of communism. 
It was then clearly prudent to lapse in~o impenetrable 
silence about political issues, busily engaged in the more 
serious and scholarly responsibility of "objective" textual 
explicationo During this era in France, where intellectual 
trends have traditionally been better articulated (and as a 
result more confused), this silence was acknowledged and 
even proclaimed by such figures as Camm;, M<~rleau .Pont.y, 
and Robbe-Grillet~ It happened here too, but even the issue 
was left unspokenr except perhaps in the editorial contro= 
versies of. t.he partisan g~:}?,, which had fruitlessly sQught 
an accommodation between politics and criticism for twenty 
years.25 Only with the decline of the Cold War in the 
middle sixties did the stranglehold of New Criticism begin 
to be loosened. 
Not accidentally, then, have New Critical methods had 
most appeal through these years to critics of u conservative 
T.S. Eliot repeatedly avowed his support for 
ction Francaise, a conservative French group advocating 
eocracy, and dangerously approached endorsing Italian 
scism in his Criterion editorials of 1928 and 1929. I.A. 
~hards generally avoided political issues, but he did attack 
collectivism several times and seemed to advocate a nine-
teenth century brarid of individualism in his concept of 
synaesthesis. The Southern Regionalists collectively pro-
posed a return to the II agrarian•" virtues of the Old South 
in I'll Take~ Stand (1930) as did Ransom in God without 
Thunder (1930) and Tate in Reactionary Essays£!! Poetry 
(1936). Brooks and Wimsatt are· said to have come out in 
open support of McCarthy, and they, as wel:l as Wellek and 
Kriege~ seem to have reserved their most trenchant disdain 
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for social criticism with progressive implications, particularly 
of the Marxist school. 
Likewise, the opposition to New Criticism seems to have 
found its most strident voices on t~e Left, whether on the 
pages of New Masses in the thirties or by ambivalent renegades 
of the fifties such as Trilling and Fiedler, inspired by the 
example of Edmund Wilson. Fiedler's articles, "Archetype and 
.Signature,'' and "My Credo," spelled out the absurdity of New 
Critical assumptions with crushing insight as early as 1950-52, 
at the heyday of. critical explication. 25 An underground of: 
opposition has persisted since then, and "old leftists" such 
as Weimann of East Germany and Sidney Finkelstein in the United 
States have continued to express this opposition. With the 
plitical upheaval ·of the s1xties, however., the a.ttack has 
' ' 
.en renewed with vigour by Fred~rick Crews, Lewis Kampf, . ' 
their "Emersonian" New Left faction in the MLA. Louis 
declared, "The :i;unction of poetry, Matthew Arnold 
J said, is to criticize life. Surely criticism should do 
no less," and, "By its very nature, in spite of our academic 
merchants, literature is not a commodity, but the sign of a 
creative act which exp1«esses personal, social, and historical 
needs. As such it constantly undermines the status quo. 11 26 
This point need not be considered an empty slogan if "need" 
!eso facto represents the inadequacy of the status quo, in 
contrast to fulfillment, its accomplish~ent. In a recent 
~ diatribe, "Do Literary Studies have an Ideology," 
- Frederick Crews has proposed that the ideology of li tera:r.y 
studies currently doe~ have an ideology, but "less in what 
they say than in _what they refuse to consider," which, we 
may presume, would be of the needs of society and their 
representation in·literature. Crews attacks the "escapism" 
of "capi. talis-t scholarship" and questions, 11 whether a good 
political anguish may not be essential t:.o good critici.sm. 11 27 
Apart from these attacks, New Criticism gives the appearance 
of declining of its own weight, perhaps like water slowly 
<_ receding from the bathtub--its decline seems to have caused 
these attacks more than they did its decline. New Criticism 
does not seem pertinent to the malaise of the sixties and 
seventies, while our country seems tottering at 
of latter day Weimar uncertainties. So everybody 
vigorously searching out alternatives, but without fresh 
issues having arisen to help lead us to a different 
land. Our transition seems to be occurring without 
~ble signs or any definab.lH eff.icient cause beyond the 
in Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, we can define our intentions to a certain 
extent as a reaction against the proscriptions of New Criticism. 
We can deny that man is II limited and imperfect n as '1~ .E. Hulme 
maintained, since human experience is almost infinitely 
complex. No standards of perfection exist against which we 
may validly measure ourselves without diminishing this com-
plexity. We are paradoxically both more and less than perfec-
tion. There is a rnul ti-dimensional breadth of human t1xperience, 
and it is the proper function of literature t.o explore these 
dimensions without exacerbating our puritanical anxi,~ties. 
we paradoxically want to declare Fallacies fallacious (Fallacy, 
thou art Fallacious} in order to express ourselves once again 
as we please, with approval reserved for whatever seems 
successful without necessarily fitting particular guidelines. 
A tentative manifesto to this effect might be proposed: 
1. Literature is pleasure: there is gratification in 
representation £md vicarious identification. The withdrawal 
from raw Ernperience to .its surrogate fulfilled by dynamic 
acquiescense is pleasurable to most who are able to project 
into language. 
2. Literature is assessment: we shape and structure 
experience in literature; our sense of purpose and 
herence is bodied forth in llterature, in which we compare 
we see with the artefact we further want to impose. 
3 • Li te:rature !-,S ~r~~~i.ol!: our experience is shaped 
to express it. The stream.of language along 
'dimension of ti.me and our exertion to keep even wi.th its 
---·· 
progress gives coherence to what.we say and projects meaning 
upon the random universe ~bout us. 
4. Literature is communication: we use language to get 
- our ideas and experience across, primarily that they might 
effect changes in emotions, attitudes and behavior. In this 
sense literature is propaganda, as Sartre proposed in What .. . --
24 
is Literature? .overtly propagandistic literature (Christian, 
Marxist, social-realis~ic, etc.) cannot be rejected except 
to the extent that it fails as propaganda. 
5. Literature is competence: competence is not the 
only criterion, as formalists often try to make it, but it 
remains an important one--without formal skills, the other 
values of literature might be lost. But competence alone is 
also inadequate, as may be seen in the novels of Sarraute 
and Robbe-Grillet, French authors who escaped the Cold War 
by articulating silence. Competence is pleasure, assessment, 
and expression adequately wrought in form to be shared with 
readers. 
New Criticism has neglected the first, third, and fourth 
these dimensions in its emphasis upon the second and fifth,., 
assessment and competence. We must reject these inhibitions, 
but without abandoning its formal·discoveries. Leon Trotsky 
0 nceded the ~sefulness of formalisci as a meth6dology in the 
0 ntext of social ci;-iticism, and we must do the same with 
ew Criticism, but in a c~ntext more comprehensive than 
.ither. formal or social approaches .• 28 New Criticism· has 
ought us a wealth of critical insights, in fact a renaissance 
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in explication unmatched in the entire history of criticism. 
However circumscribed their views, ·figures such as Richards, 
Eliot, Empson, and Leavis in England, and Ransom, Tate, Brooks, 
and Blackmur in America have made a brilliant contribution to 
' 
the "job" of cri,ticism that we cannot ignore. The techniques 
of explication they have given us are the first task of 
criticism, the preliminary spade work to be done before we 
, 
launch into the questions. they have evaded. Our job is to 
sift the good they offer from their inhibitions, the valid 
insights from their/Procrustean negativism. We must salvage 
/ ' 
what we can from the cul de~ of their orthodoxy, the 
welter of Fallacies they have invoked to justify their evasions. 
In a word, we must bring our concern with breadth to bear 
.upon their int~nsively defined methods to find a new synthesis 
meaningful for criticism. But in this effort we must also 
recognize that New Criticism might be the best that this 
country can offer: its demise might very well end our modern 
renaissance of criticism, a mortification occurring in two 
stages, first in its institutionalization since 1950, arid 
then in its aggressive but equally uninspired academic reject-
ion since perhaps 1964 (to set an arbitrary date, the year 
Susan Sontag published "Against Interpretation"). We can see 
,ts faults well enough"'.'-the qu~stion remains whether we can 
( . 
~,:ne up with something better for ourselves. Our inspiration 
,-_:, 
to be more than the recognition of their faults. 
t 
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Chapter 'l'wo: 
I.A. Richards and some of his Critics 
The most influential figure in the history of New 
;• ·-,j,;,,.: 
Criticism has undoubtedly been I.A. Richards. His books 
established an aesthetic model against which others of the 
movement measured their own theories. Thqy usually disagreed 
with his ideas but almost always proposed their own as a 
response, a more satisfactory am:,'<l.rer O presumably, to the 
questions he rai,wd. ,John crm..re Ransom acknowledged in 
•rh':_ !,'Jew Critichnn (1941) that, "Discussion of the new criticism 
must start with Mr~ Richards. 'l'he new criticism very nearly 
began with him." 1 Allen Tate likewise acknowledged his own 
"Nobody who read I.A. Richards' Practical Criticism when it 
appeared in 1929 could read any poem as he had read it before. 
From that time on one had to read poetry with all the brains 
one had and with one's arms and legs, as well as what may be 
inside the rib cage." 2 Finally, from many examples, Stanley 
Edgar Hyman broadly declared in The Armed Vision that, 11 What 
we have been calling modern criticism began in 1924, with 
the publication of Principles of Literary: Cr.i.ticism."3 But 
none accepted his theories at their face value. Theii response 
was a reaction first to his "impulse" theory of ·affect 
in the twenties, though accepting his call.for a 
critical apparatus interpreting poetry, and then to 
is projective theory of the imagination proposed in the 
hirties, though accepting his proposal that a theory of 
,JV 
knowledge is fundamental to the problems of critical e,,pli-
cation. Unlike the cautious, universally admired criticism 
of Eliot, muc~ if not most, of his theory was rejected, but 
he raised a broad variety of questions to which other answers 
became tenets of New Critical orthodoxy. Without this neg-
ative encouragement, Eliot would very likely have S((~ttled 
into the role of a latter day Matthew Arnold, and American 
fi9ures such as Ransom and •rate r.,muld probably have devoted 
mor,:'.l time to poetry and less to criticism, which, it may be 
speculated, would have become less explicative and less 
theoretical in emphasis~ 
But there is a paradox in the influence of Richards. 
Almost all have successfully defined themselves relative to 
his theories, nut nobody has yet been able to deal adequately 
with these theories in their own rather elaborate context. 
Whatever fragment of his scaffolding critics have chosen to 
explore, other and often more important parts have been 
excluded from consideration that would seem to bring their 
conclusions into doubt. Logicians like Ma:,{ Black and Manuel 
Bilsky have vigorously assailed his theory of knowledge from 
a positivistic approach, overlooking the organicism in even 
earliest books which successfully complements his affin-
to behaviorism. D.G. James, a Kantian ideal~st, reason-
bly questioned his affective principles in general terms, 
· .. 
l-lt neglected the many passages in which he seems to have 
sufficiently to avert such a broad refuta-
Ransom and Tate adopt·ed his frame o·f reference by 
somewhat simplifying i.t and denying its basis in psychology 
(Tate freely admitting that he had little understanding of 
psychology) , thom;L. tli'""' absence of psychology led to a sterile 
formalism which Richards u:n.'uerstandably wanted to avoid. 
Finally, epigones of the New Critical faith such as Stallman 
and Krieger more drastically simplified Richards' theory to 
make of it a parody they could easily re?_fute. Of cr.i tics 
morc-;1. positively indebb,~d to the influence of Richards, Empson 
and Clei:l.nth Brooks took particular branches of his theory, 
respectivt~ly h:is conct1rn with arnbigui ty a.nd irony, to propos~3! 
formal theories apparently outside the context of affective 
criticism, and his two most devoted apologists today, W.H.M, 
Hotopf and Jerome Schiller, seem to have floundered somewhat 
in the effort. to find a synthesis they could defend.. Hotopf 
haB laborioutlly emphasized questions of epistemology at the 
expense of aesthetics, the heart of Richards' theory, while 
Schiller is both thin and obscure in what is obviously his 
first book. 5 Even Wellek' s thoroughly docu1nented assesBment 
in a recent article seems to have excessively simplifi<.~d tht? 
essential theories of Richards& 6 
The responsibility for this history of misconceptions 
ultimately be laid upon Richards himself. He complains 
none of his late essays that his critics appar~ntly do~not 
ad hi.s books, 7 and this might be partly true, but .the major 
lies, I think in his tantalizing suggestion of organ-
which never quite becomes fulfilled. In his early 
chapter exudes clarity and structure upon its 
particular topic, but the relationship among chapters is 
often almost random and their topics seem to cut across each 
other without sufficient explanation. In Principles of 
~iter~ criticisn:., which most obviously exemplifies this 
inadequacy, though a brilliant contribution to modern criti-
cis;m, thirty-five chapters average eight pages apiece, and . 
there often seems little explanation for their sequence. As 
Hotopf has proposed, Richards must have gathered all his 
insights in notes organized according to categories, without 
having tried ve.ty hard to or~ranize thc!se categories .into a 
sequence with a beginning, middle, and end. In his later 
books and essays, his lack of organization unfortunately 
creeps into his sty le, hi theirt.o a model of lucidity, which 
has become almost impossibly elliptical and discursive, a 
peculiar contradiction to his insistence upon clarity and 
simplicity in Basic English. Really the best analogy for 
the organization of his theories would be the image clusters 
in Shakespeare's plays. Theory incessantly erupts in vital 
new metaphors to be integrated with what went before, but 
often. obscurely and in unpredictable transformations. Organi-
•:.zation is insisted upon, for ex,imple in thE:1 Preface to the 
edition of The Meaning of Meanin9, where he proposed 
credible explanation of the relationship among his early 
this organization is superficial, usually the 
topics or perspectives, and 6ften barely in 
ntrol of its material. The reader is spurred on by the 
fusion of insi.ghts but denied a comprehensive understanding. 
He has only the assurance that even a partial understanding 
is fertile soil for explorations of his own. 
Our own approach, likewise necessarily limited, will 
be to explore untt justify his theory of affect 
rejected by the New Critics and unacceptable even to Hotopf 
and Schiller~ The former mostly ignores the issue and the 
. 
latter proposes that Richards came of age in turning from 
his 11 impulse 11 theory to Coleridge's concept of. the projective 
imagination, a metaphysical application of this theory which 
Richards has earnestly (and correctly) declared to be a 
consistent extension of h.is earlier views: "I changed my 
vocabulary and my metaphors somewhat ••• to present much 
the same views again~ 11 8 It should be noticed in this remark 
that Richards himself is willing to discuss his theories as 
metaphors, models proposed to define the experience of read-~ 
ing poetry. It is our contention that the rejected affective 
principle underlying these metaphors justifies and integrates 
the technical concepts he proposed that have been more 
acceptable to New Critical theory. As useful as these con-
cepts have been, this affective principle is more important, 
particularly as the basis (perhaps the only correct basis) for 
establishing a synthesis among the wide variety of critical 
advocated today. Our affective resp~nse to 
may easily be established as the valid common 
enominator for all of these approaches, upon which their 
i~ferentiaa may be explored in mutually applicable terms. 
Ut more of this later. In this chapter his books will be 
treated more or less in th(-dr or.igirnil sequence frankly as 
our concession to the usefulness of enumeration in grappling 
with his ideas. His affective principles fairly clearly 
defined in his early books will first be explorE~d, and then 
their extens:i.on durin9 the thirties$ We shall finally attempt 
to refute a few of the New Critical misconceptions about his 
theories. His later articles collected _in ~culative 
!_ns~ (1955) and So Much ~e?-1:£ (1968) will be touchE~d 
upon i.n the next chapter. 
· 'l'he Foundation of Aesth~!::;!,~_§.., co=iiuthored by Richards 
in 1922 w:i.th C.K. Ogden and Jam.es Wood, was his firHt book, 
a slender ninety-two page comparative study of current theod.es 
of beauty. It has been neglected by critics of Richarde,9 
though it first presented in relatively lucid fashion the 
essential theories he later expanded, especially the concept 
of synaesthesis. Richards typically began his inquiry wit.h 
a multiple definition, a list of sixteen possible definitions 
· for beauty compiled in three groups progressively more affec-
tive in emphasis. 'I'he first was composed of purely objective 
theories, the second of pragmatic and functional theories, 
and the third of psychological theories, the most sophisti-
cated of which being of synaesthesia: 
A. 
I. Anything is beautiful which possesses the simple 
quality of beauty. 
II. Anything is beautiful which has a specified form. 
13. 
III. Anything is beautiful which is an imitation of 
nature. 
IV~ Anything is ~0autiful which results from success-
ful expl<}l:tation ·of a medium. 
V. Anything is beautiful which is the work of genius. 
VI. Anything is beautiful which reveals (1) truth, 
(2) t.he spirit of nature, (3}_ the ideal, (4) the 
universalt· (5) the typicale 
VII. Anything is beautiful which produces illusion. 
VIII. Anything is beautiful which leads to desirable 
social·effectso 
IX. Anything is beautiful which is an expression. 
x~ Anything is beautiful which caut'5es pleasure. 
XI. Anything is beautiful which Etxcites (;.'!motions. 
XIIe Anything is beautiful which promotes a specific 
emotion. 
c. XIII. Anything is beautiful which involves the processes 
of empathy. 
XIV. Anything is beautiful which heightens vitality. 
XVe Anything is beautiful which brings us into touch 
with exceptional personalities. 
XVI. Anything is beautiful which conduces to synaesthesis.l 
argue that theories VI through IX belong to part c, 
, ile XV properly belongs to part B since contact with "ex·-
Ptional personalities" does not necessarily imply a profound 
:'feet upon consciousness. But the point is probably not 
worth debating. 
Richards fairly quickly dismissed the theories of 
beauty in groups A and 13.,often wit.hout seriously consider-
ing their implications, and moved to the psychological 
theories in group C for closer e,mminatic.m. He associated 
the doctrine of pleasure, category X, with Santayana's 
principle that beauty is "pleasure regarded as a quality 
of a thing, 11 and criti.cized it only been.use it provides 
too restricted a critical vocabulary .. He later proposed an 
explanation essentially similar when arguing against. the 
obverse position that beauty is "inherent in physical objects, 
not a character of some of our responses to objectse"ll Here 
he likewise criticized Clive Bell's theory of 11 significant 
form, •i pattern in art which produces a unique aesthetic 
emotion, since he could not accept the' view th.at our re-· 
sponse to art is a qualit:at:tvely singular experience Q He 
·.expressed a great deal more interest in the empathy (or 
Einf8hlun~) theories of Lipps and Lotze, nineteenth century 
German aeetheticians, especially in their treatment of 
aesthetic experience as the interaction of impulses when 
we project our feelings beyond ourselves to eliminate the 
antithesis between self and object. It is interesting to 
note that he discussed the concepts of both impulse and 
in this cont.ext, long before he supposedly 
Coleridge's projective theory.· He has been 
idely praised for abandoning his behaviorism for a pro-
ective theory with the publication c>f Col~~ .. idge £!! 
_gn~ginati.on in 1935, as if he shifted his choice between 
these mutually exclusive concepts. Actually, both concepts 
had been initially found by Richards in the scientific and 
ti 
metaphysical theory of ginfuhlunJI. developed in Germany. The 
'' 
best that might be said is that he later shifted his emphasis 
from one aspect of this theory (impulse) to another (pro-
jection), but without abandoning behavi~rism for organicism, 
neither alone adequately describing his views at any phase 
in his career. In Foundatiorm o!~ Aesthetics he did expn~ss 
reservations a.bout the empathy theory, especially in its 
extreme view of a mystic union with the objective world, 
but acknowledged its importance ,;when correctly described." 12 
Richards proposed that the most successfully inclusive 
theory of beauty (and the principle of inclusion also excludes 
non-aesthetic modes of experience) must be that of synaesthesis, 
the equilibrium and harmony of impulses bringing the whole of 
the personality into play. In the early, presumably prim-
itive stages of aesthetic response, these impulses combine 
to produce emotions, but with increased equil:i.br:i.um we be-
come impersonal and disinterested, aware of our differenti-
··. ation and isolation from things around us. With a partial 
ordering of impulses, the resulting.disequilibrium is stim-
ulative and leads to either irresolution or action, as 
Proposed for example by Marxist critics in.the propagandistic 
Yalue of art; but with our equilibrium approaching perfec-
we achieve an Apollonian synaesthesia, the aloof and 
emote experience of beauty. Richards claimed this principle 
.j 15 
ultimately derives from the Chung Yung of Confucius: "Having 
no leanings is called Chung, admitting of no change is called 
Yung. By Chung is denoted Equilibrium; Yung is the fixed 
prindiple regulating everything under heaven." (p. 13) But 
his concept of synaesthesis had other sources as well. 
Wellek discloses that the word 11 coenaesthesis" might have 
been acquired from ~ycholog:i.cal Princl:E_l<:.:?.., by James Ward, 
a Cambridge professor during Richards' undergraduate years,13 
and Richards himself acknowledged the importance of Friedrich 
Schiller's theory of equipoise between life and shape in 
art. Richards dutifully reported Schiller's denial that 
purely aesthetic experience is possible as well as his in-
clusion of dispositions toward action among proper aesthetic 
responses, but without exploring these concepts very thor-
oughly. He obviously preferred Ethel Puffer's explanation 
of a passive response, which he quoted at length: 
The only aesthetic respose is that in which stimulation 
resulting in impulse or movement is checked by its an-
tagonistic impulse, combined with heightening of tone. 
But this is tensio~, eg~!librium, or bal~~ of for£es, 
which is thus seen to be a general condition of all 
aesthetic experience. 14 (italics in original) 
Richards, agreeing with both Miss Pµffer and 
another contemporary, synaesthesia inv<,lves 
equilibrium among our greatest number of im-
Ulses, an aesthetic balance preventing us from breaking forth 
The effect of beauty is the accomplishment of 
equilibrium, the catalysis of the entire personality into 
stasis, the opposite of praxis. Intentionality, the Hegelian 
"for-itself, 11 is metamor:,hized into what James Joyce cur-
rently found i.n thc-~pip:t'i.any, the 11 of-itself," the satis-
faction of a perfHct moment which would be vitiated by 
additions or pragmatic applicationso Neurotic gratification, 
pol:i. tics, religion r and cmy other mode ~f belief and its 
implementation must be excluded from the proper domain of 
aesthetic response. We are left with what F.R. Leavis de-
scribed in another context as "naive Marxism inverted," the 
d . J . d' 'd l' f b 1 d 'J ' l' t' lS ra 1ca. in 1v1 ua ism o~ a ance sens1J1 1 1es. 
The four th book of Richards t Science ~n<! ~.X.., pub-
lished in 1926, four years later, may be profitably examined 
next since he simplified his ideas to address himself to a 
general audience. We find here the clearest extension of 
his II impulse 11 theory of synaesth(~sis. The political context 
of his aesthetics was also clarified in his warning of 
economic, social and political 11 dangers, 11 presumably of 
an impending twentieth century upheaval. Apocalypse had 
undoubtedly been suggested, as proposed last chapter, by 
Russian Revolution as well as World War I, labor conflicts, 
a general malaise throughout the early part of the twen-
century. rrhe root of these social problems,. Richards 
lay in the psychological inadequacy of the individual 
is ultimately, he felt, a 11 biological.crisis." Man's 
illingness to countenance and even participate in re-
essively barbaric collectivization lay in his inability 
as an individual to organize hir1 personality toward satis-
factory ends. His impulses have become disorganizede ran-
domly scattered, and unproductively pitted in conflict with 
each other, a conflict entirely different from the salutary 
balance between Chung and Yung. 'l'heir disbalance has en-
couraged destructive modes of behavior to such an extent 
. 
as to.be recognized the "greatest evil which afflicts man-
kind.1116 
The central importa,nce and responsibility of c:ci tics in 
the twentieth century, Richards felt, is consequently to 
make the adjustment and reconciliation of impulsE~s in. 
literature available to our alienated public so th<;;;y might 
bring their dissonant impulses into greater harmony. The 
static equipoise to be gained would be neither an ill con-
'""3.V 
sidctred pr axis nor torpid inactivity, but, most appropriately, 
an "incipient preparedness, 11 a readiness for action that 
would substitute for actual behavior.17 If this sustained 
condition of alertness were regained, most other problems, 
both social and individual, would be easily resolved. Poetry 
would serve as a "perfectly possible means of overcoming 
chaos," in fact a new Hindenburg Line defending our traditions 
from the onslaught of barbarism (p. 82) • 'l'his social ob-
to have provided the basis for Richards' later 
of multiple meanings, his ardent concern with 
Ucation, and even his efforts to establish a Basic English. 
Was vitally concerned with the preservation of the sen-
ent individual as a benign unit of a similarly benign 
culture. He felt the individual primarily (but not exclu-
sively) gains his equilibrium through a heightened respon-
siveness acquired-'<?:tt}m the experience of literature. 
To explain our·responst'!. to literature more specifically, 
Richards proposed a hierarchic theory of aesthetic conscious-
ness interconnecting the impulse, a unit of experience, with 
the text of poetry, the raw data uni.que+Y appropriate to the 
i f C ¥~•~~1.·•= qa suggested a sequential process in SC ence O . ,., ., .. """''"" am. i -... 
our response from words to images and then ideas and emotions 




This sequence would occur simultaneously in our experience 
and understanding of words., For this reasoi-1 a word could 
be understood in one of two t-3enses, either as a sensory 
stimulus, the recognized sign, spoken or printed, or in its 
"full body 11 involving the entire process through images, 
ideas, and emotions. (p. 11) In the second and more compre-
hensive sense➔, the sign becomes a word when it resonates 
with implications through the impulses it stirs and gratifies. 
association with intricate pat.terns of impulses enables 
adult using it t.o stimulate these patterns and newly: 
them within the creative matrix of langua~e. The 
·• rd begins as a sign, the Pavlovian response j_nduced by 
but in its complexity it soon becomes "the key" 
experience, "a mere welter of disconnected impulses." In 
poetry, with its additional resources, ·the word finally be-
comes "a means of ordering, controlling and consolidating 
the whole experience." (p., 26) Images, second in the above 
diagram, betwt;e:n words c:1.1:.d' itl;;;;:•:,s and emotions, were only 
suggc1sted by Richards and in fact never tlu:>roughly invest-
igatea .18 At the i::ight end of his paradigm, then, Richards 
divided the poetic response into two co~ponents, ideas and 
emotions, establishing a dualism which led to most of the 
controversy about his theories. 19 Ideas were described as 
42 
an "intellectual stream" or "realm of· thought 11 which prima-· 
rily functions as a "means" to direct and excite the emotions: 
"Our thoughts are the servants of our interests, and even 
when they seem to rebel it is usually our interests that 
are in disor·d.f1r." (p. 11) In contrast, emotions were made 
the active branch of consciousness, the seat of our interests 
and source of energy in consciousness. Here lies the realm 
of impulses to be structured by ideas, eidetically bodied 
forth in images, and consolidated in language. Man's quest 
for assurance in a homeostatic balance of impulses leads him 
language and poetry for outlets of emotional fulfillment 
experience. Language, imagery, and themes are objective 
modes of organization integrated in poetry to create an 
quilibrium among the unsettled impulses in his mind. 
Chapter VI, "Poetry and Beliefs," was the most contro-
(e\ren notoriom~} in Science and Poe:try and, for that 
in Richards' entire corpus of criticism. Here he 
· d the dichotomy of emotions and ideas to distinguish 
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between statements and "pseudo-statements." Statements, he 
claimed, are the proper concern of science in their reference 
to facts which may be verified; but fiction, religion, meta-
physics, and most human beliefs have consisted of pseudo-
statements, expressions arousing fe~lings and attitudes rather 
than stating verifiable truth. The word "pseudo-statement" 
has been a pejorative term devised by logical empiricists 
such as Ayer and Carnap to describe statements lacking ob-
jective validity because of tautological self-sufficiency, 
emotional gratification, or, most commonly, the combination 
of the two.20 Richards tried to adopt the term without 
these implications in order to show how pseudo-statements in 
literature serve the emotional needs of religion without 
its defects in unsubstantiated belief. By concentrating 
upon the primary function of literature, the creation of a 
static equipoise of impulse's, he felt, we abandon verifiable 
truth to· science, and in doing so establish a clear, valid 
foundation for the job .of criticism. Belief, the confusion 
of pseudo-stateme_nt with fact, has been removed from litera-
ture, replaced by "suspended disbelief," an "experimental 
submission" we grant the poet to benefit from his organization 
experience. 
Richards had first proposed this radical distinction 
etween the referential and emotive aspects of language in 
--.;.=, of Meaning, published 1923, again in joint author-
ip with C.K. Ogden. He there claimed that the symbolic 
e of words, what he called "statement," is "the recording, . 
e support, the organization and the communication of 
references," while the emotive ut:a~, "probably more primitive, 11 
expresses feelings and attitudes- Poetry exclusively concerns 
the latter, he said, because its emphasis is not verifj_cation, 
but the arrangement of language "for the sake of attitudes 
which their acceptance will evoke. 1121 This second use, the 
"evol.":!at..i.ve function". of: words, has dominated human communi-. 
cation in religion, art, and ordinary social intercourse 
since the prehistoric origins of language. It is only re-
cently that the "symbolic function" has been sifted out, 
isolated, and purified to divest empi:ric:al science of human 
motivation. It would be similarly useful, he suggested, to 
purify the evocative function of poetry.in order to improve 
the "range and delicacy" of human experience .. (p. 159) As 
the empirical methods of isolation and quantification eman·~ 
cipated science from belief and reliqion to bri.ng it of age, 
so might criticism be brought to comparable levels of sophis-
tication. Aesthetic experience would become concentrated 
perceptual activity freeing the memory "to widen and amplify 
sen,sitiveness 11 and evoking emotions presumably to be balanced 
and refined through heightened perception and memory. 22 
Though it has been generally overlooked, Richards ac-
'knowledged in The ~~ani!),S, of Meanin~ that the symbolic and 
':-,,_-
evocative functions of language cannot be entirely ~eparated. 
e ridiculed the compa:r.ablt';1 ant:i.thesis between Intuition 
(p. 241) and appt·ovingly quoted Vendryes, a con-
linguist, to the effect that 11 the logical element 
. d affective element mingle constantly in language .. " (p., 152) 
He even declared, "Not even matlH:mmtics is free as a whole 
from emotive complicat:i.ons 6 11 (p. 153) He consciously acceph~d 
the paradox of trying to separate the inseparable as an in-
tri.nsice unavoidable problem oft.he "sign situation," as he 
indicated in his diagram in the first chapter: 
Thought or Reference 
Symbol e • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • " ._ Referent 
With this triangulation of the "sign situation, 11 he sought 
to demonstrate that thought or experience, the triangle's 
apex, mediates the relationship between a symbol and its 
referent., respectively the two legs of the triangle. Their 
tripartite relationship represents our association of a 
symbol with a particular context of experience--we learn to 
remove i.t from this context to be combined with others in 
the context of language. (p$ 53) The symbol thus becomes 
an act of reference, a partly separated component of ex-
(the left leg of the triangle generated with its 
fulcrum) which vitalizes the recollection of the 
We are. required to respond once again to our 
,arlier response, while the objective referent, wha~ever 
aused this experience, remains one degree removed to be 
scribed in its recollection. An inductive gap exists 
(represented by the dotted base line), and to close this 
science must minimize the capricious behavior of thought 
or reference, the triangle's apex, through the careful 
verification of meaning. Consciousness must be standardized 
in its ct1.pacity as med-l.ator so the inductive leap between 
symbol and referent {the base of the triangle) can be made. 
What Richards defined as the 11 Utraquistic Subterfuge," the 
confusion between qualities of things and their emotional 
effect, must be reduced and, if possible, 0 eliminated. 24 In 
contrast, poetry and the arts must make a virtue of this 
subterfuge by emphasizing the wealth of human experience im-
pinging upon the sign situation, including the speaker's 
at.ti t.ude toward the referent and whomever he is addressing, 
his intention, and even his response to the ease or diffi-
culty of whatever he is saying. {pp. 223-27) Emotion and 
intuition would be properly involved as effects competently 
managed in the context of poetry. But this process emanating 
from the triangle's apex should be distinguished from the 
horizontal iriductive equation at its base. These essentially 
different uses of the identical sign situation should not 
be abortively combined either through belief or its inHtitu-
tionalization in religion and the state: both science and 
poetry must reject this fallacious confusion of purposes. 
Science emphasizes the relationship between symbol and ref-
with the act of reference restricted in its c~pacity 
empty, lucid mediator. Literature properly emphasizes 
his act, tho regnant process of human consciousness suf-
communication (radiating down both legs of the tri-
gle) ·but not making the inductive leap (its base), with 
the st:ring·ent c.::anons of verification it obllges. Beli.ef, 
the misguided effort to propose inductive validity for in-
tuitive processes, can only lead us dangerously astray. As 
Richards later declared, "We need a spell of purer science 
and purer poetry bf~fore the two can be again mixed, if in-~ 
deed this will even become once more desirable." 25 . 
In Principle~ of Literary Criticism, published a year 
-later in 1924, Richards sought to expand this concept of 
aesthetics with an "impulse" theory of value bringing current 
psychological investigation to bear upon the task of criti-
cism. His broad purpose was to find a synthesis among psy-
chology, ethics, and aesthetics that might justify beauty, 
the pleasurable experience of art, as a moral act, the more 
finely attenuated organization of the personality. Here as 
befot·e he uncritically accepted the thE-~ory of the impulse, 
(according to Btooks and Wimsatt, reducing all experience 
to "stimulus a~d response 11 ) 26 as a useful reification of 
aesthetics, the unit of conscious experience whether for 
pleasure, pain, conation, memory, insight, etc. The impulse 
was not considered as small as the either-or response of 
the single neuron nor as comprehensive as a motive or atti-
tude, but loosely an aggragate of nervous activity whose 
combination with others composes our conscious experience. 
Richards occasionally fell prey to this reification, for 
example when he warned against the "distorted" impulse,27 
he nevertheless used it to erect the superstructure of 
is theo1.·y with remarkable success. He proposed that man is 
a congeries of impulses to be integrated and balanced for 
intelligence, sensitivity, and good taste. Maturity and 
fulfillment maximize their gratification, and whatever per-
sonality frustrates the fewest is qualitatively superior 
because it is least wasteful of human potential. Sacrifice 
is conversely the. frustration of some impulses in order to 
gratify others, and both the debauchee and victim of con-
science must sacrifice too many. Most of us make a "muddle" 
of enough conflicting impulses to fall short of creative 
potential. Our inadequacy results fi:·om disequilibrium, the 
exclusion of impulses we ca.nnot manage, and manifests itself 
in overt behavior (praxis) and "assertion," the vulgar simpli-
fication of ideas because we otherwise lack the skill to 
justify our experience.28 The poet is indeed our "unacknowl-
edged legislator'' 'because he possesses the genius to liberate 
and justify his most fugitive impulses in the context of his 
expression. He possesses the normalcy and equilibrium to 
orchestrate these impulses to the subtlest extent of human 
experience, but his appeal may also universally gratify 
relatively crude impulses.29 
The crucial question for Richards, then, became the 
· problem of communication between the normal, highly organized 
poet and his properly receptive readerso The poet must be 
able to capture the subtlety and profundity of his experience 
communicatE-:!d form, and the reader must be en ti.rely alert, 
._. II • • 1 .. v.1g1. ant 11 (a term borr.·owed from Dr. Head) , to be ade-
, ately responsive to this organization of experience. The 
problem the two must surmount is the gap between their minds 
preventing an actual transferrence of this experience. This 
gap is similar to the inductive leap between a symbol and its 
referent, but it exists between interpretations of the same 
symbol within two "sign situations" (of the poet and reader) 
and thus supplements the inductiv·e gaps both must respt:1ctively . 
surmount. This "multiplied" symmetrical relati.onship may be 








The intersection 11 symbol" represents the point of contact in 
t, communication, while the entire base line represents three 
·. inductive gaps in poetry, the II sign .situations II of the poet 
reader as well as the leap in communication from one to 
other. To bridge the third of these ga~s (and in doing 
the others as well), the poet must voice his own ex-
well enough to induce the effect of comparable ex-
in the minds of his readers. 30 The experience of 
the poet and his readers cannot be identical, even in the 
poet reading his own lint:::s, so the ideal reader :i.s an un-
attainable perfection a-r:id we are left with the distinction 
between a "qualif iedt,,re:;-;;;;:di:.t'r; and th(:i range of actual re-
sponses mostly inadequate for one reason or another. 31 But 
failure of the poorly equipped reader is matched more often 
than not by the shortcomings of the artist in either his 
organization of his experience (for example in the popular 
poet, Ella Wheeler Wilcox, whom Richards unmercifully dis-
sected) or his inability to communicate this experience. To 
overcome these inadequacies, Richards proposed a qualified 
acceptance of Tolstoy's "infectious" theory of art: 
1. Poetry is "inf ect.i.ous II in consequence of a grea tE~r or 
lesser peculiarity of the sensation conveyed. 
2. In consequence of a greater or lesser clearness of the 
transmission of this sensation. 
3. In consequence of the sincerity of the artist, that is, 
of the greater or lesser force with which the artist 
himself experiences the sensations which he is convey-
ing. (p. 186) 
second and thi.rd principles clearly embodied Richards' 
communication and the normal organizati9n of:im-
in fact the word "sincerity" was lat<~r adopted 
~ractic~l Criticism to define the personality with bal-
impulses. Richards found the first principle unaccept= 
however, because unusual experience_rnay-be expected to 
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detract from the probability of art originally advocated by 
Aristotle. But if "peculiarity" were identified as original-
ity in the eJ<cpression of common exper i.ence, "what oft was 
thought but ne'er so well e:x:p:ressc~d, 11 I suspect Richards 
would have accepted it as an important complement to the 
third principle .. 
Finally, Richards was concerned wit;h the importance of 
form as a mode of communication between the poet and his 
readers$ F'orm involved "technical 0 questions complementary 
to the II critical II componcmt of aesthetic judgment, but theSE! 
questions were of considerable importance in the interpreta-
tion of poetry. He had recognized this .importance as early 
as T~~ Foundations of. AErnthetics, when he proposed that the 
"psychological story of the organization of our impulses" 
must be balanced against the study of forrn, f!a physico-
physiological account of the work of art as a stimulus." 32 
He later speculated in Practical Criticism that perhaps half 
the feeling of poetry comes from form. 33 Here, in Pr:LnciE..t~r;; 
2f Literar;L_ Criticism, he defined form as objective pattern 
in art that facilitates the stimulation of coenesthesia: 
"As it {form] varies, so do our further or deeper responses 
of feeling and attitude vary. 1134 He thus more or less treated 
form as a stimulus evoking our response, and emphaticallj 
ejected its autonomous objective context having independent 
He found this to be an artificial imposition of 
ckean secondary qualities upon the primary qualities of the 
scribed experience. F'orm ls not, he said, a "simple, 
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unanalyzable virtue of objects," (p. 167) and to think this 
is to fall victim to the fallacy of "projecting an effect and 
making it a quality of .its cause," (p. 21) what might be 
labeled the '°Projective Fallacy. 11 Instead, he defined form 
in terms of the pattern of response it induces, the "interplay 
of effects" aroused in the reader. (pb 173) Formal elements 
are the features of poetry creating the.effect of pattern, 
"the stimuli, f3imple or complex, which can be most depended 
upon to produce unifox:m responses~ 11 (p. 193) Rhythm and 
meter were explained as a. subtle interaction bc1tween <.1xpec-
tation and surp:d.ses 8 and metaphor as a II semi-surrept:i. t.ious 
method by which a g:r.ea.tt~r variety of elements can be wrought 
into the fabric of the experience. 11 35 The genre of tragedy 
was similarly explained as a radical expansion of conscious-
ness totally releasing suppressed experience through the 
reconciliation of pity, the impulse t.o app:r.oa,ch, and fE:ar e 
the impulse to retreat. (pp. 245-45) In short, all form was 
interpreted as the use of objective pattern (a sequence of 
expectations and surprises, as was explicitly said of rhythm) 
to maximize and harmonize the impulses of the reader. 
In Practical Criticism, published in 1929, five years 
later, Richards shifted from theory to applications, the 
;study of typical problems of inadequacy in the interpretation 
He reinterpreted Tolstoy's theory of sincerity 
ccording to the Chung Yung of Confucian philosophy {also, 
~cidentally, repeating the strange epigraph from the Bubis 
'f Fernando Po already cited in The Mc:~anin[ o~ ~1eaning: 
"Lt1t us go closer to the fire and see what we are saying o 11 ) 
to define good ta.ste as a matter of sincerity, the greater 
complexity and finer differentiation of responses in the 
creative·· i::nd:i vidct;:;;.r-; _,r;;,,~'-;:;.ci ty was found to be expanded 
consciousnessf the delicate inclusiveness enabling us to be 
true to our judgment and intuition. In~tead of rejecting 
our fugitive and tangential flights of ~magination, we gain 
the freedom to explore unafraid whatever occurs to us, with 
the paradoxical result that we become "more appropriately 
responsive to the outer ·w01".'ldo" Our subjective confidence 
gives us objective insight different from that of science, 
but in a sense more valid through the additional resources 
of intuition. We have somehow, almost mystically, bridged 
the inductive gap to "effect a union of the ~xternal and 
int:ernal, 11 a feat which science may accomplish only through 
the most rigid procedurese (pp. 284-89) Contrary to the 
frequent accusation of his critics, Richards here proposed 
that poetry as well as science enables us to escape the 
solipsistic dilem1na of subjectivism. Sincerity and good 
taste enable us to merge the subjective and objective aspects 
of experience as well as combining refinement and breadth 
of consciousness: "Being more at one within itself the mind 
:,:hereby becomes rno:t·e appropriately responsive to the but~r 
(p~ 287) Inner harmony enables us to find harmony 
our environment as well. 
ThE:~se qm:ist.i.ons of taste, sincerity, and intuition led 




affective criticism, that poetry is too complex to be judged 
entirely with objective criteria. Instead, he proposed, we 
must read it carefully, with understanding and feeling, and 
then judge it by evaluating our experience: 11 Value in poetry 
turns nearly always upon differences and connections too 
minute and .·unobtrusive to be directly perceived. We recognize 
them only in their effects." (p. 302) ijut these feelings and 
attitudes to be consulted must also involve the entire person-
ality: "The choice of our whole personality may be the 
only instrument we possess delicate e:noug.h to effect the 
discrimination." (p. 302) Santayana had defined beauty as 
our subjective response, and now Richards extended this 
principle to its logical corollaries, (1) that criticism 
must be the study of this response and (2) that this study 
would involve the 11 choice 11 of our entire pex:sonali ty since 
no part may be compartmentalized from the rest. There was 
also a paradox Richards was fully willing to accept, that 
the entirety of our subjective experience must be consulted 
to make the most subtly refined objective distinctions in 
judging poetry. Narrowly cultivated analytic skills and 
··. simplistic criteria, for example of irony, tone, or textu.re, 
result in crude interpretation because they lack this re-
· .. finement. In fact, Richards said, any fruitful critical 
of this sort is more likely to be misused than 
; 0 t because it will probably be hypostatized as a suppos-
ly infallible criterion independent of conscious choice, 
e genuine act of critical judgment. Richards also pro-
posed a third corollary of his affective principle, that 
any presumed lapse in poetic technique breaking a parti.c-
ular rule (for example he mentioned nonsense, vagueness, 
mi.xed metaphoru and the pathetic fallacy) is justified if it 
produces a satisfactory effect in the sensitive reader.36 
The ultimate question of formal technique for Richards was 
its effect, the subtlety and human apprqpriateness of the 
response it evokes. Technique was subordinated to human 
response, defined by the effect it produces. 
Richards proposed that the effect of poetry has four 
aspects: sense, feeling, tone and intention. our failure 
in the interpretation of poetry is a consequence, he said, 
of our inability to respond properly to one or more of these 
aspects. Sense is the thought in poetry, the intellectual 
content which is necessary to control our feelings. (pp. 191, 
274) Feeling is the attitude we have toward what we describe, 
our usually fugitive emotional response which we try to 
anchor defined by sense. (pp. 181, 210-11, 217} Tone (as 
rediscovered by Richards) is our attitude toward those whom 
we address, which in poetry is that of the poet toward his 
.' readers.. Richards suggested that tone is the most difficult 
of poetry to define since it is'thoroughly intermingled 
the other aspects of meaning, but he emphasized that 
•. it is probably the most important ingredient .of style, and, 
Unfortunately, the most common source of failure through 
such as over-insistence and condescension. (pp. 182, 
Finally, intention is the aim of the poet, the "effect 
he is endeavoring t.o promoteq" outside and yet controlling 
the relationship among the other three aspects. It is the 
purpose to be accomplJ..shed throuqh their instrumental:i.ty. 
(pp. 182, 356) Richards believed that all four of these 
aspects must successfully interact in good poetry and that 
the competent reader in a high state of vigilance must be 
sensitive to this interaction. 
The shocking disclosure of Practical Criticism was that 
the great majority of readers fall grotesquely short of this 
ideal& Misinterpretation is not only commonplaceu but much 
more frequent than good o:r. even adequate intexpretaticm. 
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In fact, Richards proposed, "We must cease to regard a mis-
interpretation as a mere unlucky accident. We must treat it 
as a normal and probable event.cu (p. 336) Richards e::,tab-
lished ten primary difficulties leading t~ misinterpretation, 
each posing a separate problem though he found they usually 
"depend upon one a.nother like a cluster of monkeys": 
1. The difficulty making out the plain sense of poetry, 
its overt meaning* 
2. The difficulty of sensuous apprehension, of experiencing 
the form and movement of poetry. 
3. The difficulty in visualizing imagery& 
4. The intrusi.vE~ influence of mnemonic irrelevances. 
5. The intrusive influence of stock responses, "views 
and emotions already fully prepared in the reader's 
mind. 11 
6. A proneness to sent:i.mentalityp the "over-facility in 
certain emotional directions." 
7. Inhibition, the fear of acknowledging a particular 
experience. 
8. Doctrinal adhesions, the intrusiveness of irrelevant 
beliefs. 
9~ Technical presuppositions, the ac~eptance or rejection 
of a style because of its technical qualities, usu-
ally through identification with the styles of other 
poets. 
10. General critical preconceptions, the judgment of poetry 
according to a particular critical theory. {pp. 13-17, 
180) 
Perhaps the most basic item for Richards in this catalogue 
,, 
of temptations was the fifth, the stock responser the crutch 
of average intelligence in modern civilization. Richards 
conceded that the stock response is convenient and even 
necessary in our daily behavior: if we cannot rely upon the 
habitual certitude of the stock response our lives would be 
troubled by a plethora of Hamlet-like indecisions and un-
resolved sensitivities, and we would be unable to act. (pp. 240-
In poetry, however, he maintained, the stock response 
at the expense of genuine experience. It encourages 
impersonality (except in false echoes of other poets), 
and a general withdrawal from experience 
another e It i.s a "premctture fixation" 
leading to facile conclusions the very antithesis of poetry, 
though too often proposed as its virtue, gaining credence 
in external conventions and expectations~ E:itamples would be 
the metrical regularity and archaic diction of nineteenth 
century poetasters and Eliotesque juxtapositions in modern 
academic verse. In contrast, Richards said, "Nearly all 
good poc:'lt:r.y i.s disconcerting, for a mo1nent. at hJ:ast, when 
we first t,ee it for what it is. Some dear habit has to be 
abandoned if we are to follow it o 11 (p. 254) Good poC'-,try 
disrupts our expectations to expand our potential for ex-
perience, just as this potential must be expanded that we 
might respond to the unique validity of poetry. There i.s 
mutual feedback, a reciprocal interaction with riothing to 
gain but sincerity and, collectively, civilization itself. 
In Mencius on the Mind, published in-1932, Richards 
shifted his concern fr.om criticism to the problems of multi-
ple definition, but in 1935 he returned to criticism in 
Coleridge 2!l Imagination with a modification in his Vi(:!WS 
which has been treated as a recantation of his earlier rad-
ical distinction between science and poetry and his 11 impulse 11 
theory upon which this distinct.ion had been basea. 37 In a 
passage quoted earlier, Richards himself insisted upon t.ht~ 
continuity in his ideas, with a change merely in their 
"metaphors," and this would seem to have been the.case. If 
anything, he was shifting his emphasis from the discreet 
II • • sign si.tuat.ion" to the metadynamics of consciousness, in 
Psychology to the gestalt and in semantics to the total 
projected meaning. He was clearly rejecting s.imple behavior-
ism (which he had always avoided though sometimes dangerously 
approaching it) for a more sophisticated materialistic theory 
of effect in poetry6 
What most intrigued Richards in Coleridge's criticism, 
vast repository of undifferentiated insights, was his theory 
of the imagination. He found the integ~ative capacity of 
the imagination explained by Coleridge to combine the objec-
tive and subjective realms in a unity of experience: "The 
subject is what it is through the objects it has been~" 
(p. 57) A new possibility thus offered itself, extending 
the principle of sincerity to bridge (or bypass) the in-
ductive gap of the "sign situation" without resorting to 
scientific verification, this time through unity in the 
coadunated and "esemplastic" act of experie'i'1ce. Accordi.ng 
to Richards, this unity would settle the rivalry between the 
"regulative" and "constitutive" epistemologies extending 
back as far as Plato and Aristotle with a synthesis in the 
equation between our statements "I am" and "t.here are things." 
(pp. 65, 184) consciousness would be entirely a matter of 
projection according to A.E. Powell's theory of romantic 
imagination, the mind an "active, self-forming, self-real-
izing system" which both generates and discovers reality in 
projection of meaning beyond itself. (pp. 69, 146) In 
synthesis of subject and object, the mind would also 
ntegrate experience according to an 11 all in each" principle 
at the units of meaning surrender their inde~endence to 
ti \J 
their cooperative purpose. (pp. 81, 97) An isolated object 
and its subjective counterpart in the 11 unit 11 of experience 
would be abstractions we project according our interests into 
t.he realm of "things. 11 (pp. 144-46) Richards propoi;ed that 
our projections of nature may be divided into four basic kinds 
often confused with each otherz (1) all influences on the , 
mind, (2) all the images of nthings" we _take to be the world 
we live in, ( 3) the _images of "things II conf inned by the uni-
versal experience of mankind, and (4) the images of ''things" 
verified by scientific procedures. He found us to be pres-
ently embroiled in a futile conflict between false empiri-
cism, the confusion of Nature in the third sense with its 
first sense, and an equally false intuitiveness, an inadequate 
projection of nature in the second sense. What we need, he 
said, is a rigid scrutiny of nature projected in the fourth 
sense, of science, in order to establish the proper :r:·elatio:n-· 
ship among the other three. (pp. 157-58, 170) 
Richards proposed a theory of "mythology" to explain 
coherence of experience we project upon nature, even in 
science. He def:i.ned mythology as "the utterance of the whole 
and, as such, inexaustible to meditation." What 
a myth, he said, is what we put into it, the 
that explai.ns and justifies our experienc~. Myth trans-
us from beasts to men·and actually gives us what may 
e construed as soul in the value.and purpose we find in our 
ives. (pp. 171-74, 181) It is the pattern, embodiment, and 
manization of our projected world of experiencee Richards 
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not surprisingly clai~ed that poetry is the most satisfactory 
vehicle for myths, "the myth-making which most bring "the· 
whole soul of man into activity," but without evoking action, 
desire, will, or intellectual assent, the inadequacies he 
had combated in his earlier "impulse" theory. 38 Like syn-
aesthesis, poetic myth transcends a Lockean "regulative" 
meaning which is vulgarly didactic and an unjustified in-
cursion upon the methods of science. I_nstead, it is pro-
jection epitomized, not entirely understood or translatable 
into prose, a journey which is its own end with no desti-
nation beyond ·itself. (pp. 173, 213-14) We, its willing 
readers, must exert ourselves to integrate it with our 
repository of commonplace myths. In a restricted sense, 
of projection di$tilled and purifi~d, belief may be ic-
cepted as the credibility we vest in our myths,though this 
concept yet excludes belief as a commitment toward simpli-. 
fied goals and ideals. Thes~ are mythic, but not of poetry • . 
An ancillary concern of Richards in Coleridge on 
Imagination was the reiationship between words and experience. 
I , 
He challenged popular·· ,'linguistic a,f3sumptions by claiming 
that a word is not a unit of meaning, but an "abstraction 
,from an utterance"· which of itself, artificially isolated, 
/ 
/' ' 
many possible meanings to be useful for communication. 
He repeated his ;position in The Meaning of M~aning that the 
ost important factor in _the speech act is meaning, the 
of experience, not the symbol transferred to the 
ntext of ~yntax which has been only one component of the 
"sign situation 11 : "Apart from the speech act," he said, 
"there are no words." (pp. 101, 104, 107) He was primarily 
interested in the organic interanimation of words as symbols 
of experience, and even wEmt so far as to claim that the 
absence of syntax is often favorable to the imagination. 
(p. 91) He did find in the single word at least a modicum 
of projected imagination ("The projectiqn of its meaning 
into a word is an instance of Imag.ination"), 39 but the 
cluster of such projections in the. speech act obviously 
seemc-:id the key t.o the fullest ret:1otu:ces of the ,imagi.n.ation. 
In Th~ Philos9.eh.x_ of Rhetoric, published a year later 
in l.936, the last of Richards' books to be treated in this 
chapter, 40 he explored more thoroughly this relationship 
between language and the imagination. He attacked what 
he labeled the "Usage Doctrine, 11 a prevalen't: attitude of 
the thirties that words are "fixed factors 11 combined in a 
sentence as a mosaic might be put together 11 of discreet 
independent tesserae." Instead, he proposed, words and 
their meanings result from the wide II ir1terplay of the in-
terpretive possibilities of the whole utterance." (p. 55) 
, Meaning organically shifts and flows to adapt itself to 
any particular context of this utterance, and the defini-
tion of particular words is part of this process in~a 
of experience through the interpenetratioh of 
11 •• olanguage, well used, is a £2~letion and 
oes what the intuitions of sensation by themselves cannot 
o. Words are t.he meeting points at which regions of 
.,,. . ., 
V -"• 
experience which can never combine in sensation or intui-
tion, come together. They are the occasion and the means 
of that growth which is the min.d's endless endeavm; to 
order it.selfo Tha.t is why we have language. It is no mere 
signa.lli.ng syst~>:m. 1141 Words may not be separated from 
experience, what we might call the "images" of words, but 
they do bring meaning to these images t~rough their inter-
action (not necessarily visual) afforded by the context of 
language. Words cannot be separated from their context of 
e,,perience in the "sign situation, 11 but they bring meaning 
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to the experience they symbolize. Metaphor particularly 
interested Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric and should 
be briefly mentioned in this connection. He proposed that 
thought itself is metaphor because it "proceeds by com-
parisons, 11 the mind primarily acting as a "cormect:i.ng organ e 11 
(pp. 94, 125) For this reason the figurative device of 
metaphor in poetry may be understood as the superimposition 
of metaphor upon metaphor. (pp. 108-9) The combination of 
two senses or images, 11 teno.r 11 and "vehicle" (their names 
here proposed by Richards and now generally accepted), in 
a single word or phrase leaves each sense individually meta-
. Phoric as an act of consciousness, but in their interanimation 
creates an unusual new experience, an image exceeding and 
Yet controlled by the language evoking it. Throtigh metaphor 
Poetry becomes the consummate embodimcmt of human experience, 




As I propose~d earlier (and this brief survey has un-
doubtedly shown), the wealth of theories proposed by Richards 
in all their modifications and metaphoric transformations 
have made it difficult for his critics with rival theories 
to defend. His total corpus of ideas in nine books of 
criticism looms llke an enormous elephant whose shape is 
to be judged, according to the parable, by the touch of 
blind men, each lc1d to a different part of its anatomy. And, 
to be expected, the results have been less than satisfactory. 
The more restricted the view, the more likely the assailant 
has commitb.~d errors in interpretation, and his only pro-
tection (but a good one) has been the relative ignorance of 
others. 11 '1.'hci Golden Rule of Scholarship" quoted by Richards 
or co:mment on anything in a book which you have not read 
from cover to cover, 1142 would seem to apply in his own case 
to h.i.s entire output of books, a formidable task indeed. 
And ft.1x· those who have read and studied his books r<;imains 
the even mo:ce formidable task o:f: unravelling critical meta-
phors as superimpositions reinforcing each other where they 
might seem inadequate by themselves. The task is difficult 
t and perhaps best undertak(m first in a sympathetic light 





Those who have not taken this arduous route but leapt 
~o define their broad differences too hastily h~ve unneces-
sarily brought their own critical competence into quest.ion. 
For example an attack by Montgomery Belg:i.on was scathingly 
refuted in detail by Richards simply through Belgian's 
evident inability to understand Richards' ideas: he pro-
posed an interpretation which Richards ironically suggested 
had been itself "a. contribution towards the study of inter-
pretatione 1143 It seems doubly remarkable that Robert 
Stallman later quoted Belgian approvingly in one of his more 
flagrant misinterpretations of Richards, that he "equates 
poetry with life," an explanation so vague and meaningless 
as to be safely ignorea. 44 More recently, to turn to a 
typical formalist assessment, Murray Krieger has zealously 
attacked the 11 vitalism 11 of Richards' theories compared with 
a "contextualist 11 position generally advocated by the second 
,, 
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generation of New Critical apologists, including Vivas, Wellek, 
Heilman, and Unger, among others acknowledged by Krieger as 
mentors and teachers .. 45 In defense of the1r views, Krieger 
resorted to simplifications and categorical generalizations 
to such a.n extent that one asks why Richards might not have 
recognized the patent absurdity of his views. The answer 
is quite simple: they have not been the views of Richards, 
but of Krieger's conception of Richards, an altogether dif-
ferent matter~ For example, Krieger clai1ned, "For Richards 
of all experience is the arousal of attit~des, the 
of the e:Kperience depending upon the extent of 
omplexity in the cluster of attitudes. u46 (italics add<:1d) 
n this thoroughly misleading simplification, Krieger 
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neglected to mention that the admittedly quantitative differ-
ence proposed by Richards between art and common exper.ience 
usually leads to quali 't,$ti.ve distinctions, for example in 
the "stock response'' ;,acceptaiHe to Richards in our daily 
behavior but decidedly not in poetry. Different "attitudes" 
would thus be involved in the experience of poetry and that· 
of daily living. But what did Krieger niean by the wo.rd 
"attitude"? If he was referring to synaesthesis, sincerity, 
or myth :tn poetry, as proposed by Richards at one point or 
another in his career, there might be a grain of truth in 
this explanation, though Richards himself severely criti-
cized Max Eastman for exactly this undifferentiated en-
thusiasm for experience. 47 But if Krieger is referring to 
"attitude" as an opinion or belief, as the common usage of 
,• 
the word would imply, then he is attribut.in9 to Richards a 
position exactly the opposite of what he has held. Through-
out his career Richards has consistently sought to define 
and encourage the experience of poetry that cannot be boiled 
down to attitudes. 
Krieger also claimed that Richards' obsession with the 
relationship between a poem and its experience "forced" him 
~to deny" the relationship between a poem and reality. 48 
Krieger here repeated the common argument against Richards 
.With somewhat more than thfJ usual exaggeration, but ignored 
~as have the others) that Richards proposed the inductive 
w' ap in the "sign situation" fully conscious that the emotive 
1 
referential functions of language cannot be entirely 
isolated from each other. Furthermore, also ignored by 
Krieger, Richards subsequently proposed a number of pos~d-
bilitiec for bridging {or bypassing) this gap, including 
his theories of mythic projection and Confucian sincerity, 
both of which have been mentioned in this chapter. If 
Richiu:ds correctly extcmded this fundamental problem of 
epistemology to aesthetics, he was hardl,y victimized by 
his awareness. In fact, with his theory of the "sign situ-
ation" he proposed exactly the subject-object relationship 
Krieger says he denied, but with full recognition of the 
problems compe.lling its thorough .investiqation. His effort 
to grapple with these problems has been far more successful 
than that of formalists with their simplistic, unexplored 
epistemology of a perfect equation between experience and 
rEHlli ty. 
Krieger additionally claimed that Richards has falla-
ciously presented us with an absolute choict~ between mech·-
an.istic psychological analysis, his own approachf and no 
approach at all, the absence of analysis through a "self-
wil.led mute" idealism. 1149 His implication was that Richards 
would not accept the value of formal analysis, what he 
considered the fruitless pursuit of fictive Platonic forms. 
But Richards has imposf.:id no such absolute choice. Through·-
out his career he has treated "technical" analysis as a 
necessary supplement to affective criticism, and in fact 
his approach to explication as well as his theories of 
etaphor, tone, ambi.gui ty, and irony have betm rea.di ly 
ti/ 
adopted for the usos of formal criticism. He emphasized 
their importance in the context of affective criticism, but 
he certainly did not proscribe their use in a strictly 
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formal (or 11 technical 11 ) approach to criticism. If an abso-
lute cho:i.ce has been e:;;tablished between formal and affective 
critic ism, it has been impos1;:;d by others O not Richards him·-
self, who tried to maintain a 11 dualist 11 _critical outlook. 
Our last example from Krieger I s imposing supply of misinfo:cma=• 
tion is his claim that Richardt,' affective approach pre-
vented him from finding any norm for the experience of 
poetry except a clat:rn of responserj relatively close to an 
author 1 s, which, Krieger claimed, is 11 merely the regulator 
of tlH,! lowest denominators ranged about it~ 1150 In other 
words, the only standctrd Rich,,.1rds could find to judgt":! tht'! 
validity of poetry I s ex.plication was i t.s common e;;cperienoe 
"relatively close" to that of the poet, too imprecise a 
standard to be useful to the critic. Again Richards seems 
to have been attacked for defining a problem of criticism 
that would otherwise have been overlooked. Richards was 
of course quite concerned with finding a "norm," or at 
least a range of adequate responses that might be considered 
normative, and he devoted an entire book, Practic~! Criticism, 
to this question.. He proposed a choice of four possible 
:norms, of the artist himself, the perfect reader, the qual-
':;._ 
lfified reader and our actual flawed experience (too oft,~n) ~ , 
$, 
rf1in the e:>cplication of poetry. He recognized that the second, 
(!), tf the ideal reader, provides the best norm, but also an 
impossible one; he alr;o recognized the advantages of the 
first, the artist himselfu but also its unavailability to 
the p'..:.liL.:- at large. He therefore chose the third as a 
practical goal and began grappling with the fourth to bring 
our inadequate reading habits up to the level of competence. 
His presentation of a choice did not mean that he lacked a 
suitable norm; quite the contrary, he had a thoroughly 
sophisticated theory of norms that forced him to reject that 
of the 11 pe.rfect" r.ea.der t1pparently required by Krleger I s 
contextualism. These manifold errors of Krieger would not 
be so irritating but for his condescension toward presumed 
errors in Richards and the fairly widespread circulation of 
his views. 
Krieger seems to have owed his attitude toward Richards 
,, 
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primarily to Eliseo Vivas, whose 1935 article, 11 Four Notes on 
I.A. Richards 1 Aesthetic Theory," 51 first represented this 
formalist position, fully as erroneous but with a good deal 
more sophistication. Besides the several a.rguments he 
furnished Krieger, Vivas additionally proposed that Richards' 
theory of aesthetic response is Apollonian in the Nietzschean 
sense and excludes the entire range of Dionysian response. 
He insisted that art is important as "stimulus to the yea-
saying qualities of existence,"52 in other words as the 
arousal of belief and encouragement to action. We would con-
this "vitalist" position but must postpone the 
until next chapter. Vivas also claimed, however, 
a delicate reconciliation of impulses in literature does 
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not necessarily reproduce itself in the minds of its readers, 
nor, for that matter, does it necessarily have a salutary 
effect, as would be indicated by the many neurotics and crim-
53 inals in the craft of letters. His point cannot be en-
tirely denied, though Richards would reply (ignoring Lukacs' 
excellent arguments about decadence) that normative value in 
literature cannot be judged by the exceptions inevitably to 
be found. The reader benefits from exposure to a variety of 
poets so idiosyncrasies may cancel each other in his accu-
mulated experience. As for reproduction of sensitivity in 
the act of reading, Richards would insist that reproduction 
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conscious duplication, howc➔ver inef f ic:i.ent and subord.inate 
to the projective imagination, and this duplication at least 
somewhat modifies tht~ structure of person·ality in whi.ch it 
has been received~ Only the computer perfectly isolates its 
operations from the modifications of information so this 
input may be entirely erased. If this premise is accepted, 
and to deny it is tantamount to solipsism, precisely the 
radical "subjectivism" of which Richards has been accused, 
then the question of sensitivity evoked by poetry is a matter 
of degree, exactly the point he has repeatedly tried to make.5 4 
The angriest and most hostile early assessment of 
Richards• also written in 1935, was the review of Coleridg~ 
~ ~ination by F.R. Leavis, "Dr. Richards, Bentham and 
Coleridge. 11 55 It was probably this review more than any other 
le critical evaluation that put the stamp of orthodoxy 
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upon the New Critical disparagement of Richards' theories. 
Once Leavis opened the attack, it became fashionable to treat 
Richards as a beneficial ~~rly influence whose flaws were 
nevertheless too eg:i..c:~ivusifor his theories to be taken seri-
ously. Leavis devoted a good deal of his argument to Richards' 
presentation of his theory (his philosophical predisposition, 
exclusions, abstractness, and lack of c~arity and concrete 
evidence) rather than the theory itself. Instead of treat-
ing Richards 1 views as a proposal or prolegomenon to a theory, 
he attacked their organization and presentation with the 
rigours of explication usually reserved for poetry itself. 
Many of his arguments may be granted, for exampl,~ upon 
Richards' utter neglect of the social, conventional, and 
historical backgrounds of literature, but the question re-
mains, "So what? Warm I t Richards neverthc;less correct. upon 
the topic he dealt with?" Questions raised by Leavis upon 
the epistemology of aesthetics were relatively few, and seem 
to have mostly involved the concept of myth. He challenged 
the usefulness of a theory of myths so "generously" in-· 
elusive as to embrace both poetry and science, and lacking 
the specificity to differentiate even myths of different 
magnitudes. But in doing so, he apparently failed to rec-
ognize exactly this purpose in the four projective·theories 
of nature proposed by Richards. His attack also provides us 
With a fine example of our difficulty with Richards' over-
lapping critical metaphors. There is "not even a beginning 
in the serious critical analysis of poetry," as Leavis 
claimed, simply because Richards had exhaustively presented 
this part of his theory in Practical Criticism, the book 
whi.ch introduced the r.s.erious critical analysis" pursued 
today. In Coler:i.dqe :~n· Irnac}i.nat.ion, Richards did not repu-
diate his earlier specificity, but shifted to the pro-
jective concept of myth to define the epistemological basis .. 
of his theory. Lea.vis thus seems to ha.v.e been pitting 
Richards against himself, employing e~rlier standards of 
specificity against later abstractions intended to be 
complementary. Richards' earlier books had often been 
criticized for being too behavioristicr ironically, now 
that he proposed an organic theory to defend himself from 
these charges, he was immediately pounced upon for being 
too broad and ab i:..; tract • 
,' 
The critical assessments by D.W. Harding and Max Black 
were a good deal more balanced and included a point or two 
upon Richardt,;' technical competence that may be ment.ioned 
72 
in passing.56 Harding principally objected to the confi-
dence of Richards' psychological amateurishness, particularly 
in his theory of the "impulse," a hypothetical entity of 
dubious value for criticism. However, granting this short-
coming, no critic except Aristotle has y<'?.t transcended the 
· limitations of amateur psychology with greater success than 
Richards. He was expertly familiar with current trends in 
and managf.?d quite successfully to simplify them 
for his layman audience. It is true he did not adequately 
efine many of his technical concepts (most obviously the 
"impulse~ 11 ) , but here his a.mbi tion merely exceeded what he 
accomplished, which remains vastly more thorough and con-
sistent than the Platonic vagaries most critics have con-
fused with aesthetic response. Max Black similarly attacked 
the amateurish nominalism of Richards' early theory of 
meaning, claiming that Richards had relied upon too narrow 
a definition of "referent" as a thing tq be signified with a 
name. 57 But int.he "sign situation" defined by Ogden and 
Richards, the referent is a total body of experience stim-
ulated by myriad 11 things 11 in the physical universe, and the 
symbol is me.rely one component which is given the independ-
ence to interact in the context of language. This hardly 
seems a narrow definition, or the naive behaviorism assailed 
by Black elsewhere in the same article._ As Ransom had 
correctly maintained earlier, the nominalism of Richards was 
actually his emphasis upon the psychological context of a 
symbol being its 11 referent 11 rather than the "things" ex-
perienced that might have caused or stimulated this context, 
and this seems an entirely different matter. With much 
more justification, Black also criticized Richards' neglect 
of syntax, the full 11 assertion 11 of an idea in contrast to 
the sense of particular words which is merely "presented." 
Black showed Richards to have treated "presentod 11 -symbols as 
if they were "asserted," prematurely imposing syntactic 
standards of truth in order to include a greater number of 
in the category of emotive, non-referential dis-
And indeed it seems true that Richardst general 
73 
neglect of syntax might have led to this difficulty, though 
it had little direct bearing upon Richards' theory of affec-
tive criticism. Black himself fell into a comparable trap, 
however, when he declared that. the :resolution of ethical 
74 
issues with a thecn:y of the II interplay of gc-merated emotive 
influence" is almost 11 mischievous. 1159 'l'he attempt to eliminate 
emotion from ethical judgment seems the _same· kind of pre--
mature categorizing, and in fact an impossibility hypocritical 
to maintain. The standards of verification might be two-
fold and more elaborate than Richards had calculated, but 
the affective phenomenon is equally impexvious to the effort 
to simplify and eliminate it. 
The most important theoretical response to Richards 
seems to have bet1n the long first chapter (131 pages) .in New 
Criticism by John Crowe Ransom, published ln 1941. Ransom 
was not so interested in refuting or discrediting Richards 
as in reassessing his ideas in order to incorporate what he 
found of value in a more acceptable theory of aesthetic 
response. He disliked the 11 nominaliem" of Richards in frankly 
preferring the affective response to poetry to its objective 
interpretation. It seemed an unnecessary repetition to devote 
our analysis first to a description of the text and then to 
that of its duplication in the mind of the competent reader. 
our affective response beyond this duplication becomes 
and inchoate, introducing dangerous temptations and 
Uncertainties, he proposed replacing affective theory with a 
new approach, "cognitiv(~" criticism, c~mphasi.zing our inter-
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pretive understanding and thus the text itself as directly 
understood. Our total response, the 11 choice of our whole 
personality," would be left to occur spontaneously and appro-
priately if the cognitive problems have been adequately 
dealt with. '!'his neglect is thoroughly justified, he in-
sisted, because the experience of art is in fact primarily 
cognitive and its cognitive interpretati~n gains for us the 
acumen to differentiate among our emotional responses. 
Emotions-in-themselves are fictions and "all but unintel-
ligible for us in their supposed independent purity." With-
out cognition to attach themselves to, they would dissipate 
and very likely vanish.60 Ransom's shift in emphasis from 
affect {not denied but clearly subordinated) to cognition 
appa.r:f.Hltly solved the plethora of difficulties Richards 
brought upon criticism. Truth, logic, and belief were re-
instated as qualified virtues of poetry, and formal inter-
pretation was given its freedom since the cognitive response 
merely replicates the formal properties of a text in the 
mind of its ideal reader. 
Ransom's proposal has considerable appeal and not sur-
prisingly furnished the basis for a "New Criticism," as he 
proposed it to do, a methodology benefiting from Richards' 
insights but liberated from the muddle of subjectivism im-
posed by his affective framework. Others like. Wellek and 
Wimsatt SE!em to ha,ve mer<."!ly elaborated and justified in 
Schol,irship tlH-lse foundati.ons proposed by Ransom. However, 
are dangerous pitfalls in the theory of cognitive 
criticism. Affect is indeed consolidated and differentiated 
in its co~p1:Lt:i.V<l! embodimentp but, as I lat.er try to show in 
~hapter Five, it also activates and directs our cognition. 
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~ dialectical interpenetration exists between the two that 
prevents one from being artificially isolated from the other. 
Richards cannot investigate affect isolated from cognition, 
as in fact he does not try to do, but R~nsom and others have 
the sam(:! impediment that they cannot trcjat cognition inde-
pendent of affect. Such a compartmentalization does not 
occur in consciousness, and to propose it in theory invites 
error. Ransom himself has avoided serious mistakes, but 
his theory has encouraged the formalist reductionism art.ic=• 
ulated by Cleanth Brooks, its most respectable practitioner, 
and generally pursued in academic scholarship. Formal 
,' 
questions were pursued to the exclusion of personality and 
even history (the collective inter~ction of interests and 
personalities), supposedly "reductionist" byways from the 
essential responsibility of contextual interpretation. How-
ever, we must agree with Richards that the objective text 
itself is not of primary importance since it i.s a meaning-
less clutter of hieroglyphics if we do not share the lan-
guage and experience to understand it. Nor is our strictly 
cognitive response of primary importance since it is,·in 
fact, a feat of radical abstraction impossible in human be-
havior. What is of primary importanc(i is our cognitive-
affective response, and here, whether we like it or not, 
a11 the subjective difficulties proposed by Richards arise 
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as if from Pandora's box. They cannot be brushed aside and 
arbitrarily excluded from criticism, nor need they be, for 
Richards has shown how at least some of them may be quantifi.ed, 
sorted, and brought into a little more order. 
Poetry involves our total response to the text of poetry, 
so its study must be~ facto the study of this response. 
Any theory diverting us from this essentjal task is (I respect-
fully submit) thoroughly misleading. •rhe "Affective Fallacy 11 
labeled and delivered by Wimsatt is hardly a fallacy, but 
in fact the first principle to be taken into account~ The 
real fallacy beguiling us from the job of criticism might 
be labeled, as I earlier proposed, the "Projective Fallacy, 11 
what Richards explained in P~!E£ip).es of Liter~y Criticism 
to be "projecting an effect to make it a quality of its 
cause. 1161 or we might reconsider (as Richards asked in The 
Philoso.E.!".!X. of Rhetoric, p. 116) what William James called 
the "Psychologist's '.r"'allacy," the confusion of our method-
ology with the material investigated. The objectification 
involved in both fallacies is perfectly acceptable and even 
desirable for the ~~p__~rie~ of beauty, as Santayana in-
sightfully explained in his principle that beauty is pleasure 
regarded as a quality of a thing. But it is not acceptable 
unrecognized in the !>_tudx: of this experience. Here is exactly 
Where the unexplored assumptions of formal (or "contextuali.t:;t"} 
rcriticism arise~ in the "projective" confusi.on of a formal 
rtethodology with the objective text it supposedly explains. 
~Wherea.s ··ff ,. ·v,,. r4t' • Int ' t 'l f' tl C Il:\ 1 't , - d ec,.:.1 .. c .... ,. ·1.c1.s ries o c e :t.ne ·1t~ ,o -p .ex1. y 
l 
of this relat:ionshi.p, formal criticism treats a subjective 
need, the analytic (and authoritarian) quest for shape, as 
if it were simply an intrinsic and sc~lf~ .. sufficien-t feature 
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of the text. Not so--the teleology of form is experience: 
form is imparted by the poet to be recognized by his readers 
for effects surpassing whatever gratification lies in pattern . 
it.self, as Richards cleverly demonstrated i.n his Jabberwocky 
parody of "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity.»62 Without 
the experience of meaning, form tumbles into an empty chc1os 
of hieroglyphic iterations. 
The ignorance of New Criticism ultimately lif;!S in a 
dubious theory of psychology, moi-:e erroneou13 than the II impulse" 
theory of Richards, that cognition may be isolated from 
affect. Its arrogance lies in the thoroughly misguided belief 
that its methodology justifies this ignora~ce and the un-
examined reductionism it encourages. 'I'o the contrary, the 
experience of poetry is multi-dimensional, requiring con-
siderably more breadth in its interpretation. Many realms 
of experience may be profitably brought to bear upon poetry, 
beyond even the limits of interpretation imposed by Richards. 
We may conditionally explore the unconscious response empha-
sized by psychoanalytic and archetypal approaches as well as 
the social response ernph,isized by the Marxist, and,· most 
recently, Structuralist approaches. All of these are in-
Volv~d, however ancillary, in the experience of poetry, and 
thus may be properly brought into account. The particular 
contribution of Richards, aside from having provided the 
initial inspiration for much of the valuable theory in New 
Criticism, has been in giving us a means to escape the cul 
de_ ~ into which this theory has led us·. The "choice of 
our whole personality" raises questions beyond any abstract 
theory of cogni.tion and whatever formal guidelines of ex-
plication it serves~ 'rhis II choice, 11 our affective response, 
is properly the common denominator of al.1 cri ti.cal approaches 
(including the formalist), affording the basis by which their 
differentiae may be synthetically explored. 
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Chapter Three: 
Richards' Later Criticism and a Stratificational Alternative 
The inadequacies of Richards' early theories that con-
cerned the New Critics were his pseudo-scientific reliance 
upon the concept. of the "impulse II and hi.!3 dichotomy of affect 
and cognition-·-they accepted the dichotomy but rejected his 
choice in affect to explain aesthetic experience. Instead, 
they emphasized poetry as a refinement of knowledge and 
shifted their sights to the "facts" known to criticism--the 
objective text as a composition to be explicated. Here we 
claim they were in error, for in this dichotomy neither of 
tho two componEmts 1 affect and cognition f may be?. extracted 
and purified to the exclusion of the other. 1 Richards had 
first proposed the dichotomy, but throug~~ut his career 
tricJd to f i.nd a. suitable harmony between the two, succes~· 
sively in the concepts of Chung Yung, 'I'olstoyan sincerity, 
and mythic projection, whereas the New Critics uncritically 
accepted its compartmentalization, leaping to a naive epis ... 
temological equation that ~hat we empirically observe in a 
text must (and can) be duplicated by a mirror-like aesthetic 
response.2 They wanted this response to be devoid of affect 
so our interpretive skills would not be distorted by sub-
jective bias, and with a passive intensity so the text would 
b1;1 duplicated accurately. However, this ideal is beyond 
human capabil:i. tic~s. and, for th:i.s reason, extraneous to 
aesthetic experience. To his credit, Richards conceded this 
II 
·. Perfect." re~1ponse to bE~ an unattainable one, though he has 
apparently encouraged our effort to approach its perfection .. 
But there is a more fundamental problem in Richards' 
affective theory ignored by New Critics, who in fact have 
been even less equipped than he to rectify it. Richards 
proposed a poetic response more dynamic than theirs, but by 
no mean:1 dynamic enough and without involving enough of the 
personality in this response. Richards µid propose an 
"active 11 theory of meaning, one which he could defend from 
Bertrand Russell's distinction bc~tween active and passive 
meanings, respectively "that of man uttering a word" and 
"of man hearing the word." The active meaning, he said, 
is the more fundamental of the two for it "explains much" 
in the passive meaning of our response. 3 This we must en-
tirely agree with, but we have to go further to declare 
that the so-called "passive" meaning of the reader is both 
as active and creative as the 11 active 11 processes of compo-
sition by the poet. The reader is initially a passive 
respondent to the "speech utterance" as an "interanimating" 
collection of words, but all of the:ise compose a '' sign situ-
ation" which he must then recreate as well as possible in 
the-context of his own experience. This necessitates his 
active involvement, his maximum freedom to move about both 
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in the context of poetry and his own background of experience 
to find whatever might seem of value in his ."transaction" 
With poetry. 4 Richards has apparently rejected this degree 
of freedom, as would be indicated by such remarks as, 11 The 
identity of the addressee is irrelevant to the poetry as 
poetr;y. 11 5 But we must reply that this freedom of identity 
is essential, e'vtm crucial to poetry; the "choice of the 
whole personality" proposed by Richards himself necessitates 
total involvement, not the distillation of attention he 
proposes. 6 Richards' dynamic principle conflicts with his 
st.atic limitations excluding personality, for our identity 
is ultimately what we do, the choice we make. 
It should be added here that our choice-making activity 
involves enormous realms of experience Richards wanted ex-
cluded from our response to poetry. The unconscious is 
involved in this "choice," particularly with its dynamics 
of repression and displacement, as well as mu: sense of 
social identity, the values and aspirations we share with 
those around us. Both realms influence language and poetry: 
"Words, said Bul{harin, "are the depository,, of the whole 
previous life of mankind." "Within the microcosm of the 
word," he claimed, "is e.mbedde;::d the macrocosm of history. 
The word, like the concept, :i.s abridged history, an 'abbre-
v.iatux·e, 1 or epitome, of soc:icil-historical life." 7 Norman 
Holland has also pointed out the "defensive" nature of words, 
their counter-cathectic value in protecting us from an un-
acceptable oral passivity. 8 Both these concepts of language, 
respectively Marxist and Freudian, are relevant to .the choice 
we make in the language of poetry, and thus deserve serious 
consideration in the context of affective criticism, as 
do other, comparable reductionist approaches, whether thematic, 
archetypal, existential, or structuralist. Ari eclectic 
working hypothesis may be proposed, in fact, that eaoh~cif 
these approaches is valid to the extent that it defines a 
particular area of :i-urn;:2n experience involved in this choice-
making activity. They may be more or leBB listed on a scale 








. . f ~, 9 ;\ • our discovery o: s1gn1f1cat1on in 
themes and patterns. 
pattern synchronically imposed upon 
literature in our futile struggle 
against entropy. 
personal comrni trnent and fulfillment: 
tested by literature. 
the contradictions of our role in 
history expressed in literature. 
the unconscious dynamics of fantasies 
in literature. 
our expectations of character and 
story-outcome shared with others. 
These categories are not mutually exclusive, and this 
list is certainly not exhaustive, for other reductionist 
approaches may easily be added, for example Christian ex-: 
egesis, currently of waning popularity. But each of these 
approaches occupier. territory in ml:tpping our "whole person-~ 
~lity," and thus helps explain the dynamics in our experi-
ence of poetry. Its topographical particulari~y suggests a 
model to help define our aesthetic response. It cannot be 
pre-emptively rejected as reductionism precisely because •it 
is proposed as a model, not an inclusive "objective" as-
sessment. If poetry were a static collocation of aesthetic 
properties, then we could make our choice among these re-
ductionist approaches as fiefdoms of inquiry, or, more 
likely, we could reject them all for formal reductionism, 
one more fiefdom, of the "intra-referential" context. How-
ever, poetry is dynamic, not static; and to the extent that 
any approach might~ objectively sufficient without in-
volving the others, it is indeed reductionist, a misleading 
reification. When acknowledged, nevertheless, the taxonomy 
in any of these approaches may be highly useful, qualified 
by the understanding that no model thoroughly defines ex-
perience or excludes the use of other models''· To make 
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either claim exceeds the benefits of reductionism. Each 
critical· approach is thus a "tool," an activity defined by 
Levi-Strauss as "bricolage," our pre-scientific craftsman-
ship, in this cas.e to 0build" a definition of aesthetic 
response.9 Our aesthetic response of course remains a mental 
process independent of its model, and should not be con-
fused with any of these reductionist approaches, as has often 
occurred, particularly with formalism. 'l'his confusion is 
precisely the Psychologist's Fallacy mentioned.last chapter. 
Every critical approach, however impressive, also has para-
digmatic limitations essential to be recognized. The most 





by reductionist boundariesv but sweeps across them all. 
These boundaries are only useful to the extent that they 
help chart its nwvement. 
Sartre proposed a dyna,mic theory of language which dr:ama.t-
icnlly contrasts with the exclusionary passiveness pro-. 
posed by Richar.ds ~ Sc1rtre claimed sl:mpl,y, 11 •.ro speak is to 
act," and, without contradicting himself, "To write is to 
give,," He also said, "By speaking, I reveal the situation 
by my Vt;1ry intention of changing it, 11 su9qesting the extent 
to which .lanquage involVE:S purpose~ "'I'lrn engaged writer, 1r 
he added, "knows that words are action. He knows that to 
reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by planning 
to ,,..._h ... n,-... .,, ulO ~ ... «J. ~\'.::;: 0 He propoged thf;; wr:i. ter I s e:n~1,a,geny2:nt. v his 
•' 
comm.i tmc-mt to this change in a social (and specif i.cally 
Marxist) context, but the principle applies to other dimeti-
sicmr; of experience as WHll c He claimed that each word is 
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11 a wag(~r--a r.isk assumed 6 11 and he personified and projected 
this «risk" in our dynamic relationship with language, giving 
it almost superhuman proportions: 
Thus, regarding language, it is our shell and our anten-
nae; it protects us against others and informs us about 
them; it is a prolongation of our senses, a third eye 
which is going to look into our neighbor;s heart. We 
are within language as within our body. We feel it 
spontaneously while going beyond it toward other ends, 
as. w.:~ feel our hands and OUX:' feet; we perceive it when 
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it is the other who is using it, as we perceive the 
limbs of others. There is the word which is lived and 
the word which is met. But in both cases it is in the 
course of an undertaking, either of the acting upon others, 
or the other u.pon n1e. 11 
For Sartre language asserts purpose, behavior, assessment, 
and our entire identity. It is not the .distillation of 
sensitivity in a speech utterance, but an "expressive cos-
mology," the world defined in its projection by the speaker. 
This dynamic conception of language proposed by Sartre 
was rooted in a theory of communication. He considered 
language a socia.l act, a "collaboration" between the writer 
and hi.s readers, 12 the "appeal. 11 made by the writer to the 
reader's freedom,9 uniting the two toward a social goal, "the 
subjectivity of a society in permanent revolution. 11 13 The 
writer "mediates II this revolution in the self-awa.rent~ss he 
instills in his readers: "If you name the behavior of an 
individual, you reveal it to him~ he sees himself. And 
since you are at the same time naming it to all the others, 
he knows that he is seen at the moment he f:rnes himself. 1114 
The reader is thus both a victim and accomplice of the writer; 
his ·act of reading is a "dialectical correlative" of that 
of writing in their "co-joint" exper..ienceo Reading is an 
activity making itself passive in order to recreate the 
experience of the writer, but in this re-creation, paradox-
ically, 11 passivi.ty becomes an act. 11 The writer· "takes ad-
V'antage11 of what the reader knows II in order to tl:'.!ach him 
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what he·does not know": the reader passively acquiesces to 
their sh.a.ring of knowlc.:dge, but rm.u;t actively make his own 
further discoveries ca.tal.yzed (or "mediated 11 ) by the writer $15 
Any alternative to this communication of discovery is an 
eva.sion, exis rather than E_-!_'.'-51.xi . .s •16 In s~riarch for a ME'.!thod 
he later defined the particular evasion of formalism as being 
fetishist: II • • .we simply make a fetish out of the book 
(which often happens) just as one may do with a pi.ece of 
merchandise by considering it as a thing that speaks for 
itself and not as the rt'?ality of a man objectified through 
his work. 11 17 This reality must be 11 objectified 11 through 
its shar,~d act of communication, and if comrnunicat.:i.on breaks 
d·own or is discarded for false objectivity in formalism, 
then art becomes neurotic--a fetish. 
It is not necessary to agree entirely with Sartre to 
recognize the comparatively static (and fetishistic) limi-
tations in Richards' tl:H?.OI'Y of communi.cation $ Richa:t.~ds 
deemphasized the factors of collaboration and of the reader's 
active assimilation of aesthetic experience. In the paradigm 
of information theory commonly used, 
Speaker -- encoding -- message -- decod i.ng -·- Hearer, 
he emphasized "message-decoding, 11 .an improvement over-the 
formalist :i:eliance upon "message" alone, but in doing so he 
comparatively reduced the~ role of the 11 hearer 11 to the abstract 
Process of "making a choice," a relatively passive experience 
compared with the "Dionysian II response d(:1f ined by Sartre. 
i.chard.s also deemphasized the total process of communication 
apresented by the entire paradigm, which would open criti-
lsm to the variety of ':i_·~proaches mentioned above. With his 
nessage·~df.?Coding I tL unca,.:io~.~, he was able to ignore them. 
In his criticism published since World War II, Richards 
Lmself has been profoundly concerned with information theory, 
1d in fact has proposed a new tlrnory of. literature elabo-
sting the paradigm represented above to emphasize even 
.1.rt:her the 11 m,;'lssage-decoding II truncation. His views have 
!come more static and exclusionary than before, dangerously 
cirting the temptations of formalism, while he has increas-
igly neglected the question of affect, but without neces-
i.rily denying its in1portanc(~. In his article, 11 Emotive 
!aning Again," (1948) he took pains to concur with Max 
Lack that, "The bandying about of 'emotive' has done more 
1rm than good 8 11 and, in fact, confessed t.hat his own use of 
1e word "emotive" had b,~en a useful n~dficat.ion "encap-
1lating11 its topic. 18 He proposed that metaphor is a 
~e useful vehicle for the study of our affective response 
ian emotion, and that the essential polarity in language 
Lght more profitably be considered referential-metaphoric 
1ther than referential-emotive. 19 But since no idea is 
:rictly referential, he said, even theory must be partlj 
~taphoric, a principle certainly true of his own, as shown 
:1st chapter. 'l1hus the presumably "referential" explanation 
~ aesthetics is metaphor (as theory) about metaphor (as 
Jetic figuration) of metaphor (thought itself, as proposed 
in Coleridge ~ .!E~~-t:.i.on). Richards did not exactly 
abandon emotion, though, as may bE, more clear J.y seen in 
~Emotive Language Still," an article published the next year 
(1949}. Here he a.cknowledged, as mentioned above, that lan·-
guage does not usefully sort into emotive and referential 
components since they are cor.nbined i.n speech, and a purely . 
emotive or referential utterance does nat exist. The dif-
ference between the t·w·o may only be us<2ifully applied to 
determining their balance~ A predominantly ernoti ve expresr;iu;;, 
would tend more to rec,lll prior occurrences of the words. 
w:i.th less sorting f combining, and econo:mizing characterir,tic 
of the processes of abstract thought. 20 Emotive language 
would also resist paraphrase, its effect depending to a 
greater degree upon the evocation of experience. Richards 
thus continued to support the affective theory of literature, 
but with two modifications favoring more of a cognitive 
approa.ch: (l} he abandoned the popular ide.a of emotion fo:r 
its embodiment in metaphor, a rhetorical concept easier to 
handle in criticism, and (2) he clearly recognized that 
emotion and reference (or cognition) are inseparable, but 
apparently had concluded that predominantly emotive utteranct'"' 
are both phylogenetically and ontogenetically primitive, 
falling short of poetry. 
In "The Future of Poetry," (1960) Richards went even 
further on the road to formalism. He took pains to acknowl-
edg·o his respect fm:- Rene Wellek and particularly Roman 
Jakobson and tried to incorporate Saussure's concept of 
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signifier and signified into his explanation of aesthetic 
commun::Lcution, in marked contrast to his earlier attack upon 
this dichotomy in 'I'he Meani::1rr of Meaning, when he objected to 
making 11 thi.ngs 11 t.'he l.<i~,1uedicn,;c:.!d object of signification. 21 
He retained vestiges of hie earlier affective theory, though, 
in several important respects. He emphasized the importance 
of a thr1:zefold Bloomf .ieldian hi.era . .rchy j,n the study of meaning, 
of the phonologic, morphologic, and semantic levels, all of 
which mur:it be adequately combined in the "poet:l.c plaiting" 
of expression.22 The semantic level obviously would include 
affective questions beyond formalist inquiry, but again 
mostly as a matter of rhetoric, which in modern linguistics 
too often reduces to a vacant semiology such as those pro-
posed by Barthes or !?odor and Katz. 23 Richard!.~ also at.tacked 
the Structuralist obsession with opposition ( "mutual prt~-
clusiveness") in analyzing the ''limitless variety" of poten-
tial interanimations in language, and similarly attacked 
their. emphasis upon the interrelationship among words alone, 
to the neglect of their initial acquisition in childhood. 24 
Finally, he expanded the paradigm of information theory to 
introduce several affective complications: 
source 000- des ti.nation 
R D DV 
In this scht;;1mati:r.ation, he multiplied the procc1sses of en-
coding and decoding to include respectively four and three 
phases~ selecting (in two stages--.. s 1 and s.,}, encoding (E), 
,<, 
and transmi tt:L:ng {'i'} •' .,.,~:~£: 0.-t:~'::::'.H1'··:i·ecei ving (R) , decodin9 (D) , 
and developing (DV) • 25 'l~his expansion was necessary, he 
I 
claim1.';d ,\ since the selection of words is a complex process 
. involving several iJtages of feed-back a.11;d feed-forward (or 
"eddying"). ;r;:;ach word affi::.ets tht? probability of choice 
among the otht~ra, itnd many words desira.ble in every sense 
but one wist often be irrevocably-rejected for that one 
reason~ Similarly, words first selected must later be rt1-
jec.-::ted because they soµ-iehow conflict with other words 
selected~ He included both s1 and S2, disbalancing the 
symmt:1;try of the paradigr.nr to indicate the cy::lic interde-
pendence of the selective process, a choice-making activity 
the reader might e.xpt:;,,rience only in the closest examination 
of a text. These stager:; all seem to have been profitably 
sorted out by Richards to represent the gemrration of word£.!, 
what he called "cajoling an unembodied something into its 
incarnation. 112 6 
Where Richards seems to have become more formalist was 
in his depersonification of "speaker" and "hearer" to be 
"source" and "destination," and thus deemphasized compardd 
l\rith the expanded processes of "encoding" and "decoding." 
l'his abstract nomenclature was not accidental, but intended 
to eliminate the human being from these categories, for, he 
Saia, one cannot actually send or receive an idea: such a 
98 
99 
transaction involves a mystical or Vedantist idea of transub-
stantiation.27 But we must emphat.:i.cally disagree! By resort-
ing to this formalist equivocation, Richards was under.mining 
the whole purpose of information theory represented by its 
paradigm, the axiom that communication between real people 
indeed does take place, though modifications (what we might 
call a process of "refraction") occur at each stage of its 
progress. But real sound waves do convey ~eal symbols which 
~a;.!x_ do involve comparable "sign situations" for the 
speaker and his listeners. Without our faith in this trans-
mission, nominal.ism becomes a solipsistic extravagance. 
Richards apparently made a straw man of mysticism to establish 
the independence and self-sufficiency of language in poetry, 
a typically formalist preoccupation: 
The over-all point, however, is that a poem is responsi.ble 
to the resources of the language as regards its task--not 
to any public (except a public in command of these re-
sources). The independence of language from poet or 
from reader (or critic} is remarkable. No one can wish 
anything into, or ~ish anything out of, a composition--
though we authors and critics may differ indeed upon 
what it admits or excludes. In the end, however, it 
decides for or against us. 28 
Richards accordingly proposed an emendation· of Shelley's 
principle, from poets being our "unacknowledged legislators 11 
to the formalist creed: "~~s are the unacknowledged 
legislation of the world. 11 29 He likewise claimed, " ••• 
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behind a line of verse may stand, not the mere experience of 
the poet, but the.immense reserves;• the accumulated potentials 
of language, due to the equivalences, the oppositions, re-
inforcements, resistances, and so on of phrase to phrase . 
within it. 1130 (italics added) These words might just as 
well have been spoken by a Structuralist such as Barthes 
6r Jakobson, the latt.er of whom seems to have had an en.ormous 
influence upon this a~d ·s.imilar articles by Richards. 
Finally, Richards ridiculed the "Fallacy of Vulgar 
Packaging," the commonplace notion that the poet has a 
_.,,,,,,,,,,, ' 
"poetic experience," wraps it up in a "verbal package," and 
delivers it to his readers so they can unwrap it to enjoy 
for themselves. Richards· denied both the artificial notion 
. of "poetic expt'\!rience" (which he found in both Wordsworth 
and Shelley,· though not Coleridge--perhaps overlooking his 
"conversational poems" influenced by Wordsworth) and the 
idea of its communicat.ion in toto as a gift from the poet to 
his readers. "Poetic experience" thus misunderstood implies, 
he said, "a sort of catching a nonverbal butterfly in a· 
verbal butterfly net," and then releasing it in the reader's 
act of comprehension. This would be a patent absurdity 
because words remain in our experience with their various 
interdependencies, not.to be caught and released, transferred 
from one repository to another. 
Again we must vigorously disagree, though with certain 
q:ualif:i:cations .. The "sign situation" defined by Richards in 









and language that transcends the butterfly net parody and yet 
involves the 11 ca.pturing 11 of non-verbal experience in verbal 
structures, a process shared by the poet and his readers. 
The logic here seems impeccable: there is more in our ex-
perience than language--in fact our most creative experience 
seems visual and intuitive, particularly in our youtho Even 
-.Takobson has somewhat conceded this poirJ.t: II ~ . .but internal 
thought especially when creative, willingly uses other sys-
tems of signs which are more flexible, less standardized 
than language and lc~ave more liberty, more dynamism to ere~ 
ati.ve thought. 1131 But if our thoug·ht is different from 
language and yet language has the metaphoric flexibility to 
express almost all we think (gaining in sentential coherence 
l'lhat it loses in eidetic vividness) u then a p~ocess of 
11 coupling 11 fWemt:; nf}Cessarily involved v and the impression 
tve have of searching or groping for words (and they waiting 
?assively to be taken up) might justify the use of the ex-
?ression "catch II or "capture. n Indeed, this expression seE,ms 
to describe more adequately our process of speech than the 
Ldea of words coupling and locking together spontaneouf:ily 
iccording to their own rules-~ .. wi thout our ass is ta.nee a.nd 
dth only our consent. Returning to Richards' analogy, then, 
ie claim that butterflies are there to be caught, but the 
Lepidopterist perpetually tying and untying the webbing of 
tis net is not likely to gather much of a collection. One 
:u:rther point: the "mc~re exper hmcl.:"J II of the poet and his 
:eaders prejudicially represented by the ephemeral butterfly 
102 
exceeds the "accumulated potential" of language.to the extent 
that behavior exceeds its explanation, history its chronicle, 
and novels such as 'I'he Brothe:es Karamazov o..nd Ulysses their 
--------~ ""'"'"''" --- -- ,...,., ___ .. ,_ _,..,.,.,,.,J,..,._,_.,.,,,_ .. _ ""~-
resources in the dictionary. 31 In its symbolic function, 
language is as much a tool as a finished product, and, as 
a tool, it i.s less than its expt~r:Lence conv(~yed.. 'l'o the ex-
tent that it ie referential, it is no more to be confused 
with this experience than a carpenter's equipment with the 
house he builds. Its emotive (or metaphoric) dimension 
likewise involves a pre-lingual process of affect and conation 
ot.u: choice of wordtJ, Richards would have to return to his 
hi~:1 intc:;:.ref;t in psychology 1.m.d eoncent.:r.a.t:ing on cmcrmuni.cat.ion 
theory, and then further truncating that, he has unfortunately 
drifted from potentially synthetic critical metaphors to a 
paradigm which is formalist and exclusionary. 
It would seem profitable to return to the rudiments of 
information theory, avoiding as best we can the "fallacy of 
Vulgar packaging," a genuine mist~ce to which affective 
theory har:: been as vulnerable as stylhitic analysis has l:.Hco€!n 
to tlu~ 11 fo1Tr1,1.list herc!sy 11 proposed by Bradley. A rn.ore ere··· 
ative use of the paradigm in information theory ~an be pro-
Posed not only to restore affect to aesthetic response but 
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also to E.wtablish a 11 stratifica.tional 11 relationship between 
experience and poetry. 'l'h<~ text of a poem may be simply de-
fined as an instrument to a certain extent recreating its 
creator's ..:.rn:pc.,ri.ence:: in the consci.ousne~rn of readers having 
comparable language skills and a some·what comparable body 
of experience. The paradigm, 
Speaker n•- encoding -- messag<.:i -- decoding -- Hearer e 
applies equally to poetry as other acts of communication, for 
though it:::; 11 1nessage 11 miqht. seem rnore objectively self-suffi·-
cient, it is also (for this reason) a more efficient mode 
of conunun.ication o But the entire circuit rnust be complet;;;1d, 
for without it the printed page becomes a jumble of hiero-
glyphics and its recitation a phatic babb}.ing. ~rhe inb~g:r.ity 
of the "messw; . re" is valuc)less unless it stinmlate~:. a similar 
integrity in the rei:::;ponse of the reader. Though the poet 
cannot pe::i:fectly communicate his feelings to the reader, 
there must be a percentage of accuracy in its replication 
of meaning for communication to occur, and we may assume 
that this percent.age increases by employing rhetorical 
techniques known since classical civilization. Whether this 
proportion is high or not, however, exactly the same proc-
esses are involved in both the poet and his reader, though 
in an inverse order: the poet selects words to represent 
experience, while his reader. selects experience to "body 
forth 11 the~ meaning of the '\.1Wrds. In fnct the S1-~s2 feedback 
Proposed by Richards in the poet's selection of words should 
be counterbalanced by a DVr-DV2 1n the reader's comparable 
selection of experience. As Joseph Frank suggested in his 
theory of "spatialization," the reader must keep utterances 
in mind to test them out agifa:nst each othc-3r before arriving 
at a definite thematic interpretation~ 
For our·purposee, then, the five stages of this paradigm . 
may be profitably divided into two phases, (1) speaker --
encoding -- message, and (2) message -- decoding -- hearer, 







The second phase is an inversion of the first, supposedly 
the passive response of understanding, though the reader 
actually proposes his own meaning, duplicating the first 
phase in CJrder to compare his mrperience with the poet's, 
just as the poet resorts to the second phase while composing· 
poetry in order to judge and control his expression. The 
first phase is gen(~ra.lly emphasized by the poet and the 
second by the reader, but both are involved in both acts 
of creating and responding to poetry. Each phase has three 
components, a human being, his search for words, and his 
completed expression. For poetry these may easily be re-
stated as "stratificational" obligations: (1) the poet and 
his readers must experience life, (2) they must be able to 
translate this experience into language, and (3) they must 
cooperate in organizing this language as poetry. The fir.st 
and second sta9es are clearly shared by all society, whih1 
the third involves a discrepancy favoring the particular 
gifts of the poet in degree if not kind, justifying his 
poetry as "unacknowledged legislation" to the extent that 
he meaningfully experiences life, fruitfully expresses his . 
10-. 
experience in langu.age, and successfully; combines experienci:: 
and language in poetry e Even here, though, he must som.ewhttt 
defer to the consent of the governedp his readers, for the 
circuit to be completed. These three phases may also be 
stratificatiopally interpreted as .levels of regression from. 
ob~jective immediacy e 33 In art this immediacy li.es in the 
art object, the objective painting, as well as othE":?r ex-
per.iemce of the viewer v In poetry, however, it is the t(~J~t r 
the meaningless hieroglyphics mentioned above. None of thfi 
three phases :i.n this stratif icational regression from im.mE?-· 
diacy (experience, language, and the 11 message 11 of poetry) 
may be eliminated from poetry without apparently reducing it 
to meaninglessness. 
Roman Ingarden has proposed virtually the same "strat-
ificatiQnal" explanation of aesthetic experience in the con~·· 
text of phenorncnology. 34 He distinguished between cognition 
and what we perceive, and then, at a new level, between 
cognition and aesthetic response. In.each stage of this ad-
vancenwmt, from 11 objective immediacy" to cogniti.on and then 
to aesthetic response, he indicated a new and qualitatively 
·. Unique process of selection. Cognition sifts out the random 
and chaotic aspects of experience to give it a degree of 
shape and pattern. Then our aesthetic response, likewise 
an active process elimi!.1<:1-t-i.n.? the inessential, gives enough 
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in itself rather than a commonplace manifestation of experiEmceo 
We interrupt our normal pattern of response at the "convic-
tion moment.," whcm we discover that our ,experience can be-
come even further refined to be "aesthetic:," and a transition 
occurs as we seek a new, more refined harmony of qualities. 
This activity involves a "narrowing of our field of conscious-
ness," and, to a certain extent, withdrawal and quasi-oblivion 
of t.he real world. 'l'he experience becomes a matter of 
essence, a "secluded whole," though we gain a heightened 
conviction of its real esistence. Its qualities "crystalize" 
in their interaction, and it becomes transfigured as an 
aesthetic object through their selection and intensification.35 
Unconsc:ious "projection" is involved in this choice, and 
there is likewise a "community of experience," since we all 
are predisposed to make roughly similar aesthetic selections 
of experience, though obviously benefiting from the better 
selection of the artist. 
Ingarden proposed a complicated theory, much of which 
need not be explored in this context, but its basis lay in 
! 
a threefold stratification of objects, their cognition, and 
thei.r aesthetic embodiment, the latter two stages occurring 
through the elimination of inha:r.monie>us elements. His theory 
agr(.~es with ours in every respect except its exclusion of 
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language~ Ingarden emphasized the visual arts, thus com-
bining 11 encoding" and "message" in aesthetic experience, 
whereas our model separates the two, first in language and 
then poetry, a final stage comparable to that of art but 
following the interm,:!dia.te p:icocess of symbolization. Both 
theories are "str·a.tif icational," however, and may be accounted 
for in infm::mai..:ion theory@ They ag·ree u.pon an 11 objective 
immediacy" and cognitive and aesthetic transformations in 
the speaker and hearer. 
The New Critical quest for textual ob;_jectivity has by= 
passed these intermediate sta9es by equating 11 nH:,H-:,sag{~ 11 with 
"objE-:ctive immediacy," and this has led to disai::trous con·-
sequences in both poetry and criticism. Aesthetic interpre-
tation has been reduced to textual explication, excluding 
the multifarious dimensions of language and,. consciousnc1s:::; 
underlying the text. ~rhe inclusion of language (the 11 utter= 
ance act 11 ) by Richards helps rectify this inadequacy, yet. 
excludes the role of consciousness. The formal critic must 
reject the option to digress from the poem in order to return 
with a larger, more adequate frame of reference justified 
by the conunon experience of the poet and his readers. For 
example, he must usually ignore the social implications of 
a text, at best subordinating them to 11 themes 11 apparently 
mor<.~ sign:i.f icant, thoug-h these implicati.ons may be extrap-
olated to establish a social vision often of vital importance 
in understanding the text. The pseudo-objective quest for 
internal consistency may thus lead to the neglect of larger 
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though nebulous patterns of consistency in our consciousness--
to which poetry almost always mt:tkes its appeal. Apparent 
textual 11 flaws 11 (contradictions and irrelevanciE)S} have been 
deplored by formal critics, though they may be treated more.cl 
often than not as shortcuts, conscious or unconscious, which 
may easily be br:Ldg{;">.d in our r(:,1sponse. Sh,elley has been 
castigated for his 11 mere tumbled out. tBpatcz! of poetic,ili ties 11 
barely held together by h.:i.s "pervasive lyrical emotion, 1136 
though he obv.iously di.d not seek the textual unity demandt;1d 
by formal criticism. The narrative prose of Defoe has like-
wi.se been criticized for its incoher(mt point of view, t.hat 
i 
of Scott for its inconsistent romanticism, that of Dickens 
for its episodic structure and lack of credible character 
development, and that of Dreiser for its un~ieldy naturalism. 
'.rhese have been :r.:ej (➔ ct.c;:!d becaw:rn their corn.munica tion de-
emphasized the 11 message 11 (formal coherence) and "decodi.ng" 
(our aesthetic sensitivity advocated by Richards), and instead 
concentrated upon the collaboration between "Speaker 11 and 
11 Hearer 11 in their feelings and values, their identity and 
membership in a community. These additional questions 
frighten the proponent of textual explication, who prefers 
truncation to the "risk" of creativity~ 
•ro explain the communication of creativity, we rimst tmder-
stand the poem to function as a catalyst (much as Eliot pro-
posed) to help the reader sort once again through his own 
fund of experience. He largely shares with the poet the 
first tw~ stages toward the creation of poetry (experience 
and language) since they both live in the same world and 
speak the same language. The more they share, the more 
I 
likely he understands t.he insights of the.poet. However, 
much of his exp~rie~ce and vocabulary lies dormant and 
relatively unsatisfactorily integrated until he recognizes 
a better organization of language and experience in the 
poem and respond~:; with a comparable adj1.1:stment. Even if 
the poet's organization i.s not clearly better, its dift'er-
ences 1.:rnually encourage comparison with the result that 
some adjustment occurs. If not, the poem may be considered 
worthless for thi.s particular reader. 'rhis act of adjust-
ment might seem a passive response, except that it is an 
~<:~ of recognition, not simply an implantation or evoked 
sensi.tivi.ty. What we see we~ lar.·gely know already, but: .it 
gains a new light that obliges us to modify our understanding. 
'l'he poem functions as a "mediator" in its capacity as 11 go 
between of artist and perceiver, 11 37 f.t record of the poet's 
act of discovery which leads the reader into maklng a compa-
rable discovery of his own. It mediates discovery in the 
sense of shaping and perfecting one act, the poet's, in order 
to encourage a comparable act similarly to be shaped and 
perfected by the reader: the poet works out a satisfactory 
meaning for himself in order to encourage the reader to do 
likewise. But there is a second and less obvious sense in 
which a poem functions as mediator. It breaks down compart-,,. 
ments in the mind of the reader and vitalizes separate, rel-
atively dormant ideas by bringing them to the threshold of 
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insight in thc~ir combination. We may see this process most 
clearly in the effect of metaphor, which evokes a fresh under-
standing of both tenor and vehicle through an unusual but 
apt comparison. rrhe same ('.!ffect is produced by other mode:rn 
of figuration, by dramatic effects I even by language in it~1 
usual combination of words. At all levels the poem spear-
heads the reader's challenge to his own static frame of ref-
erence, initiating a liberation of "potential energy 11 in him 
through his active response. But we must recognize that 
poetry merely provides the efficient cause of this act: the 
final cause lies .in the inteJ.ligcmce, ·sensitivity, and 
doggedness of the reader. In a simultaneous effort he takes 
what he can from the poem to do ·what he can ·with his own 
feelings. 
, 
Contrary to the view of New Criticism, we find little 
in poetry beyond what we are already conditioned and willing 
to see. This is the way it is, and the way it should be. 
The exact replication of a text, neither more nor less, 
would be a useless, abo:ctive experience, itself a compart-
mentalization. It would be squeezing ourselves into a strip 
of film in order to peer one-dimensionally through lense 
and aperture with total recognition but no particular in-
sight. Instead, we should and do treat poetry with the 
freedom we do sculpture, viewing it from several an9les and 
distances, squinting at it, touching it, sizing it up as a 
presence, and taking stock of its flaws as well as its attrac-
tions. W<:;! must similarly make our. own use of poetry, 
recombining whatever seems meaningful in our own synthesis 
similar to, but also necessarily different from that of the 
poet. 'l'here is no primary virtue in exactly duplicating 
the text not even in approaching this exactitude. The 
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best reader is not the perfect reader, if such a paragon 
exists or can exist. What we should encourage is the ex-
ploratory reader, whose alertness and wealth.of relevant 
associations lead him in and out of poetry at will. He 
takes what he presently needs, building his own vision some-
what comparable to that of the poet. Discovering the way 
he does this and the way the poem helps him do it are what 
I consider.· to be the more useful and even the more ambitious 
task of criticism. This job is made difficult by confusion, 
vagueness, and enormous variety among our responses (even 
in ourselves at different readings) to a pafticular text, 
most of which (as Richards has proven) are entirely in-
adequate from a professional viewpoint. But the most inept 
reader undeniably experiences poetry. The rejection of 
his experience from the purview of criticism, as well, often 
enough, as the full range of responses between his and the 
"professional" interpretation, seems just one more example 
of "expertism, 11 isolating the domain of literary criticism 
to justify its existence, even, perhaps, to make it a career. 
To illustrate the difficulties of a dynamic, strat-
ificational approach to affective criticism, it seems fruit-
ful to investigate in detail the effect of a particular 
Passage of poetry. For thiB purpose, the third stanza from 
"Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening" may be used because 
of its deceptive simplicity which eliminates extraneous 
critical implications, disclosing the matrix of poetry with 
particular success. In its prose explanation, the stanza 
tells of a sleigh horse's impatient behavior questioning the 
poet's judgment in pulling him to a halt during a snowstorm 
late at night in a desolate part of the woods: 
He gives his harness bells a shake 
To ask if there is some mistake. 
The only other sound's the sweep 
Of easy wind and downy flake. 
Reverting once again to our paradigm, we can see that the 
reader largely shares Frost's background of experience and 
language in this stanza. 'rhe vocabulary is commonplace 
(76% monosyllabic and almost entirely Anglo ~axon} and the 
events described arouse a wealth of at least indirect asso-
ciations in most readers. Those who have directly observed 
horses impatiently shaking their harnesses might enjoy more 
rapport with Frost than others, but the behavior of horses 
is widely known in the cinema, particularly westerns, and 
in children's stories and eighteenth and nineteenth century 
fiction$ Likewise, even the lifetime citizen of Los Angeles 
or Phoenix has at least received snow scene Christman· cards 
from conventional relatives, played with crystal balls that 
simulate falling snow, and ·watched television reports of 
major snowfalls elsewhere in the country. Perhaps a native 
Panrunanian or Congolese has not assimilated this indirect 
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experience, but his ignorance must be considered deleterious 
to his appreciation. of this stanza. The words swEH3J?.., ~-¥2XJ 
and downy would arouse irrelevant exotic associations not 
-----"~ 
connect(:.d with ,21.n CY{)erience of snow to anchor. their use. 
For the American audience, however, the language and ex-
perience of the stl'..mza arE! commonplace. 
It is la.:cgely .in the composition of the stanza as 
poetry, at the third phase from objective immediacy, where 
crucial differences emeige between Frost's and his reader's 
accompl.ishment which make the poem an aesthetic experience 
for the reader. Here we may begin with versification, con-
ditionally a.ccepti.ng the simple tetrameter and heavy rhyme 
because they reinforce the quiet, acquiescent tone of the 
stanza. The rhythm makes old men of those who can suspend 
disbelief and it at least brings out qualities of patient 
maturity in the rest of us. The voice moralizing this scene 
with a sing-song rhythm echoing in ourselves is probably the 
true subject of the poem, for the scene described, a tableau, 
merely locates and embodies its stoicism. We might not 
entirely appreciate this voice, but it is genuine human ex-
perienc~ fit to be put to poetry. On the other hand we are 
pleasantly alerted to the personification of a horse which 
communicates with i. ts driver by shaking its harness .. A , . . 
dialogue thus occurs between two simple natures, the res-
ignation of the poet wanting to watch and perhaps join the 
peaceful lifelessness about him and the pragmatic impatience 
of his horse wanting to resume their journey homeward. The 
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pragmatic and pasteral roles are reversed here, though the 
poet later reluctantly agrees with thE1 horse, but of course 
for more profound reasons. In another sense, the narrator 
(whom we presume to be Frost) seems a modern Everyman wearily 
making h.is choice between the horse's impatience and the 
beckoning woods, also personified as an advocate. In a. 
silent dialogue suggesting the A:ci.stotel_ian dynamics of 
discovery and peripety, Frost prepares to resign himself 
to one of these personified choices but without being certain 
which, immediate communion with death in the peaceful scene 
befon~ him or a long journey through lif~ with "miles to go 
before I sleep." In the context of poetry each possibility 
is expressed beyond words, the retaining visual sweep of the 
scene debating the auditor:z impatience of the horm~ ringing 
his harness bells. Both advocates express 0 their views with 
restraint and moderation, a quiet, sober project.ion of con·~ 
flicting feelings harbored by the aging poet and also pre-
sumably by ourselves. The horse does not demand, insist, or 
impatiently rear its head, but makes a brief motion of i.ts 
head "to ask if there is some mistake," really an indulgent 
and sympathetic act. Likewise, the wind is 11 easy 1j as might 
be expected during snowfall and the falling snow "d.owny, 11 
suggesting the quiet descent of snowflakes and eidet.ically 
reinforcing the effect of deliberation in the advancement of 
age. The :juxtaposition of "easy wind" and "downy flake" 
might slightly bother us because of its heavy repetition, 
but its simple conjunction more likely reinforces the tone 
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of quiet resignation mentioned above. In this particular 
stanza the horse is a respectful minority, but the issue is 
really debated elsewhere!' in the mind of the driver, beyond 
him (let us take this inductive leap) in Frost himself, and, 
most important, in ourselves, his fallible, striving readers, 
for the question concerns our lives. We must later regret-
fully concur with Frost and his persona,_the driver, to 
continue the journey through life. But we recognize Frost's 
projection of this question into a scene of wordless dialoguer 
we abide by his decision to reject immediate suicide in 
order to perservere, though we are not. e.:icactly certain why. 
Our literary experience at the third phase from objec-
tive immediacy, the poem, thus liberates a profusion of 
implications which seem to create:~ an immediacy of their own, 
for example in the syna.esthesia irnplied by the word "sweep" 
or the debate, a non-verbal psychomachia, between two beck-
oning alternatives. We would not be able to understand or 
appreciate Frost without having (1) a preliminary fund of 
comparable experi.ence, including our ambivalent attitudes 
about aging, direct and indirect contact with horses and 
snowfall, and (2) a similar basic facility with the connot-
ations of language used to describe this experience. These 
shared realms of consciousness, rudimentary and thus too~ 
often neglected in criticism, may be compared .with the under-





at top mostly concerns us, but it rests upon a vast bulk of 
common experience essential to its support. Without this 
shared back9round, communicat.i.on breaks down in literature. 
Frost 1 s stanza (and poem) presumably stimulates sufficient 
common experience to gai.n universality, but if and when his 
poetry ceases to yield "underwater" meaning to readers (as 
Longfellow's al:t:t:1ady has, though he conj:idently addressed 
himself to posterity), no matter how excellent i.t.s formal 
virtues, it shall rightly fall into oblivion. Though the 
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cri ti.c must primarily concern himself with literary expc~ri.ence r 
his too common neglect of language and shared experience as 
the foundation of literary expression encourages formalist 
extrava9ance .i.n the explication of poetry, for example the 
late theories of Richards or, to a greater extent, those of 
Jakobson and Barthes treated in Chapter Six. All three phases 
(or strata) a:r.e crucial in the communication of poetry--
otherwise it ceases to be read meaningfully ~nd pleasurably, 
and instead becomes historic document exclusively the concern 
of literary scholarship. 
Richards would not particularly disagree with this Vi(.:!W • 
Our departure from his theory lies in the recognition that 
there are a_large variety of valid approaches to poetry beyond 
its rudimentary explication. Everybody has a different fund 
of experience, for example regarding horses, and a different 
repository of associations for any particular word, for example 
"sweep. 11 'l'he context of the poem somewhat anchors these as-
sociations within a specific combination, for example in Frost 1 s 
putting the horse in a halter to pull the sleigh and having 
it nod its head impatiently 6 but for each reader a great many 
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associations remain free and untied. These are not an ex.,. 
traneous nuisance, an irrelevancy, but give body and vividness 
to the experience of the poem. For example, my f ar--fetched 
refe1:ence above to the 11 psychomachia" suggested that the 
horse's behavior makes it seem an allegorical representation 
engaged in debate as had been common in Medieval morality 
plays. This specific comparison strikes_ my own attention 
though Frost undoubtedly had no idea of its applicability 
when he wrote the poem. But who is to command by edict and 
prevent my free exploration of this possibly useful connection 
in my own experience--! doubt Frost would have. As John 
Dewey correctly maintained in ?i,rt ~ Ex_perience, the weal th 
of associations I relate to my understanding of a poem are 
necessary to particularize and individualize my interpretation: 
But experience is a matter of the interaction of the 
artistic product with the self. It is not therefore 
twice alike for different persons even today. It 
changes with the same person at different times as 
he brings something different to a work. But there 
is no reason why, in order to be esthetic, these ex-
periences should be identicai. 38 
There is an enormous range of possible interpretations for 
any poem to be fruitfully explored, and the two st_andards 
of choice among them are the text itself and.the total scope 
of human experience relative to this text. 
The reader should not vainly exhaust himself searching 
for an ultimately "correct" textual meaning, an j.gnis fatuus 
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bearing scant productive results accompanied by too much 
anguish and arrogance. Instead he should insist upon parity, 
that he 1.1, a somc"what 2:ormal human being with somewhat normal 
responses in a somewhat better than usual state of order 
while reading poetry. As Aristotle maintained in the 
~icomachca11:. ~' h:is human condition. is his major respon-
sibility, and, we might add, his strength and limitation, 
before, after, and during his experience with poetry, though 
we may share Richard's hope and expectation that his normalcy 
will improve a.s a result of his reading experience. He 
should recognize that the responsibility of his interpretation 
is his own, that its ultimate validity lies in himself, not 
the text, which is mer<~ly a catyl.ist v however imprErnsive 
its re~sult.s. •rhe poet composed his pc,em largely by a process 
of autoscopy, judging his expression in the progress of 
its effect upon himself. It is incumbent upon the reader to 
respond in a similar spirit, with a kind of inverted or 
doubled autoscopic response. His benefit might simply be 
in expanding his imagination or attaining greater resources 
of vocabulary, for example (among a thousand) in using the 
word 11 sweep 11 as a noun to describe the fullness of a scene 
as a synaesthetic response. But with a modicum of effort 
he might also expect to find the voice of the poet t6 be~ 
addressing him as an equal in the act of mutual discovery 
and even deferring to his final judgment, a democratic 
gesture necessitated by feedback in autoscopy. To put him-
self in thin qood company at its better moments, the reader 
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must indeed sharpen his sensibilities, but he need not 
sacrifice his identity or. supinely abandon his own resources 
of experience. ·rhis would be sycophantish and neither pleas-
urable nor useful. Feedback, the mingling of voices, his 
own and the poet's, will profit him.the most. 
One cannot help noticing here the applicability of 
M.H. Abram's paradigm in Th~ Mi.rror !!_nd .~h~ La,~ comparing 
fundamental approaches to criticism. He divides the total 
aesthetic experience into four distinct components--work, 





He then distinguishes four basic critical approaches, each 
• 
of which emphasizes one of these components. 'I'he 11 mimetic" 
theories of Plato, Hurd, and Lessing emphasized the accurate 
representation of the experienced universe; ·the "pragmatic 11 
theories of Sidney and Hobbes emphasized the effect upon 
the audience both in pleasure and utility; the "expressive 11 
theories of Longin us, Wordsworth, and Coleridg(; emphasized 
the expression of the artist; and the supposedly "objective 11 
theories of Ransom, the New Critics and European formalists 
emphasized the composition of the work itself. The 'tqord 
11 formalist 11 might more appropriately designate this last 
component rather than 11 ob:jective 11 because the hypothetical. 
objectivity of these theories is two d€:grees :removed from 
object.:i.ve immediacy, separated by intermediatE:1 levels of 
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meaning in· experience and language. According to Abrams, 
the transition· from, eighteenth century classicism to roman-· ·· 
ticism involved a shift from the Lockean perspective com-
bining mimetic and pragmatic emphases to the expressive 
emphasis upon the identity of the poet in the romantic move-
ment. But this paradigm may be appli~d equally well to 
current trends in criticism to help explain our defense of 
··affective criticism from New Critical attacks. The prag-
matic emphasis of Victorians, first preferring "utile" in 
Browning and Tennyse>,n· and then "dµlcell with the fin de si~cle 
reaction of Pater; Wilde, and thei:t: coterie, was challenged· 
by Richards in his proposal for a combined pragmatic and 
objective (or "forma·list"} approach in affective criticism. 
Then Ransom's cognit:i:-ve approach with subsequent New Cri~ical 
• 
modifications almost totally eliminated the pragmatic com-
ponent, bringing criticism into a strictly formalist realm 
apparently for the first time in the history of English 
literature. The pragmatic and expressive approaches have 
been denounced respectively as the affective and intentional· 
fallacies, and the mimetic theory has been all but forgotten, 
an eccentric obsession in figures like Auerbach and Lukacs. 
Composition and te~hnique have removed aesthetics a safe 
dis~ance from experience. 39 Without minimizing the.· importance 
of the expressive or mimetic theories, though, it seems time 
to return to a more balanced critical outlook by restoring 
the pragmatic appr.o~ch in affective criticism. This time, 
however, we should emphasize the active response of the 
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read.er. 'l'he pa.ssi vi.ty recorrunended by Richards pa.ved the way 
to formaliBrn,, "contextualism, 11 New Criticism, o:r: whatcwer we 
want to call it. Our purpose is to retain as many of Richards' 
productive insights as possible, but within a broader and 
mon1 dynamic frame of referc~nce. 
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A Brief General History of Affective Criticirim 
The history of affective criticism before I.A. Richards 
is piecemeal. Most critics accepted its rudimentary tenetst 
particularly upon catharsis in tragedy, but they mixed the 
cathartic hypothesis with mimetic, expressive, and formal 
theories to such an extent that few useful insights were 
explored very thoroughly. More often than not, even those 
as eminent. ,1s Sydney and Dryd,~n were moutJ.1i.ng principles 
they found in earlier theories, all of which may be traced 
to Plato 6 Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus, when affective 
criticism was first proposed. The only modern periods of 
innovation have been the eighteenth century, when Addison, 
Hume, Burke, Alexander Gerard and others were influenced 
by the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, and Shaftesbury, 
and the twentieth century, when Santayana, Dewey, Richards 
and others fell under the comparable influence of modern 
psychology. The interlude of the nineteenth century seems 
to have been generally dominated by metaphysics and ex-
pressive theories of art. These may certainly be integrated 
with affective theories of criticism, as Richards tried 
with a measure of success in Coleridge on the Imagination, ----·-·- -- -- - ... ~~ ... ---..---
but they raise entirely new questions beyond the scope of 
our present inquiry. 
Plato and Aristotle began the history of affective 
criticism with what amounted to a dialogue upon the effect 
of literature, suggesting important questions yet to be 
sati.sfactori.ly f~Xplc:dned. In the !..9.!l Plato briefly pro-
posed the "inspirational" theory of poetry that the poet 
sings not by art "but by power divine, 11 and in fact th,1t 
his mind is t.hc.':! minister of God (or the power of one). 
The poet rapturously communicates divine wisdom that he 
himself does not entirely understand, and we respond in . 
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kind likewise without necessarily understanding his meaning. 
Poetry is a communication from the gods (might we not call 
them archetypes or fixations?) with the poet addressing us 
as an inspired, uncoinprehending intermediary. l Here Plato 
seems to have been sympathetic with the presumed ignorance 
of poets, but in a. cel~~brated portion of Book X in ~he 
Republic he shifted his pos.ition (anticipating Tolstoy) to 
advocate the abolition of poetry from the ;dli';)al state ex-
cept for II hymns to tht::! qods and praises of f a.mous men. 112 
Ironically, his argum.ent may easily be adopted for the 
defense of political censorship replacing the gods with 
the state, particularly the censorship which has been 
imposed in China and the Soviet Union. But his logic is 
difficult to refute either regarding propaganda or the 
modern tenets of affective criticism, upon which it bears 
important implications. He disdained poets as imitators 
of imitators three degrees removed from reality. He 
claimed that God (or "one-ness") creates the prbtotype of 
the chair, the artisan imitates this prototype, and then the 
Poet, a poor third, imitates the artisan.3 His theory was 
not as absurd as it first might seem, and to adapt it to our 
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purposes, we need only eliminate God to establish experience 
(obj,~ctiV(::. immediacy) a.s perceived one-ness at the first 
level, then introduce language as the finished product of 
our entir0 .Gulture at the second level, collectively 
11 fabricated 11 i.n a manner comparable to the artisan's chair, 
and finally treat the mimetic principle in poetry as the 
third level: 
Plato 
idea of chair 
1. created by God 
2. imitated by the artisan 
3. imitated (once removed) by 
the poet 
Translated 
physical things and events 
imminently experienced 
expressed in language 
compm:;ed in poetry 
Thus reinterpreted, this hierarchy is exactly the strat-
ificational rearrangement of the paradigm. from information 
theory we proposed last chapter. Poetry is an imitation of 
an imitation in the sense that it formally rearranges 
language, which itself is a rearrangement of experience. 
Metaphor defined by Richards similarly fits this hierarchy 
because it combines experience which itself is a metaphoric 
combination. Plat.o claimed this many degrEies of remove from 
reality makes poetry useless in the discovery of truth, an 
opinion we cannot accept because the intermediate levels 
add more than they detract from the truth of the final 
Product. Language and art eliminate the apparently in-
essential in order to give more coherence and expression to 
this product, so we may accept Plato's premises though re-
jecting his conclusion. 
In the second pa.rt of his argument, more difficult to 
refute, Plato ··maintained that poetry should be abolished 
bf;-':!Ca.use the 11 :cehell:tons principle" is encouraged rather 
than a "wise and calm temperament 11 which is "not easy to 
imitate or to appreciate when imitated. 11• Wisdom and virtue 
are more difficult to evok<) thc:m the "pas:tdonate and fitful 
temper" and do not arouse as much interest, particularly 
among average readers. Literature appeals to our baser 
emotions and accordingly diminishes our ability to reason 
competently. Moreover, Plato claimed, .i. t. inci. tes and 
intensifies these emotions, undermining our ability to con-
trol them: "• •• poetry feeds and waters the passions 
~ 
instead of drying th.e1rn up; she lets them rule, al though 
they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to in-
crease in happiness and virtue." 4 As a result, speaking an 
"inferior degree of ti:uth" (the imitation of imitation) to 
an "inferior part of the soul," poetry is more harmful 
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than not and }3hould be abolished from the ideal state. Plato's 
conclusion seems validly derived from his premises and is 
corroborated by the success of censorship in modern total-
itarian societies. But with our Anglo-American respect for 
the freedom of speech, we are almost universally repelled by 
Plato's argument, unable to judge its merits even with regard 
to the particular question of affective critici!:lm. 
We gladly turn to Aristotle's concept of catharsis in 
Poetics which t,.ras undoubtedly proposed to defend emotional 
release in poetry from the cri ticis:m by Plato. 5 Pe:r.hapi:, 
anticipating Freud, Aristotle suggested an allopathic ex-
planation of catharsis, that the pure vicarious experience 
of tra~5edy ha.rm.onlzes and then relc1ases our jumble of pent-
up emotions$ We scapegoat a tragic figure by identifying 
with him, projecting our conftrnicm upon _his pure, single·-
minded quest, and then by reveling in his destruction. The 
result is supposedly the control and reduction of our feelings 
in a socially acceptable manner. Whereas Plato ha.d charged 
that po,s:try incites our emotions and is thert~f ore bad, 
Aristotle i.mpliff:!.d that tragedy r cmf-J mode of poet::.1:y, controls 
emotions through their channeled release and therefore serves 
a useful purpose" Both ccmcurred in advocating- the control 
of emotion and rEwognizing its importance 'i.n poetry, but 
poetry's effect was seen to be primarily excitatory by 
one and cathartic by the other. As indicated abovE'~ t we 
cannot t1asily make a final decision which v;Lew is correcto 
The truth probably lies in the middle, with literature 
both intensifying and releasing emotions, though Plato 1 s 
theory of intensification would SEH?m dominant. A useful 
indication of the difficulty in making this choice would be 
the current rivalry between conventional psychotherapy 
and so-called "behavior therapy" techniques to eliminate 
obsessions and comparable p:r:oblem.s through the Pavlovian 
inculcation of new habit patterns. Psychotherapy is cath-
(Aristotelian) in its strategy to release repressed 
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feelings, while behavior therapy is excitatory (Platonic) in 
its strategy to replace destructive channels of expression 
by others supposedly healthiere. Againu Iwould•stresa 
that a compromise m~E,~ms necessa:t:y, though none has been 
convincingly proposed since Plato and Aristotle 0 with the 
possible exception of Collingwood' s theory treated ltater in 
this chapter. 
The contribution of Longinus to affective criticism was 
not as important as usually thought:. His conception of the 
sublime was essentially rhetorical, of the power an orator 
exerts over his audience. Emotion (ekstasis, or enthusiasm) 
was relegated to being one of five sources of elevated 
language, and Longinus car€~fully emphasized the importance 
of avoiding 11 tasteless turni.dity 1• 11 the unccmtrolled bombast 
of an excessively emotional deliver.yo Nevertheless, his 
brief (;1:icplanation of· the connection bc~tween emotion and 
imagery remains useful: 
••• the word [image} is predominantly used in cases 
where, carri.c1d away by enthusiasm and passion, you think 
you see what you describe, and you place it before the 
eyes of your hearers. Further, you will be aware of the 
fact that an image has one purpose with the orators and 
a.nother with t.he poets, and that the derdgn of the 
poetical image is enthralment, of the rhetorical--vivid 
description~ Both, however, seek to stir the passions 
and the emotions. 6 
llis distinction. between entlu::alment in poetry and vividness 
in rhetoric seems to have been academic since imagery 
would involve vividness to produce ~nthralment, the usual 
effect of the sublime in literature. In this passage, 
however, Longinus did suggest the paradigm of information 
theory •with a slight, though useful modification: 
emotions~-imagery--message--imagery--emotions 
The static, computer.;..like "speaker--encoding" relation-
ship is represented in a more human an~ poetic fashion by 
"emotions--imagery, 11 which he properly inverted in the 
hearer's response. ·Longinus also stressed the importance 
' . 
of the relationship between the sublime and harmony of 
composition, whose "blending and variation" recreates the 
proper emotional effects in the hearers. He suggested 
~ 
that language expressed with emotion by a competent poet 
spontaneously cr~ates the form to evoke comparable emotions 
·. ("the echo of a great soul") in his readers·. This echo 
response seems an important principle, a valid extension 
of Plato's theory, but it was not really explored yery 
thoroughly by Longinus, who emphasized questions of 
rhetoric in the c~mmunication of emotions.7 Finally, 
among the ancients, Horace's contribution to affective 
criticism in Ars Poetica was his distinction between 
du lee and utile, pleas.ure and instruction in poetry. Both 
are "pragmatic," .as Abrams claims, defining and polarizing 
our response to poetry into two basic kinds: with dulce, 
We have gratification both through the intensification 
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(Platonic) and rel.ease (Aristotelian) of emotions; with 
utile, we have the lesson learned, the "message" of. poetry. 
The· latter: is what Platin~.,~ought but: ,d-esp.~ired of _:fi'nding .. 
in suff i.cietd: arnount1;,': ,:bi'''poetry; though. !1:t-~.l(:: may be 
observt~d in th(~ concluding stage of catharsis, and, more 
impo·rtant, it is intrinsic to the synaesthetic response 
proposed by Richards. Though by now thr~adbare, this 
dichotomy thus continues to be useful--it has received 
lip service throughout the history of western criticism 
and seems likely t.o survive the twentieth century as well. 
Since Horace and Longinus, little was added to the 
theory of affective criticism until Minturno, Scaliger, 
and others of the Italian Renaissance who returned to the 
cc.mtrmrersy bt·:rbmen Plato and Arit1totle upon the balarwe 
betw<:]E:m grief a.nd aesthet.ic pleasure o With Hobbes ,1n.d 
Descartes, though, a theory of psychology was proposed 
which stimulated a more profitable recrudescence of 
affective criticism. The Hobbesi.an emphasis upon appetites 
and self-gra.t.iLi.cation led such critics as Addison and 
Samuel Johnson to identify tragic pleasure as the assurance 
of the audience that it escapes the destruction of the 
hero. The Cartesian emphasis upon the stimulation of 
"animal spirits," propounded by Descartes in ~_!.ise on: 
the Passions of the Soul (1650), led such critics as Dennis, ------- -- -- ...,.,."' ..... ,,._..,_ 
. Akenside, and Edward You.:ng to a.dvocate the harmonious 
stimulation of the passions for their own sake, to want 
to increase them, not flush them out with cathars5.s. This 
"stimulat.ive 0 theory legitimized the Platonic conception of. 
literature with the assurance that passionate "stirrings" 
~av$.· a ~alu~:ary_· effect~·· With the prevalent Shaftesburian 
1.36 
· emphasis· upon benevolence arid sentimentalism in the· eighteenth 
century, thet•H?. stirr:i.ngs were prima:d.ly of sympathy, or, 
in its extreme, pity, apply:i.ng thE! stimulative theo:t·y to at 
least one part of the .A.ristotelia:n formula for tragedy. 
Lord Ka.mes and Hugh Blair advocated the pure intensification 
of pity alon.e in a "luxury of woe 11 ; but in .A. £.!l~lo~oeh:l..cal 
En~x_ ~En~ ~ o~~ ~f 9.1.u: Ide3:!!~ 9f !:h.~ SubL~m~ 
!ln<!. ~~~utiful (1757) F;dmund Burke sought to find a b1:1.lance 
among our passions, selfish (Hobbesian) and soci.al (Shaftes-
burian) , whi.ch mingle as pleasure and pi-dn in our E.~xperience 
of tragedy. In a more organic vc~i:n, Hurne ingeniously pro-
• 
posed in his essay "Of Tragedy" (1757) that our affective 
experience of literature, specifically of the pleasure 
and pain of tragedy" involves the absorption of subordinate 
emotions by those which are dominant, intensifying their 
effect even if the two are directly contrary. Thus the 
graveyard scene:of ~~maybe construed as intens.i.fy-
ing its tragic effect, not in its contrast, as has been 
generally proposed, but through absorption, the assimil-
ation of comic gratification by pity and fear, the dominant 
emotions of tragedye Finally, the theory of the association 
of ideas by Locke and Hartley was introduced to criticism 
by such figures as Abraham Tucker and Al.e,rnnder Gerard. 
'rucker' s theory of the synthetic coalescence of idea~1 ant:lc-
ipated Coleridge 6 e theory of the imagination, while Gerard 
bx·oug·ht em<Ytion into this explanation "-'Ji th his proposal 
that pass.ion gives ui-iity to related idc~as by k@epin~J the . 
attention "f.i.xt 011. the ob:ject.S ~.,;trictly connected with it. 11 
Gera.rd 0 s insight anticipated the modern theory of affect, 
treated in Chapter Five, that it energizes and selects our . 
interests, and, in fact unavoidably helps determine our 
cognitive processes, even in the act of perception itself. 
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In the early nineteenth centuryf Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
Hazlitt, and Shelley were somewhat concerned with the emotion-
al effect of poetry, but entirely in the context of the 
expressive theory cmmnonly associated with romanticism.. lis 
considered the experience of the poet more significant than 
the recreatE~d expf.u:ience of h.is readers. 'They we.re slightly 
91.dlty in thi.s respect of the formalist asHwnption. t.hat 
the II ideal II reader passiv,?ly stereotypes exactly the im-
pressions he receives, though for them these impressions 
were of the genius of the poet rather than the formal context 
of his poetry. 9 In the Victorian era affective criticism 
was revived with the popular HQratian concept of ~le. ThE! 
Longinian concept of the sublime was also revitalized in 
Ruskin's quest for 11 noble grounds for thei noble emotions," 
wh:LJ.e both Arnold and John Stuart Mill seem to have returned 
to the view of Gera.1:d upon thc1 binding force of e:motions. 
suggested that poetry attaches emotion to the idea, 
While Mill propo~rnd that poots are "those who a:ee so 
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constituted that emotions are the links by which their 
ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are associated together. 11 
Finally, the infectuous theory of art by Tolstoy (briefly 
treated in Chapter Two) revived Plato's ethical concern as 
well as influencing· Richards' modern theo~y of affective 
criticism. 
Of particular interest in the nineteenth century, 
though, was .the unique affective theory of Edgar Allan Poe. 
Poe's obsession with creating bizarre and exotic effects 
led to his· proposal of a dispas.sionate role for the poet as 
' . 
a technician .of effects in others. He claimed in "The 
Philosophy of Composition" (1846) that the most intense 
effect to be.produced in poetry is the experience of beauty. 
His composition of "The Raven" had .accordingly been struct-
ured, he claimed, to create this effect of beauty in the 
common reader. He also claimed to have planned the poem, 
"step by step, to its completion with the precision and 
rigid consequence of a mathematical problem." He had 
accordingly chosen as "the most poetical topic in the world'i 
.the death of a beautiful woman, created a "close conscript-
ion of space" to frame the scene, and often repeated the 
refrain "nevermore" to intensify the reader's expectations.· 
In his review, "Hawtbor~e•s Twice-Told Tales," he.extended 
this theory to fiction, and in "The Poetic Principle" went 
so far as to limit the proper length of all literature to 
the length of time a single 'effect may be sustained. Poe 
thus placed an unprecedented emphasis upon the emotional 
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response induced by literature, but his theory was also 
uniqu,~ly artificial in his implication that the poet n.e.ed 
not experienc(; the emotion he stirs in hi.£, readers,. 'I'he 
poet's feelings presum,:1bly dcri.ve from h1E; creative r:it.r.·uggle 
to fabricate this emotion, a dispassionate critical aware-
ness radically conflicting with the them:y of Longi.nu.s that 
the poet communi.ct1tes emotions by e)l:pres_sing them, by 
responding to his own emc::.tions., Parado;.dciJ.lly, according 
to Poe's theory, the poet may feel a pleasant sense of 
accomplishment as a craftsman when he successfully instils 
forrm,:i.lated!' thoughl' this view has becomc1 commonplace in the 
twentiet:.h century, for the poet is now conventionally under~ 
stood to be engaged in the relatively dispassionate search 
for. cs,.tylitlc iigents to produce fm exact effect upon the 
reader • 10 Our objection to both Poe and his relucta.nt 
modern dc~scendtmts would be .in the artif .icd .. ali ty of the 
creative act they proposee The most successful means of 
instilling particular :f:E1(~lings in a r<-::ader would yet SE:H~m 
to be tht~ acciu:ate response in language to one• s own feelings. 
If the writer can comp,~tently and honestly express his 
feelings, it would seem inevitable that his choice of words 
Will automatically induce a compm:·able rosponse in h:ts 
readers. One Os i.mpr(ission of Uriah Heep in Dav}.:...1 ~012,;e_p.r.E,~, 
for E~xample q undm.:tbti~dly reproducef, the i.ni tial a tt.i tu.de of 
Dickens himself as he stirred his own imagination to the 
threehhold of eidetic realization. 
of our parad.i<~Jrn i.n i:nformat.ion theory g 
. . 
. . . . 
poet!s effort--measage--imagery--emoiions 
I would sug-9·t-:1r:Jt that this i.s a da.ngc.irous limitation and 
perhaps accounts for t.he mE!diocri ty of most of his works. 
trying to evok,::: r- but the~J(~ impuh:,EH~ a:t:e supplementary 6 not 
a tot.o.l subr:1tit,ution fo:i:: these ft1r:1:lings. The complex 
emotions succrrna:i,fully con-mmnicated by a writer like Dlckens 
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writer immune to them. 'l'he fear and wonder he m.ight think 
he arouses in a product like "The Raven" is more than likely 
to be flawed bE:~cause of its mechardc,11 gimmick~ and" :i.n-, 
evitably, its sentimental:tsm. Tone has be.come condescenr:lion, 
of thc1 11 craftsman II weaving a spell over his credulous 
audience. The sensitive reader feels maneuvert'Jd and thus 
deprived of rapport. 
II. 
The b1entic~th century revival of affective criticism was 
la:i::gely initiated by IeA. Richardsp with the result that most 
critics defined the:i.:r. views with respect: to hiB, much as we 
indicated i.n Chapter Two. Most reacted against what they 
thought to be his behaviorism, but a few have proposed that 
his af:fecti,.re fx:ame of reft~rence ni:-:!Hd not be el:i.m:lnated but 
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turpa.nded or mod.if:i.ed.. 'l'hese are the critics who now concern 
us, c1.t:1 well a.s the philosophers Santayana and Dewey, who 
In ~~>tici~~!~ ~ PoE;~tryv published in 1937, D .. G. ,Jam.es 
took Richards to task from a Kantian perspective with results 
comparable to our own., He attacked Richards' indiscriminate 
use of the coirwept II impulfi.ell and its emphasis upon our 
reception of sti..rm:1.li in li, terature rath{;ir than their imagin-· 
atlve recombination: 
In the "impulsE:'!u" wh.ich is the inclusive name for the 
entire procer:H3 from stimulus to att:i.t.ude. nothing is 
. indicated to show the creative act. which is prer..;ent and 
fundarnent:al to the reste We hear a. great deal a.bout 
sensation, tied and free imagery, references, emotic.ms, . 
and ,ittitudes; hut nothing of the primary activi:ty with-
out which sensation, imagery, and reference are abst:ract-
icms, and ,~motions and atti t.udes impossible o It ir3 all 
Hamlet without the Prince. If we are to remedy this 
omission, we rnuftt:. cease to speak of the reception of 
"stimuli" which cause certain results which may be valuable, 
and speak instead of an "active agency" which creates its 
object and in that creation enjoys: certain emotional and 
volitional accompan.i.ments.11 
James also insi,::.ted upon a central "act of apprehem,don" dom-
in aesthetic experience, as in perception, which sub-
ordinates particular impulses to an imaginative synthesis: 
• •• that th,? act. of awarenef::.o is a creative act ·which 
may require for its occurrence the prem:➔nce of certain 
physical fac:tors, but which cannot be reduc,-:!d to them. 
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m1r1ceptible of such a conveniE~nt reduction to neur.:al 
events as Mr~ Richards would have us believe., Hence the 
primary si tuat.ion whi.ch we have1 to hear in mind is not 
m.:i.r neural susceptibility to stimuli,. but the imaginative 
sy.nthc~sis of sensations which a:i:1:~ presented to the mind 
on the occurrence of certain physical and neural proceeses.12 
James thus pi tbc:.%1 hixnself against Richards 1n a controve1:sy 
that may be traced to the eighteenth century choice betweEm. 
Locke and Ka.nt a.nd later between Wordsworthian perception 
and Coleridgean imagination. James rejected the psychological 
theory of perception ixnplied by Richards for a Whi tehea.dian , 
concept of II pr.lf:lhension II and organic uni. ty. He disconcert-
ingly invoked rt~ligion in his argument, but his specific 
attack upon Richards was remarktibly like our m-m. He em·~ 
phasized that the active outgoing effort of the reader syn-
thesizing experience is more important to aesthetic appreci-
ation than the passive reception of effectso Effects are 
only part of the process ·which occurs through the effort of 
the imagination to reach beyond itself to experience. 
Approximately the same time, R.G~ Collingwood pro-
posed an e};:press.ive theory of emotion that more specifically 
explained this active effort of the reader. 13 He proposed 
an important though overlooked distinct.ion between the 
initial "pertur.h;:ation" or excitement. in emotion, an oppn:rnsi:ve 
experience beca,rne we do not: yet recognize it, and its 
com.b1ned grati.f icatio:n a.nd i:nt(~rrnif i.cati.o:n. once it is 
· :r.ecognizc1d, ·· iunu1lly through its expresi;don in language .. 
Catharsis · is the t·(~co9nition. of emotions and even thEdr 
resulting exacerbation, not their release through gratifi-
cation as haf, been usually Z:n.1ppor,<:?d. Simply becom:in,;:r aware 
of exnot.ions .is tantamount to the:b: grati,f:i.ca:tion., and 
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t.hi.~ subtler ca:tha:t'tic response g.i:ves li tr.;n:a:ture its purpose, 
both in the .ix1.dividt1al a:n.d collectively u to acquaint us 
with the full orchestration of our emotions.14 The poet 1 s 
gratification. in his dis(:overy of language i.s comnmnicated 
to hlE> reade:t:s, who are led to nv.:tke a comparable discovery 
within thei): c.rwn experience.. 1l'his proces/3 (o,: 11 tri11rnact.ion, iY 
as it will 1.atE~r be cal.led) of aesthetic C.'"'Ommun.ication 
obli.\Jes the p{J(;;t to be entirely candid about his o·wn emot:!.onii p 
confident that. they are shar1;;:1d by his public, and to recog-
niz~~ that h:ts pr:Lmary motivation is to communicate his 
feelings, t.o effect their simila.r recognition by his publice 
His .relationship with his readers thus becomes integral to 
his aesthetic experiencep fore "What he says will be some-
thi11£r that his audience saya through his mouth. 11 He must 
accept his public as "co11abo.rators 11 who have the s.aroe 
feelings and responsibilities as he, "for their function as 
audience is not passively to accept. his work, but to do .:i.t 
over.· again for themselves. 11 15 His discovery of his emotions 
in poetry mediate~ their discovery (comparably dynnm:lc) of 
Such had been implied by Shelley in his conception 
of poets as our "unacknowledged legislators," and would 
later be proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre, in a strictly 
political sense, of using language to encourage engagement 
in one's public. 
Max Eastman was another critic whose views extended 
the scope of affective criticism. Eastman has been aggres-
sively attacked as a Trotskyist renegade whose principles 
were brought to th.e 'brink of absurdity when· he became a 
Readers Digest editor, and by New Critics in particular for 
his supposedly "vulgar" enthusiasm for heightened exper-
.ience to· the neglect of quality in literature. Lately he 
has been perhaps mercifully overlooked, but his views 
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deserve careful re-examination. In "A Note on I. A. Richards," 
' . . 
(1932) his attack upon Richards' polarization of science 
and poetry anticipated Richards' later theory of projection. 
He showed that the semantic objectivity advocated in The 
Meaning of Meaning leads quite naturally to Richards' theory 
of poetry as "pseudo-statement." By divesting science of 
the subjective factor in intuition, Richards paved the way 
for similarly divesting poetry of its objective validity 
as truth or meaning which merits belief: 
Indeed, once they [Ogden and Richards[ had isolated 
science as a pure pointing to things without a·tti tude 
and without reference to behavior, it was quite inevit-
able, I suppose, that Ogden and Richards should turn 
round and detine poetry as a pure evoking of attitudes 
and organization.6f. behavior without pointing to things, 
. II.The- coup d I eta.t of Ogden am:1 Richards. confiists of cutting 
off knowledge from life!, and then dec.ltu::tng poetry once 
more the mistrc,i:;s of life e" To t.he c(,mt:t>ary, hl1 claimed, 
objectivity is ;;;. strictly subjeGtive activity, he claimed, 
Coleridge on Imaqination: -----'•-- --~--..,-- -
The world i~ not composed of 11 thingir;. 11 It would be as 
true to say that the world is organized into 11 thingi:a, 11 
by cru.r thoughts., And this org.rmi~;ati.on is car:i.:-ied out 
in the main, especially in its earlier phases, primarily 
with the view to establishing attitudes and patterns of 
behavior.. It is rat~her rno:re a classif .i.c2,tion of r-e·-
sponses to what the world presents than of the material 
presente.d~ 17 
find in the world about us, and~ posterior~ the descript-
ion of "things!, in language and poetrye 
However, in 11 '.t'he History of English Poetry, 11 first 
published unde:~X' the title, "Division of Labor in Po,~t:t:-y, 11 
Eastman himself Sf;H'.:.ms to have propos<:~d the Ernpand:icng polnr= 
ization of knowledge and exper..i~~nce as an explanation of 
the history of English literature$ lie claimed this division 
culminating with the pr,actice of modernists like El:Lot and 
Cummings, jt.rnti.f.ied by the ep.iotemology of Ogden and R:i .. chardr;,, 
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has reduced poetry to an obscure, meaningless impotence. 
Knowled9e and t::xperience had been synthesized in the Ren-
aissanc:e imagination, when poetry was stimuliited by science's 
infancy but yE1t. r::.e,-mied th-r1 highest vehicle of knowledge o 
With the metaphysical poets there was "a transition from 
poetry as an assumption of knowledge to poetry as a 
serious piaying with .idecu::i, 1118 a slight b~t sign.:tf icrmt 
change initii.ati.ng the separation of knowle:d90 from exper-· 
ience. By the Restoration, poetry was ass:ig.m~d a dis·-
tinct role of its own 6 providing a "refined intellectual 
pleasu:re, 11 a major sacrific(:! of.her former un:.lversalJ.ty, 
alt,ogether eliminating the pursuit of knowledge. 1rhis 
su'bo,:dinate role was only briefly challenged in romantic 
criticism, and then a further division of labor occurred 
in the aestheticism of Poe and others and'fi11ally the 
modern 11 cult of tmintelligibili ty 0 11 Eastman regrett(:;:d this 
development and particularly deplored modern obscurity. He 
preferred the Renais8,?mce synthesis, and optimistically 
assured his reade:cs, "The division of labor we are discuss-
ing is, in short, not absolute, and never can be, either 
among people or among books~" He appealed to the "very 
great poets of the future" to understand this problem and 
presumably to rectify it by somehow restoring harmony be-
tween knowledge and feeling. The ultimate harmony he 
sought is perhaps indicated in his brief article, "A Word 
With Lewis Mumford," in which he praised the Golden Age in 
Greece, when Empedocles, Parmenides, and others simultaneously 
initiated .. both science and poetry. 
Eastman's particular affective theory of poetry was 
roost pers~asively- explained in his essay, "What Poetry Is," 
in which he proposed. that the primary function .of poetry··· 
is paradoxically to heighten consciousness by obstructing 
our response: 11 It seems .. then that consciousness is, arises 
out of, or depends upon, two things--a blor::kage of action, 
and an identification of one experience with another so 
that action may be resumedo 1119 He used the example of 
putting on a coat--if our arm easily passes through its 
sleeve, then our act.ion is entirely automatic; but if our 
arm gets stuck, perhaps caught in a torn lining, then our 
attention is stimulated, whereupon we search for a means 
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to get our arm through. Once our arm is free and our action 
has begun ag-ain, consciousness lapses. '11he difficulty of 
the task., the problem posed, had briefly stimulated our 
attention, which ceased when we could carry through our 
response. This close relationship between consciousness 
and obstructed action impressed Eastman as the fundamental 
explanation of the effect of literature. In particular he 
cited the theory of Margaret Floy Washburn that, "A per-
t ception does not become conscious unless a responsive 
action is !nitia!~d, but it also does not become conscious 
Unless the initiated response is obstructed. 11 20 (italics in 
original) An obstructive delay supposedly inhibits our 
automatic response, arousing our attention and directing it 
to the task. of finding a solution. As long as we are at this 
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"br.:i.nk of action," we en9age in thinkingq but if our 
f erred, we lose consciousn,1ss in this particular area. This 
"brink of action" seems identical with Richards 0 "incipient 
response" and extends the principle in a useful fashion,_ 
though Ea,s tman. overextending its application to 
crit.:i.cism~ He :Lrrnisted upon the primary_, unqualified 
importance of h(dghtened response .:i..n our literary experience: 
11 ~ irnp1:·actical identific;ition that you can induce some-
body to listen to is poetic, because it is the essence of 
an at.tent.ivfi com;ciousness@ It is mind SUftpended on the 
brink of action." (italics included in the original) The 
:i.mpra.c:tical has a heighbrming effect, he claimE:d, becaurne 
it creates a problem without an evident solution, apparently 
the ultimate single purpose of art: "To me it seems obvious 
that such realization, or heightened consciousness of life, 
i.s desir(~d foi: its own sa.ke ~ 11 21 Art for art.' s sake b,~cerme 
srt for heightened consciousness's sake, a principle per-
~aps unfairly ridiculed by Richards when he suggested that 
oeing tortured would fit Eastman's definition of art.22 But 
the strength as ·well as weakness of Eastman's theory lies 
Ln its breadth of application. All modern art may be 
~valuated in terms of heightened consciousness, an asriet 
Eew theories possess, though more explicit fc:ictors w·ould 
:>bviously have to be brought into account regarding any 
?articular aesthetic experience. 
In his articles, 11 What. is Poetry" and "Art and the Life 
of Action," Eastman ingeniously applied his principle to 
poetry, part.i.cular_ly in his unique explanation of metaphor .. 
·He claimed that metaphor heightens consciousne_ss through 
the obstruction of impractical comparisons: "'l'he metaphor 
provokes the bxain function with its truth.-to-·perception, 
but inhibits it with its untruth-to-action .. " . A poetic 
metaphor is an !E~racti:.cJt.~ ide!}tificatiqn of· two exper-
iences, and its function is to arrest action and arouse 
consciousness. 1123 He claimed his theory of mt:!'taphor to be 
dynamic, and purposive in contrast to R:i.cha.rds w u which is 
relatively static and descriptive, though it should be 
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noted that he proposed his theory in 1932, four years be-
fore Richards explained himself in The Philosop)ly_ of Rhe~oric. 
Eastman also extended this principle to form, claiming that 
the succer:.sfu.l use of fol:m requires a clash of: .impuli:H::?s 
which arouses our attention and then gratifies us with its 
successful resolution: 
The forms that elevate mere impulses of expression into 
works of art. are i.ntc~:r.esting forms. That is, they are 
inhibitions of those impulses by others equally authentic, 
so that instead of being successfully expressed and lost, 
they are in-pressed and the feelings attending them 
brought into vi.vid being and sustained. 24 
But Eastman also shared with E.D. Snyder a belief in 
the hypnotic ef feet. of poetry, a theory which would seen1. 
to conflict with that of heightened consciousness. Eastman 
explained the regularity of meter in terms of this effect, 
claiming- that. a "lulling" rhythm produces a hypnoid con-
dition which brings literary experience to the threshold 
of haliilcination~ 
. . . . . 
To a· certain. extent he ascribed the · 
same lulling···effect to poetic diction, for example ad-
vocat.i.ng the rn:.;(~ of anach.ronistic locution!!, such as oho _!~, 
and alas {much to the consternation of those who otherwise . 
respect his thtH'.iries) ~ One c.>f his most -useful insights ex-
pla.:tned how a. rdmil.ar momentum in emoti.ons increases the. 
sense of verisimilitude: 
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Those inward feelings [emotions, defined as aroused but 
inactive consciousness] are a part of experience, and so 
belong to his effort as ends0 But they are also that 
part which he can really and not only imaginatively evoke 
with wordsf and so enter into his technique as means of 
giving intensity to the whole. 25 
We may pa.raphr:ase this important but obscure passage by 
saying that tht3 reality of inward feelings or emotions 
evoked by literature (we actually laugh, cry, exult in 
triumph, etc.) gives the events described, however fictive, 
a sense of re~lity livede A feedback occurs--these events 
which seem realistic generate emotions which~ real, not 
a matter of verisimilitude. These.in turn suffuse the 
Ir entire experience to make it real and personally significant. 
~y 
i: 
,r;; The truth of emotions succet•rnfully evoked sp:reads to give 
certitude to the entire effect. 
Thus a cleavage seems to have existed in Eastman's 
criti.cal theory between his theories of heightened con-
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sciousness and hypnotic effect~ He advocated alertness 
and attention in read.:i.ng, a matter of obstructed u heighte.:med 
consGiOusnese, but alee the hypnoidal experience of reality 
and inertial, perhaps an affective counterpart to the 
concepts of uin.i::formity and va.rit,::,ty or E~_ra Pound's theory 
of the constant and variable elements in poetry. Actually, 
both would be essential ingredients of our aesthetic re-
1896 0 George Santayana had proposed an affective theory 
similar in many respect,t::. to Eastman I s. S;u1tayana defined 
beauty as value which exists in our act of perception 
projected upon whatever appeals to us in our <:mvironm121nt. 
He mcplained this process with the simple formula o "Beauty 
is pleasure re9iU:'dE~d a.s the quality of a t.hing. 112 6 b.11 
experience, he claimed, anticipating theories of both 
Richards and Eastman, involvf~S the hypostatized concept.-
ion of "things'' outside ourselves in our field of vision. 
We have learned to define and judge things by their few 
omnipresent qual:l ties we e}cperience v in effect the priroary 
qual:t ties proposc1d by Locke., Santayana dt1plored the 
success of science in making things thus abstracted seem 
to exist independent of our experience, in contrast to the 
aesthetic idea wh:tch u II r<~tai.ns the emotional reaction, the 
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pleasure of the perception, as an integral part of the con-
ceived thing." With art, he proposed, the act of perception 
remains dynamic . .:u:1d has not. yet b<:.~en re if led as the rr~lation··· 
ship between sub~jec:t -tmd :::mr:t·ound.i.ng objective entities. 'I'he 
"thing" perceived aesthetically is not a radically abstract 
reduction of: gupposedly inherent qualities to the fewest 
possible, but involves a projection of our pleasurable 
Santayana later claimed that the most important effect 
of art cannot be .:ittributed to its materials, but to their 
denied.. If "things" a.re an as::,nunption about composite 
patte:r.·nr:) of effect, as Santayantt himself proposed, then the 
timc;-worn dichotomy must be abrmdoned between things and 
~ 
qualit.:ler..;, ore in li ti:~1.rature, we might add, between form and 
content. Though form and symrnet:cy SfH::.m to exist object-
ively in the world outi:dde our8elves, all that matters in 
art is whether they arouse our responsaG Santayana tangent-
ially suggested this almost solipsistic ultra-subjectivism 
in his insistence upon the integrity of our response: "Does 
the thing itself actually please? If it does, your taste is 
real; it. may be different from that of others, but is 
equally justifif~d and grounded in human natu1:e. 1127 Whatever 
affects us, including form, is what our human nature leads 
us to find appealing in our environment. 
A more s.oc:ial approach to affective criticism was 
,tn·oposed by J"ohn Dewey :i.n his book, Art as Ex_Eerie~ce, 
published in 1934. Contrary to Santayana, Dewey emphasized 
the contin.u.ity hat.ween artistic and o.rd.'.Lnary experience, 
asserting that art should be a :refinement by degree, not 
kind, of what we do and see in our everyday livese He 
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formd that capitalism has separated a.:i:·t fr.om experience by 
putting it on a pedestal, in a frame, and in the museum .. He 
claimed the result has been detrimental to both art and 
experience because the first has become esoteric 0 relin-
quishing much of the vitality acquired frorn living experie:ncE1, 
while the SElC<.md, isolated fl:om aE:1sthetic ful:fillme.nt, has 
become vul9ar and mass produced. He propor;ed the most 
important. step in the solut.ion of this problem to be a new 
convergence of art. and experience through the dynamic per-· 
caption of art in which a "yielding of the self occurs,n as 
Richards advocated, but with an active outgoing effort to 
"take in 11 the experience: 
Perception is an act of going-out of energy in order to 
rece.i ve, not a with.hold.in~; of energy o To steep our•~ 
selves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into 
it. When we are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms 
us and for. lack of answering act.ivi.tyt we do not percei.ve 
that which hears us down$ We must sutrffncn energy and 
pitch it at a responsive key in order to take i~. 28 
Dewey sugg(~sted the reader must himself be a poet to a 
certain extent, with at least incipient capabilities in 
this direction, be.cam::H~ he must select and r(~cornbine the 
material of the text in a second, derivative act of poetry: 
For to perceive, a beholder.must cr~ate his own ex-
per.·i.ence~ And his creation must lnclude relations 
co:mparable to t.hose which the or.igi.nal producer under-
went. •• o Without an act of recreation the object is 
not perceived as a work of art. The artist selected, 
simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed accord-
ing to his interest~ 1rhe beholder must go throu9h these 
operations according to his point of v:i.€rw and intc➔rest~ 
In both, an act of abstraction, that is of e:x:tracd:ion 
of what is signi.fica.ntP. takf~s pl,H.::ee In both, there is 
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a compreherwdon in it.a literal i:.dgnif ication--tha.t is, a 
gathering.together of details and particulars physically 
scattered into a physical whole. There is work done on 
the par·t of the percipient as there is on the pa:t:'t of the 
This work done by the percipient, in our case the roader, 
certainly involves {l) a concent.:¥:ated act of attention 
upon the intended meaning, as Richards proposedp but it also 
requires, (2) a reconstruction of the details and part-
iculars judged according to one' s own exper i,::nce, as pro-
posed by Dewey, and (3) a crit.ical comparh;on between the 
intended meaning as understood and other possible meanings 
one c.r.m find. Affect is involved in each of these act:ivH:.ies 
to tht.1 extent that we are motivated to do l ts job • The 
second and third seem to require more effort and the exp<:m-· 
diture of more affective energy, but without adequate 
PPlication to the first, the direct act of attention, our 
:r~econsti tut:ic:m of the xnater.ial would be personal a.nd 
i:eralevant. Also, the t:H:1:cond and third modes of response, 
though propor:ied in a sequence, may be more profit.ably 
treated as ocour1:ing simultaneously, our comparison with 
other mE:ianings mltking reconstruction possible and our act of 
reconsti~uct.ion invel'.:sely suggesting comparable meanings • 
. 
Dewey .~lzo stressed the importance of emotion in the 
cr<1at:i.cm of (;u:::·t, a 1:equir:(~ment which may easily be extended 
to the a,:;t of r·e~crea tio:n by the reader.. According to 
Dewey, emotion is not e};:traneous to aesthetic pleasure, . a 
frosting to be added or w:tthhf::ld at the choosing of either 
the poet or readc~r, but intrinsic to this experience: 1111:'he 
a.ct of <1xpression is not. soznet:hing which supervenes upon an 
inrzpiration · already complete.. It is the carrying forward to 
~ 
completion of an i.nspiration by means of the objective 
material of perception and imagery. 113 0 Dewey even proposed 
(as did Eastman) that emotion is the matrix of form, that 
our emotional response determines both what we select to 
respond to and its shape or pattern that we recognize: 
That art is selective is a fact universally recognized. 
It is so because of the :t·ole of emotion in the act of 
exprest·don. Any predominant mood automatically excludes 
all that is uncongenial wi.th it. An emotion is ·more 
effective than any deliberate challenging sentinel could 
bee It reaches out tentacles for that which is cognate, 
for th.i.ngs which feed it and carry it to completion. Only 
When nmotion di.ea or is broken to dispersed fragments, can 
matex:ial t.o which it ls alien enter cmnzcionsnc1ss 0 ThE~ 
selective opc,r;J.tion of mat:<0:eials so powerfully exercised 
by a develop.in~;r emotion in a se:riE,1s of continued acts 
extracts m.atter from a multitude of objects, numerically 
and spatially separated, and condenses what is abstracted 
in an object that. is an epitome oft.he values belonging 
to them all. This function creates the "universality of 
a work of art."31 
In other words 5 a. work of art is universal because the 
artist· is ~iti.mulatt1d by shar('.1d emotions to make shared dis-
tinctions oft thought but ne 8 e:r. so well ar:i:·anged. Dewey 
did not bE:1lhw(1 that emotion entirely dominates the ex-
perience of art, but he did feel it is an integral part 
which helps determine the choice of form. He treated art-
istic experience as a unified act of perception including , 
the events perceived, their successful choice and .arrange-
ment, and the emotions exercised in this act. In his est"· 
imation form is the "operation of forces" which results from 
the healthy interaction of these components. Unlike Richardsr 
he connected form with affect and the two with belief, 
abstract ideas, and any other mode of thinking possibly 
relevant to the experience of literature. 
Finally, Louise M. Rosenblatt has recently adopted a 
"transactional" theory of criticism based upon the theory of 
knowledge worked out by ~fohn Dewey and l.\.rthur :fl. Bent.lli.?Y 
by Dewey, Ros<1nblatt says, "to designate situations i.n 
rvhich tho elements o.t· f actor:s arc, one might say I aspects 
::>f the to.tal situation in an o:nqo:lng proce:HJ,.. Thus a 
;;he tr,uu:H'ii.cti.on between a particular ind.:i.v:i.dua.l and a pa.r-
;:icular environment.. 1133 Ros,.mblatt proposes that f)Xactly 
:.he smne proc:eBf~ occurs with poetry because a person be-
mmes a re:~a.der 11 by virtue of his acti vi t;Y in re lat.:i.onship 
:o a text, which he organiZf:'!S as a set of verbal symbols 
II This transaction is a dynamic act of selection, a 
~tal "situation" rather than a linear process and sing-
llar because both the poet and his readers uniquely com-
•ine their funds of experience. Rosenblatt also insists 
pon our making a semantic distinction between the Text 
.nd the ~~, the latter the lnvolvemm1t of t:h,e reader in 
he text. The reading of a poem, she claims, is an organic 
ccretion of feelings and attitudes in response to the 
eaning added to another. 'I'here was an active trial-and-
rror, tentative structuring of the responses elicited by 
he text, the building up of a context which was modified 
r rejected as more and more of the text was deciphered0 11 34 
he empha.sizt1£.; that this activity of finding and inter-
elating "cu.es 11 cannot. simply be divorced from e,~perience, 
Lit must be recognized to be the effort of the re;:iader in 
ls dynamic 11 transaction" with the text: 
1 f"f 
.,\,.) I 
e •• that the reader is active. He is not a blank tape 
registering a ready-made message~ He is actively involved 
in building up a poem for himself out of thEi lines e HEJ 
selects from the vu1~ious referents that occur to him in 
response to tht:~ verbal symbols. He finds some context 
within which thc,se refe.rents ccm be related~ He re-
interprets earlier parts of the poem in the light of 
later parts. Actually, he has not fully read the first 
line until he has re.ad the la.st u and _interr.:--;lat:ed t:hern. ~ 
TherG seems to be a kind of 1:1huttlin\J back and forth as 
one synthesis--one context, one persona, etc~--after 
another suggesta itself to him. 35 
In this transaction catylized by the texte modifications 
organically expand the reader's experience of the poem, 
which thus becomes a human "~vent." a selective and syn-
acti:vi ty. The ideal reader and his ideal inter-
pretation do not exist and cannot even be profitably 
hypothesized, since each reader must bring to t:he t.0)xt m~w 
values and experience leading to an altogether new trans-
action. Each finds a fresh synthesis critically adequate 
1::i8 
to the extent the text is felt and understood, and likewise, 
in reverse, to the extent he is stimulated by the text. But 
within this strictly quantitative limitation there remains 
a wide variety of acceptable responses. Poetry is dynamic, 
the active experience of the toxt, not the te,ct iti:ielf. 
III~ 
Affective cri.ti.cism may be generally and almost mean-
inglessly defined as that which emphasizes the effect of 
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literature upon its readers. This brief history has amply 
shown the wide variety of cri ti.cal apprm.1ches 1oos<:;ly 
fitting this description, though these often seem unrelated, 
or overlapping and cutting across each other in an inter-
action difficult to eJtplain. 'l)ht1y are often even contra-
dictory with no clear resolution of their differences 
apparently to be found~ '.L'he qucn.;tion n~tn:irally arises 
with at least a few of these difficulties explained as a 
matter of confusion or mixture among these categories. 
Riclu::i.rds attempted such a t.axonorny with his list of sixteen 
thc;)!o:r.ies of be<'J.uty, though his Ci:"l,t.c~gorieti do not sc,::m to 
have ad,::,qua.tri!ly covered many of thE.:: t.heori.~2:s rnen.tioned in 
our history~ Wimsatt also made a rapid survey of approaches 
in his articler 11 The Affective Pallacy, 11 .including the 
emotive, intentional, vividness, physiological, ,~nd halluc-· 
ination theories, as well as that of the grand style and 
undoubtedly others. 36 But his categories seem loosely 
organized, hastily concocted to 9.ive at least a sen1blance 
of order to the wide range of critical theories he con-
sider€::.d fallacious. 'l'he superficiality of his categories 
-probably resulted at least partly from hie distaste for 
these theoriEis ~ 
A new typology seems in order, and one may be tent-
atively proposed from the theorif:.1s we have surveyed, of 
Which three ba:'Jic kinds of af f(~ct:l.ve c.ri ticism seem to emerge t 
of {l) omotion, ( 2) 11 transaction, 11 and (3} projection. •rhe 
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11 emotive 11 e>r.planation would include the Platon.:i.c and Aristot1.1l~ 
ian theories of intensificatidn and c~tha~sis~ Shaftesburian 
sentimentalism, synaesthesis (the dandellatiqn of _emotions), 
and the 1.:.-sychoanaiyt.:i'e· · afal archetypal interpretations of · 
unconscious gratification& 37 The "transactional" explanation, 
emphasizing affective communication between the poet and his 
readers, would include Longinus' rhetor:x,cetl theory of the 
sublime, Horace's "pragmatic" choice between dulce and ut.il~, 
Poe I s emphasis upon craftsmanship, and the approachern of 
Dewey and Rosenblatt specifically labeled as being "t:r.ans-
actional.1138 Finally, the "projective" approach, emph.:u.dzing 
the interaction bet.we.en affect and la.ngmlge to project an 
aesthetic re~lity, would include the neglected eighteenth 
century theories of Abraham 'ruck.er and Alexander Gerard v the 
aestheticism of Santayana, Richards' interpretation of 
Coleridge, and, in certain contexts, the theories of D.W. 
James, and Max Eastman. A fourth affective approach might 
also be mentioned, intriguing but well beyo:nd the scope of 
this study, the 0 adaptive" theories of Morse Peckham :i.n 
Man's ~~~ .t2.!'. Chaos (1965), Arthur I<oestle:r. in The Act of, 
£.!:~-~~! {1964), and, most recently c Stanley Burnshaw in 
~ Sec-unless !V~i?.. (1970). These bring the theory of affect 
Ultimately to issues of experience as a biological quest': for 
Few of the critics treated in this brief history may be 
neatly categorized in one or the other of these groupings. 
Ost combined two or even three, but their emphasis and mode 
of combination helps dtd:ine their part..icul;;i.r approaches e 
Thus Longinuc gave equal emphas:!,.s to the emotive a.nd trans-
actional approacher,, whereas Ear;tman' s theory combined th€.~ 
emotive with the projective.. Richards brought. all three 
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into a,ccount 17 f .irs.t E~n1phasizing the emoti.v~ a:nd then the 
projective, whilE~ Dewey se{:;ms to have :found a baJ.ance among 
the three. This threefold distinction (excluding the "adapt-
ive" theories) is admittedly crude, but it has its basis in 
roughly comph~mentary dynami.c::,; of li te:cary experience: our 
response to the: poet, .induced emotions O and the stiJ:rn:i.lated 
projection of aesthetic experience. Moreoverr these cat-
egories seem ernpirically uBeful as a prt:?li.m.inary bz1sis for 
d.if fe.r,:::nt.iat.ion among these critics, Et:nabling us to sort 
out rnany of t.he more complicated theories as• combinations 
of others. The "stratificational" theory we proposed last 
chiipter may accordingly be understood as an integration of 
transactional and projective approaches, while the particular 
experience of emotion has been left for a inore technicml ex-
planation next chapter. 
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Footnotes, Chapter Four 
lPlato, "Ion," included in Criticism; The Foundations 
of Modern Literary ,Jrn'!9ment., ed. · by Mark Schorer, Jo:,H3phine 
Miles, and Gordon McKenzie (New York, 1958), p. 9--hereafter 
cited as Scherer$ 
2schorerv p .. 8. 
3sc11o·~er - b~ .l!- ,f_.,. ". · {J pp. 2~·,L 
4schorf.1r, PP~ 7·~8. 
5schox:erp Po 204. 
6schorer, p. 10 . 
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81v1y treatment of the eighb:cn1th co:ntury is necessarily 
briefr and I am mostly indebted to Earl R. Wasserman's 
article, 11 The P lcasures of 'l'ra<,:redy, 11 !fLTI,v ~IV (December, 1947} , 
pp. 283-307. Other sources I found useful include Wimsatt 
("G,m.ius, Emotions and A.sr.ociation"); M.H. Abrams 0 ?;h£ 
Mirror and the ~1p, Chapter 4 ( 19 The Development of the 
Expressive Theory of Poetry and Art"); and Walter Jackson 
Bate's Ff'OJE. ~lassie t<2_ Romantic, Chapte:c 4 and Chapter 5~ 
W.K. Wimsatt 1 s article, "The Affective Fallacy," the locus 
classicus New Critical definition of affective criticism 
from a mo:n.1 or less hostile perspective, was also useful as 
a preliminary sketch of eighteenth and nin~teenth century 
trends. 
9of course I mu1:,t concur with Richards iri reje.ct..i.ng this 
concept of the "ideal~ reader, which would justify the 
neglect of affective critical issues* If our response 
were a rubber stamp, either to form or the inspiration of 
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the poet., there would be little more to tJay about the matt.er. 
Fortunately this is not the case--if it were, literature 
would be meaningless, a rote experience. 
lO•rhis analogy with catalysis was· of course suggested 
by ToS• Eliotu who was indirectly influ~nced by Poe through 
Baudelaire and the French symbolists. Eliot has had few 
affinities with Poe except in the "catalytic" theory of 
composition, which can be traced back to Poe and little 
farther. 
llrn Stallman, pp. 477-78. 
12rn Stallman, loc. cit.· 
l3R. G. Collingwood, •rhe Princ:l.ples o,! !-1~ (~l'he Claxendon 
Press, 1938); scdected pr;u:.rna9es reprinted in The Pr.ob.leJn~; of 
Aesthetics, ed. by Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger (New York. ---- . 
1953), pp. 343-58. 
14vivas and Krieger, pp. 344~45. 
l5vivas and Krieger, pp. 353-54. 
1 ~Max Eastman, En.12~~- of Poetry with Anthology 
(New York, 1951), p. 249. 
17Eastman, loc. cit. 
18Eastman, p. 175. 
19Eaetman, p. 159. 
20Eastman, loc. cit. 
21 "Art and the Life of Action,~ in Eastman, p. 198. 
22'l'he Philoso12h): of Rhetoric, p. 124. 
23Eastman, pp. 196-97. 
24Ea.stman, op. cit. 
25Eastma.n, p. 154~ 
26George Santay'~1"na, '11he Sei:·i.sC:! of ~~~ut.:r (New York, 
1896; reprinted 1955), pp. 42-52, esp. p. 49. 
27santayana, p. 80. 
28John Dew·ey, Art ~ ~eri.m:i~ (N,~w York, 1934; 
reprinted 1958), p. 53e 
29oewey, p .. 54. 
30newey, Pe 66e 
3loewey, p. 68. 
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32edited by Ratner and Altman (New B:r.unsw:i.ck, 1964). 
33toui-e M.· Rosenblatt, "T6wards a T~an~actional Theory 
of Reading," Journal of Reading Behavior, I, i (winterf 1969), .......,..,,,,.., ___ --- . ___ .,_____ .
p. 4 3; her views here are an e:i{tcmsion of those <.~xprcssed 
in an earlier article, "1.rhe Poem as Event," .C.~lle~ J,::n:glla,h, 
XXVI, ·pp. 123-·28. 
34Rosenblattr p. 37. 
35Rosenblatt, p. 34. 
36w.K. Wimsatt, The Verbal :r~, pp. 28·~31, in passim. 
37Though unfortunately beyond the scope of th.is dissert-
ation, the psychoanalytic theory of affect seems important, 
Particularly in the work of Ernst Kris, Simon Lesser, and 
Norman Holland. 
38sartre's theory of the artist as a propagandist 
instilling a sEmse of en.9a_srement i.n his readers. may b<~ added 
,o this list, and in fact seems an important link between 
affective and Mar.xi.st c1:it.i.cal tipproa.ches. · 
Chapter J:>"i ve: 
"Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and Affective criticism" 
The foregoing critics and aestheticians included in 
the wide category of affectiv,Z! cri.t.iclsrn may also be te.nt:-
atlvely grouped in two clusterSt, ( 1) those bror.-adly con-· 
to a text., including Richards r DE.rwey, and Eastman, and 
(2) those particularly conce:cm:1d with the rolt1 of emotion 
group have devot.<~d their i:nquiry to t.hH ovc1rt1ll p:robliems of 
into account, which we obviouslv feel to be self-evident. - -
The second group have been concerned with the relationship 
between cognition and emotion in this response, an area 
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of investigation with manifold unexplored implications~ 
Foxmalists and obj0ir:tivists ha.ve tried to sepa:cate cognition 
from emotion 0 suggesting that the ideal reader, or one 
approachinsr such a p~cototype, ml1st have the discipline to 
eliminate emotion or at least subdue it in his experience of 
poetry~ In reply, the affective critics of the latter 
gr:oup have ti:·ied to show that the two are organically inter-
related and not to be artificially divided. 
To settle this and related disputes it would eeem prof-
itable to survey recent trends in the psychological theory 
of affect. The literature is vast and beyond the scope of 
th.is E,st,,?J.y, but a brief summa:ry would seem :tn order. Thf~re 
has unfortunately been a pervasive vulgarization of psycho-
analysis among critics, both sympathetic and hostile, and 
then again almost a total barrier separating experimental 
psychology fr.om li t.erary cri tici t,m. 'l'hir; wall of :i.gnor,:u1cci 
has encouraged facile conclusions in criticism, the most 
notable of which having been the treatment of cognition as 
an experience that may be isolated and r~rified. 
The first influential modern explanation of emotion, 
the James-Lange theory, proposed simultaneously by William 
lfi 7 
with an appropriate pattern of adjustment to an external 
stirnu1v.s v and then our t1xpe:r.:-ience of emotion is the ccm.sc.1ous 
awareness of this physical response, though we.make a short-
cut to treat it as a direct rcspons~ to whatever triggered 
this reaction. The body thus acts as an intermediary that 
generates emotion, without which we would be devoid of 
feeling~ "Without the bodily stat.cs fo11owinq on the pf1r•w 
ception, the latter wo~ld be purely cognitive in form, pale, 
Color1° 0 ~ ~na~~t•1·t 0 "~ ft•rt~t1"onal '·l~-rn~i-1 111 , ,, .,_.C~•-..!1 ,.J f 'i.:,-,.,._J, t•"',.,._,, ,,\.. .,..,~:,. \.AJ.. i.,;,,.i; V , ., , V ..t" t_.. t> Our entire 
our body 
the energy t.o be shaped and rentrained by the 
function of the b:cai.n.. I .A. Ri.ch..:u::(h:; 0 affective 
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deriv€~d from this theory. He p:r.'oposed a comparabli:? It circuit 
relay" judgment. of poetry, that we first. havei ,i total re~;porrne 
to a poem and then jud9i~ it. by t::rvaluating our. reBponsE~. 
That this proposed response, the .act.of appreciation, is both 
cognitive and emotional rathc~r than bc~ing strictly emotional. 
according to the ,James-Lange thE\Ory, se12;.m.s a relativf.:ly minor 
differenco@ For our purposes in cr.:i.ticis.m, though, the 
,Jamtrn-Lange theory mostly seems to support the cognitive 
approach,. Emotion is ident:if :i.ed · an physical activity in ·a 
polar opposition to.cognition and is moreover limited t.o 
relatively crude patterns of response t.hat involve overt 
phisical behavior. Our emotional response is treated as a 
spil:U.119 ovc.~r of behavior into consciousness, a. geyser of. 
physici;i.l release which rn.::1y be arrested and cut. off from 
experience if we have enough conscious w:i.11 power. In 
fact ~Tames rec om.mended that we ex,;rcise repr.esflion to "con·" 
' . 
qut~,:- tmdesire,\>.<ble emotional tendencies in ourselves 1 11 for, 
"the suppresBion of the actual movements has a tendency to 
supp1:ess the nervous ci,n:rents that incite them., so that the 
external quiescence is followed by the internal. 112 Here 
·· James' s proposal seems to have anticipated th«:.? Pavl_ovian 
therapy techniques of behavioral psychology (actually first 
by Plato) in advocating the inhibition of impulr~es 
order to eliminate themf compr.'i.:r.-ed with cathartic theory 
psychoanalysis, which seeks to eliminate them through 
e:x:pressi.onc 3 
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Lange theory, which I think perhaps considerable, James's 
a surplus dissipa.t,ion. of erH:!rgy frorn the body w'hich ma;/ be 
centrate our attention upon interpreting poetry: "When 
we teach children to repress their emotional talk and display, 
it is not that they ma.~r 1 more--gu1te the reverse. It is 
currents are diverted from the regions below must swell the 
activity of the thought-tracts of the brain." 4 Our neural 
energy may presumably either be discharged in emotion or 
this neural energy James wants to channel.will later be shown 
he equates with emotion are its extreme manifestation in 
preparation for an emergency of some kind. Under normal 
circumstances, the body is simply alert, vaguely echoing our 
conscious attention, while we exercise a more refined emotional 
response in our conscious feelings, for example in our ex=• 
perience of poetry. We usually do not have a physical re-
action to poetry, though figures such as Housman a~d Emily 
spine. Those of us less inspired by the muse nevertheless 
cortical response which is emotional: if a poem's 
associations generally confirm our experience, we feel a 
'Benne of gratification; if they seem to hit us with new 
insights, we respond with appreciative wonderment; if we 
mu.st: briefly c.h.sagrc:e, there iB conce:cn a.nd perhaps hei9ht.,· 
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nation; if we partly agree with what we mostly reject, there 
it~ reluctant acknrnv·.ledgement; and if we feel we ju£,t don wt 
understand, t.he:re i~J impatient baff lemt.:;rrt:. A.11 of thc;'.se 
a.x.:-oused by the bodily reaction desc:ci.bed by James.* 
These feelings we have about poetry may be identified 
which nw.y also be :f:ict.ively aroused, rnof,t obviously, for 
cxa.mpler in the: v.ica:r:imrn g:r-21t:iJ:icatJ.on of .pornography .. 
Affective critics such ao Richards have been entirely con-
cernc⇒d w;i, th the primary re.sponse u bnt if our "suspension 
of verisimilitude can lead to the incipient bodily response 
described by James in this vicarious gratification. In 
pornography this response would be sexual arousal, technically 
conation rather than emotion though certainly accompanied by 
emotions. If sufficiently stimulated, this mounting inclin•= 
ation toward gratification can altogether dj_vert our attention 
from the primary reading response into a train of our own 
fa.ntasies ~ •ro a certain extent the fantasy content of lit·-~ 
eri:1.ture which might fit: the ,James=Lange theory probably 
:teinforfv,,:- op,d nvt·C""ld"'-' C)"'~ "r·i•~·11·"arv 11 "'P<'Y")t"'''l"""" = -....,. t~'l U l, ~- ~~- .<'?. ~ , .. , A ~J \.<l ;.. -• . l--.. ,,_, 1 \ . .J. -1,. ~,,. .,;J l: ,,. t -...} -...,:.. f bn t beyond tJd. ;:, 
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point it becomes a distraction. The ideal interaction, a 
hydrofoil, might be to indulge our fantasies in moderation 
as we skim over the ~0xt, high enough for an easy flight but 
also close enough to maintain our support in the more criti-
1 . . ca primary response to the text itself. This compn:nn.i r;P: 
arousal, for example the shame, guilt, and fear evoked in 
fully ma s an intellectual experience of a full range of 
t . emo ~J.on:3 brought to the threshold of incipient behavior 
proposed in the James-Lange theory. 
Of course the theory of affect has been cnnsiderably 
eighty years ago, and these modifications generally seem 
to confirm the principles of affective criticism that we 
support. The first major challenge to the James-Lange theo~y 
the "Cannon-Bard theory"), developed through the twenties 
and early thirties on the basia of considerable neurological 
investigation. Cannon proposed that the emotions are gener-
ated in the thalamus and hypothalamus, not the body, which 
he proved to be relatively slow, insensitive, and indis-
criminate in its response. He also performed lobotrnnies on 
· anirr@lB to establish that those decorticated suffered extreme 
emotions v unua . .lly to the pi tc:h of :r..:1.qe p while those~ ·whose 
th.::tL:unur, and hypotha1amrn:; wer(~ darnaqc!d became predict.ably 
Xcitahlc-' 1)11t: ~f i•-11,.=. th"1°·r•"tf'"' . .., , , ~•t ~- ,., ,,.., .. ~,_. t. . ...._.. , f~lt..,.e,.:l,lti,4;;;t "'v10, t-. 'I.ft)· ·--,·· l·•;,:, 1 ..,."l1" c:• '''("l···c, ,., 1· ; .. r,=, r;."-'-· ~·· !l..1. L \,)\,_, 1,<,.,,J-,,ot 1,./!.,~, ,11 ,... ,, er..,, l,,....., 
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damaged in the thal.:Hni.c re9ions., Apparently confirming the 
James-Lange theory in one respect, however, he found the 
cortex to serve a largely inhibitory function, restraining 
the activity of the tha.Ja.1111-rn and hypr.Jth:.:d.amus ~ 5 Cannon I s 
1927 explanation of this process may be .profitably quoted in 
full despite its heavy use of jargon: 
with conditioned processes which determine the direction 
they are roused and ready for discharge. That the 
thalamic neurones act in a special combination in a 
' t' 1 . given emo:iona_ exprossion is proved by the reaction 
patterns typical of the several affective states. These 
neurones do :not require detailed irmervntion from above 
action is a primary condition for their service to the 
body--they then discharge precipitately and intensely •••• 
When these neurones dischaxge in a pa,:rticulax combJnation r 
excite afferent paths to the cortex •••• The poculiar 
quulity of the emotion is added to ' - t . simple sensa~ion ,,vhcn 
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the thalamic processes are roused. 6 
With slight modifications Cannon diagrammed this process in 
. 
R r·c; c:r1 E)t.t1:r" { , etc,) 
'.!.'h thalamus 
B body response 
This diagram seems to differ from his earlier explanation 
in indicating an almost direct path from an external stimulus 
to the thalamus without intermediate cerebral interference, 
whereas his earlier explanation had suggested an initial 
cortical response before the c~ntripetal stimulati.on of the 
thalamus. Unfortunately, the diagram seems to repreEent 
more accurately the commonly a.cc:c1pted thalamic theory that 
the primary £:unction of the co1~tc:x i.n the cxpcricrnce of 
motion rerna.ins inh.ibi tor-y f s.i.rnply sh:i.f ting the seat of emotion.~: 
rem the body (according to the James-Lange theory) to the 
Thus a clearly compartmentalized distinction yet 
174 
seems to have be.c;m ma .. intaim~d i.n the thalnmic theory b,::!tween 
cognition, a cortical activityp and emotion, thalamic activity 
inhibited by the cortex. The categorical difference be-
tween emotion a.nd. cogn.ition assumed by ,John Crowe -Ransom in 
-Nt~i'r ~:r:i.tici:r:?-m - (1941} would seem tc, have bc,en justified by 
current neurological research. 
Cannon at least brought the source.of emotions closer 
to the cortex, and subsequent research gave the cortex a 
much more sign.if icant role in the grmrn:E,,tion -of emotions .. 
The investigations of Dussr-!r de Barto:nrt1'} and W. S ~ McCullough 
in 1939 cast doubt on the concept that cortical influence 
is entirely inhibitory since the stimulation of.neurons 
· leading from the cortex to the thalamus apparently brings 
an increase and n6f a decrease of thalamic activity. 8 Other 
~ 
exp6riments also demonstrated that afferent excitation is 
not essentia.1 to emotion, contra:cy to the James-Ltmge thc?ory, 
and that emotion without corti.cal activity is an automatic 
reflex, usually an outburst of meaningless rage, not the felt 
expc1rience of emotion. Parts of the brain outt~ide but neiu: 
the thalamu::I were also i.denti.f:ied as being involvc~d in the 
experienco of fea:r. and rage, and the success of pre-frontal 
lobotomy upon the cortex to eliminate fear and anxiety (with 
side effects of increased tactlessness and aggressiveness) 
suggested a direct involvement of cortical activity in the 
- e:xper.ienc(~ of emotion. It was co.ncluded that the normal 
~experience of emotion would seem to involve _the interrelation-
ship betwet::m the two rc1.ther than an exclusive activity of 
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one or the other. Since the mid-thirties psychologists have 
therefo::re tried. to develop a mor<o,: com.proherrnive: theory of 
emotion, though incor;0rating both the James-Lange and 
thalamic theo:t::i.esv n<~ithe:r of which may be_ entirely dis-· 
Arnold proposed that . . J. .;. d emotion oc:curs ::tn a comp .. .l.Ct;h:e 
process would begin with the activity of attention (compar-
almost simultaneously both the cortex an.d thalamus 1. with the 
cortical response initiating additional nerve impulses to the 
thalamus, which in turn relays them to the body to produce 
autonomic effects observed once again by the cortex. The 
(climinRting her schematically unnecessary distinction be-
R receptor 
SR sensory relay station 
Ev cvalua.tion 
E emotion 




fn this diagram th~ i~teraction between cortex and thalamus 
may be seen as essential,.· to emotion, probably in an in-
cessantly active circuit, while the body response relayed by 
the thalamus throu;Jh/th~ nervous system feeds back an aware-
ness of our physical ~timulat.ion when our emotions reach a · 
\ threshold of sufficient· intensity. However, the common 
process involved in the experience of emotions would be 
-cortico-thalamic interaction, and Arnold goes so far as to 
define all experience in terms of this relationship: " ••• that 
there is a psychological experience whenever there is cortico-
thalamic or th.alamo-cortical transmission of nerve impulses .. " lO 
Emotion and cognition have become different faces of the same 
process of interaction in conscious experience. Cognition 
emphasizes the cort.ex and emotion the thalamic regions, but 
neither may entirely eliminate one or the other of these 
poles, because all experien~e involves the interaction be-
tween the two. 
Since tais explanation proposed by Arnold in 1950, the 
psychological theory of emotion has advanced even further 
with new discoveries in neurology which keep unsettled the 
issue of the exact relationship between emotions and cognition. 
The lymbic system, a coordinating center linking tpe cortex 
and hypothalamus, has been found to play an important role: 
and another center, ·the reticulum, which controls waking and 
sleeping, has been discovered to control the activity level 
Of both the cortex and hypothalamus. The stimulative influence 
the reticulum would suggest once again a possible modifi-
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cation of the Jamei>:-Lange t.he.ory t that an cmtir.ely new 
· , body function. creates emotions by stimul;,lting cortical 
activity, thcugh I am told the reciprocal influence of the 
co.rtex upon the reticulum has yet to be adt:K1uately •St.,:1died. ll 
On tho other hand, exptffiment.B by Schachter and Singer :in the 
control of &drenaline supply have established that cognitive 
factors are the major determinant of th~ experience of 
emotion,, not appetites or low,u:- brain center functions. 
jy 
These experiments also indicated that few physiological 
patterns exist to differentiate our efuotional responses, 
fi~ach of which st.i.mulates a gen(-;r.ali.zed high l~vc~l of sympath~· 
etic activa.t:ton in the autonomic nervmrn syst:cm. 12 In a 
study of perception published in 1960 by Solley and Murphy, 
the close r.e1a.t.io:nehip between cogn.i tion~ .?ind emotion again 
seems to have been conf .irmed. Revi.ewin9 considerable e:-{"" 
pe:r imental evidence, Solley and Hm::phy prcipose di vi.ding 
perception into a five stage p1:cH.::ess: {l) expectancy, 
(2) attending, (3) reception, (4) trial-and-check, and 
(5) percept, with a sixth stage, autonomic and proprioceptive 
arousal, influccnce.<l by· the third and fourth stages and in 
turn i.nf lmmcing the fourth and fifth stages. They diagrammed 
this process of perception as follows: 
-~----
EXl)CC''" '1P('V' L-.::. 'f,,+··•-c.,p;-'l { n-r L....::::. ,.:;,, ... ,,•np~·; ,,·)''~ ___::, 'l'r~ "'1- e211d·· .... h"'C't ~ Y) .,,,,.,.,,r.,v.y} l;, ... t.. .. <-11«1:. •··.I 1· --/ -~-t •• L . ., .. 1-f-.~ ,.{,,, .-.\ j ----✓ J.-,.1,, ... .,."l.,_; _ ~~-~?:~'-- 1,!. ~I .~ ..... . J,Ct-,,_. ~. ,. ,,.," .__ .~J _ -;; .... t.\. '!o,.,,,"--'J·· ,..~, 
'I' I\ 
A 1:: t:c.;1": c~n1i c t) r.1<:l 
~---'~ l""'.t ., .. , t, 1-·,, ¥1' -; ,··i C n r,._ <"· { '\t (-'-"' 
~- / ,.. n• •-' ~:• .-~ .,._ 't., .... _,, '-- ,[:-' ,_. ~>., ., '•"' 
l\XOUi~i:1 l 
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Shifting the ter111s to be int.cqra.ted from emotion and cogni ti.on 
to motivation and perceptionv they p:r.opcrncd that motivation 
is an essential ingredient of all these stages. Without the 
energizing force of motivation, they claimed, the act of 
perception cannot occur: 
Motivation raises ox~ lowers the level of consciousness 
with which perceptual ~cts are carried· out; it functions 
to guid6 the selectivity that wa observe in perception; 
it serves both a facilitative and an inhibitory function. 
In short. 9 motivatJ.on does govern t.he direction. and strengt,h 
of perceptual actsi indeed, w:i.thout motivation effects it 
is doubtful that we would perceive at a11.13 
current theories in psychology thus seem abundant in confirm-
ing our view thnt cognition and emotion a~e organically 
connected while the relatively crude incipient physical 
response often identified with emotion is a side effect 
which influences our conscious experience only when a certain 
threshold of intenGity has been reached~ Though this physical 
response may be controlled, minimized, or even possibly 
eliminated, the dynamics of cortico-thalamic interaction 
(conceding both to be stimulated by the reticulum) puts 
t . d . . . . 1, ' t' emo ~-1.on an cogni t.1.on 1.11 an 1nsepara >.i.c f :,,.ntcrpenet;:I:a ~.1.ng 
relat.:i.onsh.:i.p.14 
Research in experimental psychology would thus indicate 
validity of Gerard's proposal in the eighteenth century 
Dewey's in the twentieth that our perception and under-
ing of literature are dictated by emotion, or, if the 
word 11 dictated 11 seems too strong, let us say suffused and 
directed by emotion. At both levels we suggested earlier, 
the "primary" act of attention and the subsequent mixture of 
catharsis and fantasies triggered by this act, emotion seems 
an important if not predominant factor. 
Trends in the psychoanalytic theory of emotion have 
been roughly parallel to those of.experimental psychology, 
though differences between the two ,fields are tantalizing 
for those who try to reach an acceptable synthesis. On 
one hand, the psychoanalytic model of personality dynamics 
has little similarity to brain processes traced by neuro~-
ogists. The libido may be tentatively identified somehow 
as involving the activity of the hypothalamus, reticulum, 
and other lower brain centers, and the conscious and un-
conscious may be located in the cortex in some pattern of 
interaction among neural shortcuts,-as William James briefly 
proposed in Chapter Six of Principles of Psychology. But 
this contorted application of Freudian theory is at best 
tenuous and probably useless in experimental psychology, 
certainly in the study of neurology. On the other hand, 
psychoanalysis successfully explores patterns of behavior 
that presently cannot be explained in. terms of either 
neurology or experimental psychology. Their labored con-
clusions tdo often seem the initial assumptions of poycho-
analysi~bey9nd which it leads us to clearly significant 
insights in the.dynamics of personality. In the theory of 
(or emotion), these differences between the two 
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co:r-tico=th At the beginning 
psychic energy discharged to attain gra~ification and causing 
a side effect in our fee]ing of emot Ironically, p2r-
t cortico-thalamic theory for our 
sm because language could be 
"By pt·ovid.i.ng an opportunity f:o:r- the: 
to aischa~ge itself in wnrds the ther 
power the idea which was not 
Such a simple r~inciple of catharsis 
much to our gratification as critics, but Freud 1 s early 
theory was soon drastically modified because it confu~ed 
affect with drives, our emotions with our appetites. In 
Ql . .<', • f I • I ,.> 1l .. .: r:, '-'19· r P"' ,._ 1-, _,.,,, 'c1v.,, -~ ,-· ·• f'' , .. (") -"'""•fl... ""'" .,~,.!~ t .. ii,;..... .l .l.1-tc~ill.,\..\.,-• t, ,, t.he 11 eco:nornic 11 point of 
He Dr0or)~Pi ~•,~&- (~••r f••nrl~n1~-1~~ 1 1·~y~1 :~ h11P~gy {~ ~~:.,..0 t: '4..,x· ,, ,:),>4-.,. t,,,_ .• ,f1,,(-A.L ,.tH ... . -.,\-~.J,t..,;,{.fi,~>{,;-~ l,.,(.,,.t ..),,s;:. ,, ... ). .l!i.c, rt·.,.,, ... ,.JI.,., .J).,.'),,~ \, .. ,\,;\,)~ f\,",.,'. 
_directly 1:e:ica.sed thro,J.<Jh mot i li.ty ( the active, ~·ff: ort toi:i'<'-l:Cd 
gr ... t· . "" . . ' <-, .1.i:tc:atJ.on; or i ndi:r:cct ly :r,:.,dnccd th:r.nu9h dr :Lve :r e1:,ent·· 
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ion in language, and (2) in an affect charge of the motor 
or secretory functions. He thus treated ideas and affects 
were seen as externalizing cathcxes, structure! seeking 
exprcssio11 in an indirect, sublimated pattern of gratification, 
while af fee ts were seen as interna1.i,d.n9 proct:~ss•~s of 
discharge experienced in the body which~ lacking structure, 
held by Freud as late as 1915, when he published his import-· 
ant article, 11 'l'he Unccmscious, II bore the ~;ame impl:tcat.:.ions 
del<~terious to aff ectiVt":: er i tic ism as the J ames-Lan9e the 
tJ1.i11a.mic theories did. If idea and affect. can be pola.rized 
into ~::xac:tly oppor;ite dri.ve representations, the on<c~ a process 
involving the body and the otlHl:r a structure i:nvolvinq the 
mind, then the New Critical distinction between affective 
cu1d e:ogrli.ti ve approaches to cri ticisrn would seem valid, a. 
major premise of formalist (or contextualist) approaches. 
The separability of affect and cognition in the dynamics of 
pexsona.l:i ty would justify their compartmentalizai.:ion in the 
field of criticism. To our insistence that both must be 
involved in a comprehensive theory of literature, the pro-
ponents of 11 cQgnitive 11 criticism might reply with a measure 
of justification that Freudian theory itself suggests they 
and they (the proponents) prefer to do this, 
dealing exclusively with perceived structures and letting the 
vaguer and less clearly discriminated process of affect auto-
matically take care of itself. 
However, with the publication of The E~o ~ the Id in 
1923 and Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety in 1926, Freud 
shifted to a new'perspective more in agreement with the 
cortico-thalamic theory in combining affect with cognition. 
He proposed that the affect-charge becomes structuralized 
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. 
in the personality as an "ego function" which may be used to 
signal an attitude without affect discharge~actually taking 
place. This patterning occurs in .affect-discharge channels 
for the release of emotion, innate to begin with, which 
proliferate and become st:r:ucturalized as part of the person-
ali ty. In this proce.ss the existence of a "super-affect" has 
been proposed which once formed would be continuously present 
as a structuralized affective state, a character trait, or, 
in the words· of Rapaport, a "comple_x quasi-;st,able substructure 
of the personality. 11 17 Rapaport himself tries to combine 
these thr~e stages of Freudian theory of affect into an 
acceptable synthesis. He defines affects as safety-vdlve 
drive representations which at first use inborn channels 
and thresholds of discharge much in accordance with the 
I . 
James-Lange theory of· ,affect. The?, in the development of 
personality, he proposed that "the damming up of drives by 
defenses makes for more intensive and more varied use of the 
// 
affect discharge.cbanne'is ••• ," resulting in the increased 
importance of subtle affect discharge-channels and a compar-
able deemphasis of "massive affect attacks" in the overt 
expression of emotion. As a result, he proposes, "a con-
of.affects extends in all shadings from massive affect 
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'I'his 
comprehensive explanation by Rapaport seemn harmonious 
transrnj r.rnion of :nei'il<;:S .impulses. 'I'he child r:10:re easily fits 
the James-Lange theory in his frequent outburst of emotion, 
but with the structuralization of the mature Ego in countless 
subtle discharge-channels, affect would ~e moderated to be-
come a .sustained influence upon tho personed .. it.y in i t~1 
interaction with its environment, either in a normal or 
pathological pattern of response. 
~i'htn, expcr irnental pr;;ycho1ogy nnd psych.:)c\.nalyru..s seem to 
bring us by different routes to the same conclusion. Affect 
(or emotion, loosely its pattern of behavior) is a function 
even our most abstract reflections. It guides our choice of 
cannot be el~ninated or successfully compartmentalized, for 
this likewise evoke feelings, however subdued and restrained 
by our purpose. Likewise, affect cannot and should not be 
eliminated from the experience of reading literature, e1ther 
in our "primary ret1pons:e 11 or. vicarious gro.tifi.caticm. 
Whether we like it or not, our experience of literature 
e.moticma:1~·-·to deny th:i.s is hypo er. i ti cal" to ad voe ah~ its 
cessation iB to ask the i1npossi.ble, to make it ,3. 11 f allac-y" 
absurd. Our task is not to deny affect, but to encourage 
the most satisfactory affective response to literature, 
fully cultivating our attention in synaesthesis, as I.A. 
Richards proposed~ but also exploring our emotional involve~ 
ment, nnr f rrntasieg as a corn.1"ili trnent to t.hie adventures of 
identification. .. 
Footnotes, Chapter Five · 
l.,.11' - · --····,i· ~•> ·•1- • :i .;,~ ·.:. ·• ,~, f ~:)_sycl'ol
0
oc1v (189'. VCL. .1.am LI o.n( . .:, t" ~..25:~ l r ,,., ,,(.,.1. p .cc..,, 0 : ;;_ • ::J "J_ • l .l .. } p 
743. 
2william James, p. 752. 
3The best introduction to behaviqr t~erapy_and ~ts 
successful treatment of neuroses is by Joieph Wolpe, The 
Practice of Bch-a.vio:e 'fherap:y_ (1969). 
4william James, p. 754. 
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-5For the layman it is almost essential to rely upon the 
summary of Cannon' r::: e:?:tensive investigfati.ons. Those I have 
found most useful (and c:ivai.lahlG) for my purposes a.re, 
"Emotion as Vi.sc:ern l Action: .An ex:tensitm of La::1..gc' z 'l'l.'H:::ory, 11 
by M.A. W,;:~.w1er nnd II An Exci t.ato:ry Theory of Emotion r II by 
• 
Magda B. Arnold, both includc<'l. in Feeli~1g~ .. z .. nd Emotions, 
edited by Martin L. Reymcrt (New York, 1950), a collection 
of articl.es making frequent references to Cannon's theory. 
For developments in the theory of affect since Cannon, the 
article, 11 Affectp A.'i,.Janmess, and Performance, 11 by Carroll 
Izzard et aL, includ<::;d in Affect, ~09-ni.tion, and Personality, 
edited by Sylvan Tomkins and ca;:·1:oll Izzard (New York, J..965), 
is qui.t.e useful. 
6Reymert 6 pp. 12-13; quo·U.:!d by Arnold from 11 '1'he Jam(;:!s-
Lang<::l ThcO:t::l' of Emotion, 11 ~· l1. Psx:_choL 39 (1927), Pe 120. 
7 Reyrnert, p. 13; fr.om II l\g;.dn the ,James .. -Lan.g.e and the 
'l'halamic Theor.ies of Emotion, 11 !:._E_>.-'chol. !3~·, 3R (1931), p. 282. 
8Reymert, pp. 17-·lB; cited by Arnold from ,J. N12u1·c1rl_1:~i{)l_., 
0.938), p. 69,. 
9Reymert, p. 19. 
lOReymert, pp.·30-31. 
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111 am informed of this by Angus McDon~ld, a psychologist 
and personal friend. 
12s. Schachter and J.E. Singer, "Cognitive, Social and 
Physiological Determinants of Emotional State." Psychol. Rev. 
6 9 ( 19 6 2 ) , pp • 3 7 9- 3 9 9 • 
13charles M. Solley and Gardner Murphy, Development of 
the Perceptual World (New York, 1960), p. 52. 
14other theoriris apparently bearing out the same con-
clusion, by Eliz.abeth Duffy, D.C. McClelland, and S.S. Tomkins, 
are surveyed in "Affect, Awareness, and Performance," by 
Carroll Izzard et. al., op. ,cit. 
15The best account of this evoluti~n is by David Rapaport, 
"On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects," in Psychoanalytic 
Psychiatry and Psychology, Clinical and Theoretical Papers, 
Austen Riggs Center, Vol I (New Yor~; 1954), pp. 274-310--
hereafter cited as Rapaport. Also useful are Rapaport's two 
books, Emotions and Memory (New York, 19·12) and Organization 
~ Patholog¥ of Thought (New York, 1951), in passim., as well 
,as Otto Fenichel's The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis 
(New York, 1945), again in passim. 
l6cited by Rapaport,.p. 278; from "On the Psychical 
Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena." Collected Paners 1:24-41 
(London, 1946) • 
17Rap~port, pp. 30o-jo1. 
~8Rapaport, pp. 304-305. 
"Lingu tics, Sty st ~, and 
ruggested that emotion i.s a body Yl() ·t-.:L ()!l 
refined, use of language, thus a morle of experience easily 
affect in liter~ture, but ncrn ½e have a n8w task, to prove it~ 
pos by Saussure, a repository of words and grammatical 
Nevertheless, our 
words and even syntax while speaking, the parole fined by 
Sau~sure, necessitates first recognizing words and syntactic 
ch,>it'.'' ,.r ... ,·,r,1 .,,,, ... ·,.,.,c 
•... '\..~ ,_. ,J,.., \,.,_.,. (~.J.!t~.,,-b-,•, ,J In this complex act both cognition 
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formalist equations and theor 
this fundamental certainty. 




compiled and puhlishc:d by f,,ome of his · strn1ents af tl':!r his 
formalist in sbparating language from p~rsonality ahd emotion, 
but he made a numhcr of linguistic distinctions subsequently 
fields, primarily anthropology in the structuralism of 
is mostly ignored to concentrate upon n ~tructural des-, 
cription of phenomena relatively impervious to time, for 
A denial of history is implied, apparently a reactionary 
opposition to theories of social progress, particularly 
Marxism, though Levi-Strauss hi.mself has maintained that he 
does not wish to deny the progressive theory of history 0 but 
to supplement it with a comparable theory of pre-historic 
At any rate, this distinction between 
synchrony and diachrony has also been applied in the int~r-
pretation of literature, in the search for static forms to 
the exclusion of dynamic process either within the text itself 
or its II transaction,-:i 1 u :re 1(1.U.orwhip with the reader:. Prob·" 
the interpretation of Baudelaire 0 s ~ Chats by Jakobson 
and Levi-Strauss and its extension by Michael Riffaterre 
integrating linguistic and poetic structures.3 Riffaterre 
claims that our previously cited paradigm of information 
theory must be d):'asticallyreduced tQ the message and the 
addressee, a reduction which actually seems further limited 
to "message--decoding" without the final "hearer." He . 
, 
concedes that the purpose.of the message is to draw a re-
sponse from the hearer, but insists that this response be 
a comprehension of linguistic structure devoid of content, 
,,.// ' 
either in idea or, we may presume, affect. His critical 
position is technically affective since he is concerned 
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with response, but in the sense of poetic structures being 
auplicated or s.tereotyped by our minds i-n their exact pattern. 
Mind-shape duplicates poem-shape, while cognition and affect 
are eliminited from consid~ration as choice-making activities. 
Diachrony, in this case the growth of our response, the · 
accretion of emotion, ideas, and language, is altogether 
denied. 
Saussure's distinction between ''signifier" and "signified" 
(more or less word and its referent) also has formal im-
plications and curiously appeals to our conservat_ivc in-
clinations. The relationship between the two, defined 
miathematically as a.n axis, is described as "arbitrary" and 
by implication autocratic so "the masses have no voice in 
tne matter~" Instead a "contract" exists between the two 
'Which is a "heritage of the preceding period," implying the 
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• ·1 b' t· - - - i 1 receiveQ ar 1~rary syrn0O.s. The "prime conservative force" 
in this historic contract shows the "impossibility of 
r,2vol uti.on, 11 he claims, a prospt~ct likc:wi:;:;,e .:u:sua.qing our 
f 1:'?:ar of poli.tic;:,J.. uphea.v,11 in these troubled times~ 4 J:'or a 
few pages Saussure thus rosorted to political metaphors 
- which mi.9ht be v,:'tlid strictly appl_ii;.,?d tq langna~re u though 
one cannot help noticing .:-:i peculia:r. conr.wn;;u1cc be.tween his 
rejection of process in linguistics and the conservatism 
implied in his metaphor's vehicle, a rejection cif process in 
history toward ba.rb;irous domocratic vi~ita.s. Agrd.n we scc-rn 
to be brought ba.ck t.o the erstv.rhi.1c virtlH:;S of t::::ynehrony, 
the preservation of existing strrn::'!trn-:er;;, the most demon-
affecti.Vf? cr:i..t.ici.sm, however, a fund,<trnental mod:tf.icnt:ion .1_s 
required to accept this dichotomy bet·ween "signific?.r" a.nd 
"signified" in the total "sign sit.ua.ti.one 11 Saussure pro-
posed simply that the "signi.f:i.ed" is wha.tever object might be 
arbitrarily indicated by a word, for example with eqnos 
representing a horEH:!, the picture of which was actually 
included in his text. He repeatedly suggested a.n. expl:i .. c:it, 
fixed relationship between the,two, bridging an.enormous 
gap be.tween objf:ict.ivt~ immediacy and the language act:, as if 
words naturally consist of signs representing discrete 
-Lockean things a.nd events~ 'l'he inter.n,edia.te stages i.n our 
consc"'C)t1C: ~n 1-·pg..-,"'1-i(·1n r,f C'"-'1)"""•1',:.rnr•,CI c:e---e·•Pl 4·.c', }'!c"ff"' bcPn f>"!im-· .,,6.... _,,.,..  .... f._,,.,.~ • .lu ia.f ,,,,.~J-- ., .._,,1 ,4(\, ... _.t,. __ ,Cl,, '\-,t~ L. ,\ \t, I. .\ \: --...,, _.. ....-, • ,-.,, •·· ,., 
inat.ed from this radic.a.lly attenuat.rJd expl.an.:.'i.tion of the 
sign event. In Elements of Semiology, Roland Barthes, a 
modern proponent of Saussurean lingl:\istics, assures us 
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that Saussure did not intend the "signified" to be a thing 
but its mental representation, an important distinction. It 
is possible to find thi's meaning in Saussure, but he did 
not adequately clarify this point, and neither he nor Barthes 
seems to have been much concerned with the intermediate 
stages of conscious experience. Barthes proposes that Saussure 
meant the objective horse to be particularly depicted by 
its mental representation, which in turn is particularly 
and arbitrarily represented by the word horse or equos, so 
its mental experience is in effect an intermediate stereo-
type linking the horse with its name without adding or sub-
tracting·any further connections of meaning. We would argue 
that experience is virtually eliminated from language. in 
this theory, and what we have left is reduced to two homologous 
planes parallel to each other, one of content, the signified 
objective world, and the other of expression, language as 
the signifier of· this objective world. Language-wielding 
homo sapienssimply transposes pattern from one plane to the 
other. 
For Barthes and other radical formalists influenced by 
Saussure, literature understandably becomes the "classical" 
assortment of meaningful counterparts between these two 
~lanes, language and reality. However, in the context of 
\ 
affective criticism we must particularly reject this entire 
conception of language because of.the vital importance of 
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"to lunguager cc~tainJy in our early stages 
of childhood but even to a 
Saussure's exJmple brings us 
h . . t t .1eJ.S- f)()l.n : r0pres0nt2tional 
fcrwartl, a silent, 
• 
with profound, unspok2n ropport, 
between signifier and Dignified advocated by Saussure, or 
word I r:; meanin9' and atomistic, but like a 
penumbra, an nrca of undefined, recollected experience. 
Often, as Santayana proposed, it has enough clustered super-
a fa:i.rly 
ation, for 0xamp1c J n our conception of a. ho:rr;e. Yet, th.Lr; 
directly in our lives 
the! 1,or:d 
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upon our conception of horse. It is a radical abstraction 
lock our minds into a one-to-one equation, a pseudo-Platonic 
abstraction, for example the drawi.ng of a-horse used by 
Instead, while reading we must dynamically sort . 
through these associations, a tangle of ~ordc and impress-
ions, and the more venturesome our effort, the more worth-
while we make literature. 
Barthes tries to explain this 
expe:ri.ence as "connotad;ion" strictly in term:c; oE 1:1.ngu:\.r,tic 
signifiors, but his theory seems entirely inadequate. He 
of connotation by including a signifying system with a new 
a.d in.fin:i.tu.rn ,, Non-verbal experu~nce thus may be explained 
in terms through the inc~usion of all 
possible asnociations of 
l •1 ~ .,r~ l <"'(1-i-• -i ~ 5 symDO .. J..G X LT.h~ .• ·-on •. ,. This ingenious theory suggests 
Richards' proposal in The PhilosoDhy of Rhetoric, that all --- _____ I;_~ __ 
thought is metaphoric, involving comparisons of one sort 
or another; but Richards did not reduce this concept to a 
11 . d :1 a.i.. . expc:r:tence re uceei, 
as in Ramist logic, to an infinite regression of binary 
'l'he II loort(:IH::ss II of his proposal r:ccms to have 
(,:xper.i.encc 
ingredient of the language act which helps to interrelate 
r,tords, and o.f eounm i.s i tsc1f shaped ,.md directed by the 
probess of experience, any proposed hierarchy of s~gnifying 
systems sei;Ims mostly a matt,:it.' of forma.liat. ingemd..t.y,. 
The last of Saussure's dichdtomies which concern us . :tr; 
t.he ent.ii:·e system o.f language i:\.nd its particular combi.n-
ations when we speak or write. Lanaue ia a s_vstem, a ...,. ... ' .l 
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synchronic pattern of ~peech habits we share in order to 
communicate with each other f while f::~E.£1:!:. ir.; the diachronons 
act of choosing particular combinations from this system in 
different as system and process and mus~ be studied separ-
ately. Again, his distinction is useful but misleading. It 
seems to be supported by recent investigations of structural 
and transfor:rn<1tiona1 litVJJJistics O but both schoo1~3 have 
un.o,ba.shcdly restricted their discovery procedure's to the 
investigation of synchronic patterns i.n !~_ucf prt,cis-=.ily 
accounting for thi~d.r limitath'm in explaining th~: actual-
processes of speech. Immediate con.sti tuenbJ sought by 
structuralists and the generation of sentences by transform-
ationalists have practically nothing to do with our actunl 
formation of sentences while talking, and their results rnny 
he e>~pected t.o reflect the lirn:i ts of their methods.. In 
'11 
A gJ~ammar docs not tell us. how to synthcr..izr~ a spec:i.f:ic 
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given utterance. In fact, these two ta s which the speaker 
the same, and arc 
both outside the [according to gen-
emphasis of linc::Jnistics upon Ianquc f the syr,tem of lanquaqe 
._.._,_,.. .... ~· ...,,,....,,,..,... .. .. 
irrespective of its use, has led quite r0turally to the 
vast internali%ed system which entirely dominates our 
thought. All we can do, i+ seems, is pick and choose tram 
its E,t:nwture,~ u a quaJ.i.f ied voli tiona1 choice amon:g non~" 
vol:iticm.a.1 pat.tern::,, with the b::1.lance of authority lying- in 
itself, rather than our feelings and 
motives in the selection we make. 
Quite the contra~y, we insist, the act of speaking or 
writing is an entirely different sort of behavior. While 
eng·aged in this act we almost sirnul tfU\emrn: ly pr.ojcict mean~· 
in•;J f orwa.rd in t.irne, find words to particularize this mean-· 
ing, and syntactic patterns to connect these words among 
themselves and with our present context of thought. Linguists 
acknowl.edge a linear dimension of language, but what they 
1) . . J. r' . , r US\U:L ... y have .1n rn:u:tc;. :u:; a sequence S(:.>en o.,.)Ject.1.. VG.! y .(:rom an 
seen on a page or a voice filling the dimension of time 
understood spatially. It would seem more useful to describe 
this forward projection of meaning by imagining ourselves 
d.irnension, perhDpr, throu~rh 
a tunnel or over a ·highway towar.d·a vanishing point on the 
horizon. Like scenery along a Nebraska road, impressions to 
be expressed in words but a good deal ahead seem vague though 
upcoming. As we approach, particular words materialize 
like barns and houses, while possibilities for syntactic, 
arrangement almost simultaneously materialize to connect 
them among themselves and in relationship to our present 
context. Then,once our words have been syntactically com-
bined, in effect locked in the act of expression, they and 
their combination remain in our memory to help project 
connections toward new words and meanings. It is a swift, 
unmeasurable process, yet its sequence generally seems to 
progress from feelings and pre-verbal ideas to particular 
words, especially substantives, then verbs, modifers, and 
finally most of the form class words (prepositions, con-
junctions, etc.). Substantives and verbs seem to carry the 
burden of meaning,·while syntax, a mortar b;i.nd~ng them, is 
effected through the function of pronouns, form class words, 
etc., and of c6urse_the position among words. 
The. overwhelming importance of substantives and verbs 
may be seen in poetry, where John Ciardi has suggested the 
healthy ratio of noun~ and verbs to adjectives and adverbs 
to be approximately two to one. Form class.words are even 
fewer and carry little meaning except to connect other words. 
In Frost's stanza, for examplev the sequence of form class words 
alone seems entirely cryptic (his a to if there the the of 
and) while the sequence of substantives carries a great 
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deal of the meaning (lie harness bells shake mistake sound 
sound's sweep wind flake) and virtu ly completed with tho 
addition of adjectives and adverbs (He gives harness bells 
shake a.E.;k some r:tista.ke only other sound u r, s'iveep (':)nt,y w1.nd 
downy fl2rJ::.1::!). Even Lf the sequence :is ffd..xcd i.t wcn .. d.d still 
words .cd.one or combined ·with jabberwocky ( 11 kee dabs his 
harbob dums a glake/ To ung if there ot mungs piflake./ 
'l'hE.1 arly itheir ba.g 1 d the.~ gleep/ Of icrgly <:;lind and. bowzy 
plake."). Thus syntax would seem not dominant but subordin~tc 
coherence to the rest 
Even with regard to syntnx alone, though, smaller 
syntactic units, for example the prepositiortal phruse and 
adverb clausef apparently take precedence over the unity 
of the entire sentence~ Local synta.ctic conr1ections seem 
to ha.V•.':} immed:La.te pi.iori ty, while total unity if:; accomplished 
without more interference than necessary. This unpopular 
m1pposition amon9 mo~:;t linguists bears important irrtplica.t··· 
ions in literature. As Christensen has demonstrated in 
the equational limitations of the nubject-predicate re-
of 
of appositives and· pa.rent.betical .i.nc.lus:ions v:i thin the 
sentence. The accumulation of these modifiers forces us to 
pay more attention to local syntactic connections rather 
than total r,entence unity., This local emph::isis seems a 
syntax, particularly the artificial Subject-predicate 
' 
equation which is binary. Moreover, as £.S. Lewis has 
(1942), the syntax of a poet such as Milton matters little 
compared to the roiling ,:ind expanding · sequence: of: words. 
Milton's involuted, Latinate sentence pattern justifies 
this sequence in a conventionally acceptable syntactic 
stitute the poetry, which lies more in the progressive 
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sequence of words with impinging auras of expericnce.9 This 
i.s precisely the "interanimat.ion" of. w·ords in p:roximi ty with 
each other which interested Richards in both Coleridge nn 
the Imagination and The Philosophv of Rhetoric~ 
-- ----· ... 1...... ......_ ....... ------
It must be emphasized that we cannot entirely deny the 
Whorfian hypothesis regarding the influence of syntax upon 
t.hinki.ng, for example in the logical bias of the subject-
predicate relationship, but we suggest that the choi¢e of 
words more significantly influences our thinking than does 
their syntactic arrangement, largely a by-product of this 
choice, and that the primary relationship for both is with 
tho experience evoked. In a passage often conveniently 
overlooked r \vhorf hi.msel f has conccdod thf? pri.m:i ty of non·~ 
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verbal conscious processes to language: "My own studii:s 
suggest, to me, that language, for all its kingly role, is in 
somo sense a supcx:f i.cia.l cnnbrcidory upon deeper -procf,•sses of 
consciot.H'.,i.,sss, which are necessary befo.re any communication. g 
signaling, or symbolism whatsoever can occur ••• 1110 These 
"d,~eper. procEH:"lfH1s 11 · involve our experiential gr.asp of "obj1:~ct-. 
our choice of words and their syntactic arrangement. There 
seems to be an interlocking stage at which words and ex-
perience arc· tct:.ted and confirmed wit.h regard to each other 
with a certain degree of parity and often even the domin-
ance of languager but anterior non-verbal dynamics of con-
ulated phylogenetically in the evolution of eie human 
species aR a language-wielding animal, ontogenetically in 
the infant's acquired capacity to use and understand language, 
and, we insist, i.n t"he ordinary process of choit:e among 
words whenever we speak or write as mature adults. The 
words arise (or erupt) in consciousness to describe and 
specify our experience, not vice versa, any high school 
teacher knows about st~dent compositions. If a student com-· 
pensates for ignorance by relying upon language or jargon 
alone, his prose is awkward or vapid and repetitious, but 
if he 11 knows 11 what he is writing about: for example an 
.incident .i.n his own life, then h:L!~ l~:1.ngua.~Je f lcn,,s, hi.a £:,k.1. ll 
as a stylist demonstrably improves. Likewise, EzrR Pound 
ha.~3 repeat,edly insisted thc,.t a poet mi.mt have a fund of 
actual experience to write about, and language nlone does 
not fill this bill. 
M·r 0• .,,n·,.,..,f· · .. "" 11 " ·~th ~4 ---~1 4 tr J t o c. ..,.r.A2-.; ..... :u..,,,.i. ,, . ., v ·: , : . .. , .. egt:t-'. u. ,.:.o .:.1c .an.guage a.c -
in our wonder about snowfnll, we do not necessarily begin 
with the intention to use the synaesthetic word "sweep" 
and hold it in abeyance until_exactly_the right context. 
Beginning with feelings and impressionsu we gradually un-
wind ourselves in la:ngtw.ge until the word "svmep" bodies 
forth into our immediate cluster of experience shaped and 
articula.ted by lD,:ngu.a,ge., beccnn{;-:S "locked,, as a word i.nt.o 
syntax, and is finally uttered. The lag or diRcrepancy ln 
time between first reaching the threshold of consciousness 
such a lag seems essential, especially for poets, who mist 
loiHi with meaning thei words they fina:U.y choose, The 
200 
longer a particular word remains suspended at the threshold 
of speechr the more weight in meaning it probably accumulates 
in conscious associations and syntactic possibilities, that 
is to say, the more it would seem to gain in relevance to 
the poet's total experi~ncc. Vice versa, the more words 
and combinations a poet may ~1a.ther and hold for ripening in 
this cluster at the threshold of speechr the more adequate 
Will be the context of his expression. A facile talent 
narrows this discrepancy, quickeni.ng the turnover of gathered 
Words, but profundity would usually oblige its expansion. 
The reader has exactly the same task in revcrse--he must 
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"rewind" the fc;yntax and vocabulary in a comparably de-· 
liberate fa,shion to asser.a; most fulJy the meaning cind ft!()li.n.gs 
The best defense I have found of syntax as the dom-
i:i:uuwc~) is FU)man Jakobson' s important distinct.i.on bi:1tween 
metaphori~ and metonymic style~.11 Jakobson claims there 
are two basic typi?:s of aphasia, "<::ontiguity disorder," in 
which words are loosely associated without being syntact-
~ 11 •r "'0 .:.,•·!· · rl d II c~: • 1 · ~ • "· ·•1· ·1 "" d -::i.·~• 11 · .; •- -~ }·, c:• " 1· '"' .,, • ... ca "1' c nnc ........ e .. , an ·"·1-.mJ. ... d.l. :t 1..y , ... 1 •• ,or. c~ ... n w,u.c . -~:t TL .. ,,.,,,_ 
suggest a polari .. ty between two radically diffe:nmt kinds of 
style t the mttt.aphoric ;:,,nd rnetonymic, wi t.J1 cc)rn.parable difL~r.-· 
ences in experience and literary genre~ Metaphoric style 
and thinking is supposedly subs ti tutivr~" involving Eia.sy 
accessibility of particular words and (as Richards proposed) 
a deemphasis of syntax, most clearly observable➔ in poetry. 
As Eastman suggested, it would disrupt the continuity of 
syntax to arrest our attention upon the manifold implications 
of particulm: words. In contrast, metonymic style would be 
predicative, progressing· syntactically from subject to 
predicate, from modifiers to "hea.d words.-" or vice vc.irsat 
from "head words" to rnodifiersr creating the soquence of 
language characteristic of prose. Metaphoric style would 
directly and expa.nsively connc.:c::t the 11 vehicler" what.ever 
Word is used, with its 11 tenor, 11 the conger.ten of rn0an.ing 
represented; while met.onymic .style would minimize this 
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may be syntactically connected. No 
be exclusively devoted to one or the other of 
since both the lexical and syntactic functions are ob-
viously essen aI to language, hut a writer's style may be 
e;-,rp1:1cted to 
ultra-metaphoric and the late style of James ultra-motonymiG. 
Likewiset the current linguis c conce~n with l ··~---'"~···~•-· 
its syntactic manifest0tion in particular sentences might 
be considered a metonymi.c approach, while the concern we 
metaphoric. The beauty of this distinction, 
t both functions of language proposed by 
on may as bcin.g dyn ;;1.nd af tive 
.;;llf app:1rently not do this), suggesting 
to express ourselves. Also, 
to a certain extent, Jakobson 1 s metonymic pole recalls 
style, that any word, event, or figure of speech implies 
those which follow, so that narrative is a. mode bf synecdochic 
overlay, each part elaborating the meaning of those which 
prec<c~de it arid requiring comparable elvboration from tl1ose 
Which f61low, a regressive pattern analogically suggested, 
. 1 1 ' conica_ paper cups _ying 
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b;:i.si.s fox.· cornpar·ing s.t.y lc~s 
~. '"1 
rne::t.c)r).yrni. c.; t!.o/:t .r'·(:rne: s <i' ~-t ~:, The 
simultaneity of tenor and vehicle (or simply word and re-
f e:tent} w11i 
sequentially connecting associations, that is, in emphasizing 
the sentential context of n word as its true referent rather 
than its meaning, or, more , its verbal rather than 
its mental context. 
Actually, all of these polarities seem to boil down 
without too mu~h simplification to an orthodox linguistic 
distinction between the lexical and syntactic d SJ,C)llG Of 
language. The metaphoric sty 
synecdochic and pred 
progrerrn f orvJ ' t ' .1:-n · :1rnr?:- or across the page. 'I'hc:'. prcb lem 
construed to imply ,::. self·-suffic:tent fo:nnal combination of 
syntax and figuration exclusive of conscious processes 
anterior to the forrna.tion of ,,10:r:ds and sentence,;. A fine 
example of th.is forrnali:,,t 1:-easonin9 may be found in another 
article by Jakobson, "LinguL:;Lics and Pord:ics, 11 .in \-':hich: he• 
proposes :rep.resent.1119 verbal comrnunica.tion with a complex 








I·Ie~ cl~~•n~ ~1·1~~ ·~~tll{n t·1,{~ p~-~d 4 a- p~o•r•5 ~oct•~~as ~p ~he . (.le:~,,. i;;; - a, ... n.~ d,., ... L.A.i.;) "'1-. ..t,..,_j. ,4..:;,AU I...J",J'f.. • .,~ .. ...-•. ,x J... -~Ni~~ •~_-:.a l., . ... 
cont€!::t;t, etc. 8 though aJso proposing a threefold division 
of gf:.nrer,. based upon the conjugation of verbs that would 
see:m to intc~grate one other component of tht,! paradigm for 
(1) the epic in the third pe:ri:;on i.nvoI·vet3 the 
referential function; (2) moral poetry in the second person 
is linked with the .. emot.1ve p ,. '. :r.unccion. 
situation" of po;;~tzy thris becornf!S multi·-·dirnr::~nsiona.1, but 
defined. as firnch by grammatical categories. He also propo:rn~ 
a quadrant to represent the two modes of arrangement in 
verbal behavior, selection and cornbinat:i.onf respectively 
the.1 metaphoric and metonymic poles described .:1bove ~ 'fhe 
vertical. a;,.;;is ir,, of selection, rep:ter.,en ted by metaphor, while 
the horizontal axis of combination, represc.mted by rnc?tonymy o 
'I'he "poee:'d.c function," he cJ.a:i.ms, "projects the principle 
of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of 
B::t this he mee.ns the choice of words accord-~ 
ing to cquivnlcnce of meaning on the axis of selection 
(ew.10::;. x·cpresent:i.ng tl'w horse we sec) is duplicated on the 
........ ~-




and sound pattern. In other words, sounds and rhythms 
duplicate each other in poetry just as the signifier 
duplicates the signified on the axis of selection in other 
modes of verbal expression. The usual pattern of variation 
on the axis of combination (different words following each 
other) is thus intertially balanced by a pattern of repetition, 
' the principle of which is borrowed from the axis of select-
ion. Varieti and repetition successfully interact on· the 
axis of combination alone, enabling the total elimination 
of meaning and feeling, the cognitive and affective functions 
of poetry. 
In comparable fashion Eugenio Donato, a protege of 
I,,evi-Strauss, has sum."Uz.rized Lac an to the ef feet· that 
"metaphor is the substitution of one signifier for another, 
' . . 
whereas metonymy is the displacement of 011:e signifier by 
another." This appar,ently harmless formula suggests that 
,,./ 
/ 
each signifier, the vehicle for another in metaphor or 
.. 
metonymy, must itself be the tenor for a new signifier in 
another mode of figuration, ad infinitum. 14 As Barthes 
uses a regressive sequence of planes of expression to 
represent connotation (ref. p. 48), Donato quotes Lacan in 
proposing~ simil~r pattern of regressio~ which ~ffectively 
elimin~tes the signified except as another signifier. Each 
signifier represents a signified, but in turn each signified 
is itself a signifier representing another signified, again 
ad infinitum. This pattern of ::regression in signification 
would suggest linguistic solipsism excep~ that Donato extends 
c,f to 
proposed t)y noL::ind na:cth,;;-:~~ in E h,~mr:.nt:::: c,f {;crrd oJoqy. ·-· - .._.,,._,.~,. ~· -~ 'fhe 
reduce psychoanalytic theory to figurative and linguistic 
claims t is "the rn~:\pping of the domain of tlie si':Jnificr 
c.pon i.t:sclf; '' eliminating the si9uif :Led. and wit.h it the 
. f . organic processes o consciousness •rhe 
human being becomes a congeries of symbolic functions, a 
repository of mathematical terms: "The structuralist 
subject is empty, uninh~bited by consciousness, emotion, 
affectivity, and so forth. It is only a term within a 
general set of functions which in fact constitutes him as 
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subject and these functions take precedence over the elements 
they articulate. 1115 
Sau:scnrc • :;. di.chotrnny of si.9ni.fier: and sign.if ied is 
thus used a.~; J'.'"wdi.ca.l al).,,;tract.ion f o.r inter.:telating symbols 
tc ~-1·1 , .... ·,1 ,,,.; ··,· .r ,·, .... , .•. -, ,• · •, \., .-o c ..... c. U.:., ... \,n o.,. 1u1<.1s:i., . .(,.y :u1.g of consciousness. 
Jakobson's theory of aphasin likewise excludes conscious 
dmnain of f ig1rca.tion (};.::.radoxi.cally, a.s Richards f .Lr st 
I,~---or>o .. ••'•"""'" , l)y· m-,J·· ·1.· ng. 1· ;,-. t' ;,';.,;, .. ,o·· ;,>· .; t "·(•] ·11: ~ met ;':l""l"'o-\ ..,;.:,.. "" ~- ~ .,_ ,ftC/2 ~~ ... , r:~;;:_~ ·,._c:.a.1~ILA A. ..l .. -~ ;:. ,,,,, c~ -, ,.t,· ..... j:_ .. •· .o\ L J it, Both 
approaches to language encourage formalist extravagance, 
the search for linguistic self-sufficiency in literature 
·• 
independent of expc~riencc-;! • 16 If the cm1,nections between 
language and consciotume:1::a may be treated as being non-
existent, or a new and slightly different pattern of sig-
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nification, then literature has been conveniently extricated 
from the confusion and uncertainty of affective criticism. 
The "empty subject" i:::: not. humanly addressed by :U terat:ur:·e; 
has no "trans2ctional" relationship with it, but applies 
himself dispassionately to i tr.;. formal int.-/:r.1.,:reb1t.:i. on. His 
• 1 • emot1onflL respcnBe is inconsequential--form and languag3 
alone would be of the essence. 
We must of course deny this position, even in its 
_moderate guise.· Syntax and words involve conscious pro-
cesses that transcend any proposed one-for-one equation in 
s.ign funct.ionsi a.nd though figurative explanations might 
be useful to help clarify these processes, they must be 
treated as paradigmatic analogies dangerous to the extent 
that they lead to the misunderstandings summari.zed above: 
As we amply demonstrated in our explication of the Prost 
st,.u1~:a, every word involves complex feelings and a.sso<.~intiorrn 
that constitute a total possible meaning both 6xpnnded nnd 
somewhat defined by th,:! word' n contL\Xt. Both the explicit 
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d.enota.tive reference {if er,tfrely ponuible:) and itr: pennwbr,1 
of connotations are essential ingredients for the genu 
same nsvrly meaningless vnlue as a foreign word we c~n 
barely trAnslate. 
Richards insisted, this penumbra is ~co inclusive and 
results which both g~neratcs and def 
different fashion. There are rela vely few syntactic 
functions ccnnpured to our resources iri vocabulary, ana 
these few are constantly applied in the tion cf every 
~ 
sentence we usec As R result, synt~x becomes second nature, 
Like other habits, it 
serves consciousness without often penetrating it while we 
concentrate our effort upon the use of words. Nevertheless, 
both to remcmbc~ and arrunge the words we use. It also 
possesses magnificent flexibility in its subject-predicate 
equation as well as its patterns of modification. Adjectives 
of course modify nounsp adverbs verbs, etc., much ris we 
learned in school, but words anJ their nITTdificrs also fotm 
groupa which in turn act as modifiers, for exan~le the 
predicate of: a snntencc I which may be und<:.:rr,tood to rnodify 
the totuJ subject~ h bi.Ji.omi.Il divi~d.o:n may be found ,1t every 
level of combination in a sentence to link each word or 
group of words with its most direct modifier, usually 
adjacent, also a word or group of words. As a result, we 
may construct a pyr(l.mid of binomial relationships to in-
dicate the full extent of modification in a sentence. The 
clearest paradigm of this process would probably be Eugene 
Nida's tree diagram of immediate constituents which rests 
this pyramid on its apex: 17 
The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back. 
Each horizontal line indicates a binomial unit, and its 
arrow shows the direction of modification, usually forward. 
Nida uses an "X" at the bottom horizontal line to indicate 
the equation betwe~n subject and predicate, but for our 
, 
purposes it may be replaced with an arrow to indicate that 
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the predicate modifies the subject in the sense of ex-
tending and clarifying itsl1eaning. This binomial division 
into immediate. constituent may also be turned. on its 
pyramid base.in order .to i lustrate the generative rules of 
transformational iinguistics. Each so-called "kernal 
sentence" in this approach is constructed (or "derived"} 
\ 
:no 
with step-by-step binomial exp~nsions bcgizining with the 
in which one supposedly modifies the o 
They interact with each other evcn if 
ng to particularize 
particulari7ed it g 
partly predmninate over successive words simply because 
their effects are felt first, 
stantive. E2ch suggests a quali.ty (quickness and the col.or 
brown) which merges with our more general image of a foxr 
also a quality but with enough tangibility to give it the 
ph~nse progresses is of the act of quickness seeking its' 
actor, the color of brown seeking its bearer, and the fox 
f . 1 1 ' ·1 . ' 1 l . J..n,L .y part:i.cu. 21r:x.z.u,s; arw. )C.U\V p2rticul.arized by these 
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If these words were kept separate, each would bear random 
sluggishly isoli:i.tr;:1d as:mciations u but their syntactic Xf'.-
lat.ionship ri.?:infor.ces their sequent.i.a l interan.in1.::It.i on to 
bring them to an eidetic thresholdo Without much diffi.cu.1ty 
we can visualize a fox in nature, perhaps a field, abruptly 
·• 
com:i.ng i.nt.o sight:, pausing lor:.g eno.ugh to be clearly stc::e:n i 
and then jus.t as quickly d.isz.:..ppearing in ·a nfiw d.irr.Jct:i.on r 
have once seen a fox in such a moment, but the three words 
prc>pe:r.Jy combined provide this c~ffect much mere readily, r1nd 
of cou:r~e a sentence, stv.n:,:;;a o:c ent.irc) poem by a. competent 
~ . t . wri:er can give us a.n infinitely more convincing 
It was stated earlier that a poet usually tries to 
minimize the arbitrary limitations of syntax by concentrating 
upo.n fnc:c~-float.ing word comb:i .. nations such at.: appositives 
and sentence modifiers, smallerv less assertive, and les& 
syntactically demanding than the simple sentence, which 
emphasizes tht'.':! abstract equation beb:ecn subject a.nd pred-
, ica.te. We must now slightly mcxli.fy thi~: vie·w,, Syntax 
obviously cannot be:~ eliminated short of free association 
as almost any two words adjacent to each other in literature 
(and not separated by terminal punc:tua.t:lon) may be shown to 
have a. syn tact:t.c re J a t.ionship, however dh.d::a.n t ,, What I 
would propose is simply that poets rcauce the importance of 
syntax by concentrating upon local relationships among 
21: 
adjacent words rather than constructions emphasizing the 
re: :Lp ,i:rn.ong •;,,:or:dF r3epat'atcd by other 
ions and often, paradoxically, by complica ng the sentence 
with an accurrrulation of these constructions to obfuscate 
and deemphasize its subject-predicate relationship. As a 
among adjacent w t: 
In poetry as simple as the Frost stanza we have 
freedom is also effected by rh~ne 
diffusing the logical in ta. of the sentence structure. 
sequence as U1cy rise to consc 
local relatedness rather than abstract syntactic connections. 
anim~tion of experience among words, both adjace11t and 
syntactically connected, as co~nunicntcd by the poet to s 
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experience and bring us to ll1c threshold of eidetic ful-
fillment he wants us to shar0 and understand. This is the 
mes~~ge, the ultim~te :~ofundity of poetry. 
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Postscript. to Cl~apter Seven: Chon1sky' s Review of B .F. Skinner 
B.F. Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (1957), reputedly 
the first systematic effort in behaviorist psychology to 
provide a functional analysis of language, is too concerned 
with the rudimentary conditioned response to be particularly 
relevant to our task of explaining the process of writing 
and speaking, especially in poetry. Likew?,se, cfomsky's 
1959 review of ~kinner's bbok (inclu~ed in The dtructure of 
Language, edited by-Fodor and Katz, 1964, p~54\:2_7-~), a 
closely reasoned reply,now more influential than the book 
itself, seems largely.irr6levant to our tas~though most of 
its arguments .are -probably valid. In the J ast two sections 
of his review, how.ever,·Chomsky briefly proposes his own 
~ 
theory of verbal be~avior which significantly conflicts with 
\ our own. With all due respect to Chomsky's contribution to 
the field of linguistics, we must heartily take exception 
~ith these pariicular views. 
In the first.place he assails as a "very implausible 
speculation 11 B.F. Skinner's proposal, similar to our own., 
I 
that ~e generally choo~e nouns, verbs,- and adjectives first 
in our formation of sentences, and then arrange them by 
"autoclitic resp9nses, 11 that is to say, through the use of 
function words to connect them in syntax. Chomsky proposes 
instead that we might actually recall function words first, 
as would be indicated by the fapt that we usually pause before 
nouns and ve.rbs if at all,' suggesting greater uncertainty in 
their choice (p. 547). But this common experience need not 
. I 
2.15 
point. Wo pause before nouns 
the expression of our ideas a we cannot go on wi.thout 
function t:; (of 
arranged to fit in among other nouns, verbs, 
and adj 
function s thus enable us to con 
more referen al (and eruot ) concern in our utterance. 
Experience seems to corroborate this. If nouns, v0rbs, 
and adJectJves quickly and easily flow into consciousness, 
words grope around fruitless in search for their just-
ification. We do not claim that the ci1oice of nouns and 
on a.n adverb or even a p.i:eposition { "Net cm.ly J.3 he :t.:n 
here the abstract lexical meaning of tho function word 
is particularly emphasized. In general, however, a loose 
hie:i.: archy seems t:.o extend fro1n subc,tant:ives to verb;;~ 
adJectives, adverbs, and then the non-adverbial function 
point with the remat'k, "It is evident that rno:ce 1.r; invoJ:vcd 
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in sentence structure than tion of lexical items in 
l fr~mcs," clearly a criticism di at 
theory of Skinner. Our view is that Chomsky's accusation 
1.ikew seems to put the cart before the horse. ~he slat 
and filler approach he appropr tely criticizes is no less 
correct in this sense than his own ins1stence that the 
sentence first establishes itse in our minds and then we 
choose and interre the word:,, ing to its pattern. 
No such process occurs! We often begin sentences with no 
idea how they will turn out. We are confident only that 
the sut,jcct w:i .. 11 ing us to an appropriate predicate, which 
in turn enables us to use pert sentence modifiers, etc., 
fulfilling local syntactic necessities to 
justify the use of words we want to express. In this sense, 
or r;upc~rimpos upon the ideas we want to express. but a 
dynamic pattern in forward progress perhaps best suggested 
by Kenneth Burke's analogy with synecdoche mentioned above. 
• 1c. . • 1 f it 01;Jccc1vc ~ .ram a separate 
fulfilled in _space. In our progress forwurd each word chosen 
for its meaning must be syntacti.cally justified in the context 
of previous words already thus justif , i)nd in t:u:cn it 
lar mo<lificatidns in the 
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choice of subsequept words. These auxiliary modifications 
which facilitate the passage of language on the axis of 
combination proposed by Jakobson (ref. p. 204) may be defined 
as syntax. Each word has a range or what we might propose 
·to be a "lexicon" of sy\actic /obligations" 
pectations. arouse¢! by previou1f words, mostly 
to the ex-
within the 
sentence (though pronouns would be an obvious exception) 
and usually within the· last three or four words. Each word 
I 
also has a range of syntactic "influence" in the expect-
ations it itself triggers, also mostly within the sentence 
and usually not more than three or four words in advance. 
For example in the sentence "The quick brown fox jumped 
over the lazy dog's back," the word brown has a syntactic 
~ 
obligation to the to be a modifier which may follow it 
preceding the substantive it introduces, and also perhaps 
an obligation to quick to be one more adjective using up 
the supply acce'ptable in English before ge.tting on to the 
substantive. Its relatively minor syntactic influence, 
then, would be in reinforcing the expectations earlier 
triggered by both the and quick fo~ the impending use of· 
a substantive. These obligations and influences occur, 
of course·, in the forward progress of the sentence; in 
our conscious initial formation of the phrase, however, 
there is retrogressive movement as well. The word fox 
probably occurs first; next it is immediately contracted 
and promised with the determiner the, after which we are 
' ' ' -
at leisure to inse~t adjectives which correctly modify it. 
Once the backwards and forwards progress this noun 
shift to the verb 
t instantaneous progressive-
through small. clu ters th 
:ftxlf i 1 li.1.1.~J c influence to intensify and clarify the 
symbolic express Chomsky perhaps suggests 
ss, really tho pa_. __ defined by Saussure, 
he does not deve 
opt.ion 
; 
0 of current options 
and in turn it would create nc11 options as we move along 
that those options of a word, really its syntact funet1.on, 
.1 ()C:t-t t:i.()11) generally 
seconaary to its lexical meaning except in function words. 
properly reside in the word itself, net the sentence, its 
. "' 1 . 1~ c~s ._,_,.ex 1. cJ<..111 options, its inflnence and obligations 
duced when enough word3 arc co~)incd with consonant sets 
phenomenon held unaccountab by Chomsky (p. 577). The 
child does not lc~rn complex sentence patterns, but this 
lexicon of optiona for words as well as their full meaning 
pejorative description of "racntal tic" linguistic~, but 
it seems empiricnlly more accu~ato in a~scr~bing what 
act1.wlly h2:,ppcnr,: 1:;hf:n we spE\,'lk, and it brin9s the emphar:;ir:: 
with affect, which concerns us the most. 
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Footnotes, Chnpter Six 
1T ... )Ir1ki ,.,,,. '"'Tl~) 1"•'.')ei •·r.,,:, ~--J·r:, c•nv,!-,•,,-r-·i pt-v l· ·,.s!--, J(".\A"J.f"l _ ~- '\.,.,..t."-1,:,. 'li..~i• ·l; .i.~l.\\t.. 1lyt/'.~1,,. 1..., \.,~ .} ,_ ,,.,,,,1,11. 4,.,.,,,. ~--, ... ,. ·••• "---.i .Jl;, l .. ;-\"...,~ .. ,t. ;:1.f fect 
h abit--,·. 1.'n h.i.s monl?mt.~ntal fp __ ,,,r_ ,,.,-."1,.,·nc, .,,,-, ... ,l,· 'i\•f"f'---,r,"--w - \, • ~r.A.1'..!\.I. e \.J''t.;r..!l .. l't; ./,11~ . ..Lt ....... t:1 
2Cl "'l" :i-,.t.-... it.l..f~.4 
pp. 336·<-l? ,, 
71..-,.-•-1---...-•)pi- 'l ,, ... ,,. .h.,.cl .. ,.LL~- _..)AU~;; .,_ ... ··- ___ ...,_ (New 
PP~ 67 t 71-74 ~ 
5°''1'}C·' C~ 'l -f' CD -.•or,r•.r> J. - =--· ,I.., .• .,,_,,, ..... ~- •=•>, nG temporal 
jrnr-1ort,,1.nt 
by Lessing, the definitive exploration of this difference, 
La Pont..=dne, the Abbe Du Bos, a.nd Edmmd Burke re.trn.rk-ed 
upon the ne·cess.i ty of making this distinction. A uscd:u1 
brief account of their views may be found in Wimsatt and 
Brooks, op. cit., pp. 268-70. 
6 r>o•-- J a-- ·•--l'" H '.l.l' t·J;r.,·• A\. -· b ~ .,._ ~- ~ ... . 5'f..~~ .. , f Elements of Semiolcqy 
~" .. ,_,,.,.,_._,,,,,,,.,11, .... ---~- _____ , ......,,"..-~- ( ,gr,,·.~, .l..., '· 'k; New Yorkr 
.J ... ,. . ..,rc• lqc.:•71 •)n 09 C)() l .. -A.o,.f.ti. ... ,~ ."r\'l Ir J . .1:"°' ,,:,:. -- .. •·"' 
7Nornn Chc•nYodty, f:ynt;J.ctic ~~trnct:.1.ires (rt'he Ha~ru.e, 1067}, 
..,.,._,., ..... ,.~ ...... ~.--............... ,, -... ~___.,,..,, ___ _ 
p • .-n. 
Sn~ ,·1·• '"'J'i:! c: #,'\.,.S-'-.- .,(~,{. •.. - effectively used Jabberwocky 
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of Secondary Epic,. " 
hereafter cited as Jakobson. 
-
·.1_0,_',•.•; . . ,.:_ J ___ n,_.c,, i_·-:,~.£.(r, ... ~.:.• "}f· .,.,·, ·l t ... ~, r ,•··1 ,,,. ',? Pnr,'" t 11 "' -t-,,-,-,-., -· -·• ~~- -•"1~--~- ~ ·...., .•... ,.;,,,•••••·>-~ --~,:. •.. 11 •'- .-.~.t..;<:: \ ,.-..,l,t,_,.._-14.:, 
1967); for his theory 
analogy with the arpegg , p. 75. 
1417 •1~~~1,)• n0~~~0. "O~ ._.~ ~--:,t .. J.1..A."' l\_ .. ,_...,.J._,.._x t-.,. p ... ,h, 
after cited as Donato. This article 1s an extremely useful 
sympathetic account of . l . . . 1.rnp .. J.ca t:1.ons :i.n 
ur~l1st theory. The best unsymp~thotic account of formalism 
that I have found remains Chapter V ("The Formalist School 
C,f: n,) "}t v•v rl •·ic1 '·1 ··, rv -j c,m" \ 0 f._· I_,J· .. ~.-.e_,~_ ,·1_ ❖•. 1.11··.·.· P. :-.;.,,·,_,',·1 fl,(,-::·'- 1,f(' ___ , .1. '•'. ~--.-.)·.:....•','..1 __._l~-·~ • h_'r' ,., ..:,,.-;__ ... ,,.r ,:.., •• LC/ .............. , J •. \ .. , , . ~ vt," • ,.ti ___ .- -•~ 
J, J { ·1 0 ? A ) .. • 1 . l, ' 1 - 1, t J th . ' Leon ~eroi:.r-;:y,, .. u,.•'" 1.n 'i11:lC!l Irotsi:y ·oo\, · e yonng cr.1.t1.c 
Ruc;.::i:m Formn.LL:~,m, ('I'he Haguc 1 1:l65) by Victor .Erlich, a 
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for formal sel sufficiency in literature 
Roland Barthes, whose eclcc c forTualism is treated at 
length .. 1\ppend r.· 
0};:1.:t. ,.1960}. 
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